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INTRODUCTION.
The following study was submitted in 1909 as a thesis in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctor's degree
of the Graduate School of the University of Illinois. Since that
date the "University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences"
have been established as a medium of publication for mono-
graphs prepared by members of the faculty or graduate stu-
dents, and it seemed desirable that Dr. Brownson's History of
the Illinois Central to 1870 should be included in this series.
The study was originally planned on a more ambitious scale
as a complete history of this important railroad system, and
the choice now presented itself of asking the author to carry
out his first intention or of printing the thesis as it was sub-
mitted. The latter alternative was preferred as the history of
the first twenty years covered fully the early development of
the charter lines and was of sufficient interest and value to
justify publication without further delay. When the work was
edited for publication, however, it was found necessary to omit
some of the matter included in the thesis as originally submitted
and also to make some textual changes, both of which have
been approved by the author. Among the items omitted may
be mentioned an elaborate series of traffic charts prepared in
connection with chapter V, of financial charts and tables
for chapter VI, David A. Neal's Report on Traffic, and the
correspondence of Breese and Douglas relative to the claims
made by each for the credit of the land grant. These may all
be found in the original thesis, which is on file in the University
Library.
It is believed that the monograph as printed contains a
substantial contribution not merely to the history of a par-
ticular railroad system, but also to the economic history of the
country. Called into existence to meet the exigent demand
of the growing population of the interior sections of the state
for adequate transportation to market their surplus products,
the Illinois Central Railroad was built in 1850, after several
failures, to connect the rich agricultural region of central Illi-
nois with the historic, and as it seemed the natural, market in
the lower Mississippi valley. But the industrial development
of Europe and of the states on the north Atlantic seaboard
created a demand for agricultural products which diverted the
traffic of the road from the lower South and directed it to
Chicago and the East, a movement which was emphasized but
not occasioned by the Civil War. How well the road met these
changing demands and how it developed during these early and
trying years of its history are here clearly told by Dr. Brownson.
Acknowledgments may properly be made to the officials of
the Illinois Central Railroad for cooperation with the author
in the preparation of this monograph, especially to Mr. Stuyve-
sant Fish, then president of the road, for the loan of original
material and for personal assistance, and to Mr. L. C. Fritch;
to the libraries mentioned in the bibliography for the use of
their facilities and for various courtesies; and finally to Pro-
fessor E. B. Dewsnup of the University of Illinois for his advice
and assistance in the writing of the thesis.
E. L. BOGART.
University of Illinois
December 1, 1915.
CHAPTER I.
ILLINOIS IN 1850.
It has been said that a history of the Illinois Central Rail-
road is a history of Illinois. The project for a railroad through
the center of Illinois was one of the first propositions for internal
improvement in the West. Its construction between 1851 and
1857 opened up to settlers the rich interior counties of the state ;
and, when completed, it connected these agricultural counties
with the remainder of the country, and made Illinois an essen-
tial part of the economic system of the United States.
The building of the Illinois Central Railroad and its subse-
quent growth was the natural result of economic and social
conditions in the Middle-West which made necessary such a sys-
tem of internal transportation. A glance at the map shows that,
while Illinois is practically encircled by natural waterways, the
interior of the state, which is by far the most fertile, portion, is
without natural means of transportation. 1 Such counties as
Coles, McLean, Macon, and Champaign were, before the intro-
duction of the railroad, almost entirely isolated.
In the early history of Illinois, various attempts had been
made to provide a comprehensive system of internal transporta-
tion, but the results were of slight importance. The most
successful of such undertakings was the Illinois and Michigan
Canal from Chicago to La Salle. It was commenced about 1820,
tut financial difficulties prevented its completion until 1848.
The canal was the most fortunate of all the enterprises started
by the state, and for a number of years it was of great value.
Nevertheless it served only a limited area ; its capacity prevented
the use of large and economical canal boats ; frequent breaks in
the masonry or at the locks made navigation difficult even dur-
ing the summer months; and, finally, ice rendered the canal
useless during the winter season.2
1The territory tributary to parts of the Kankakee and Illinois rivers
is an exception, but the size of this territory is comparatively small.
^Chicago Daily Democrat, 1849-1851 ; references in Davidson and
Stuve, A Complete History of Illinois, under Illinois-Michigan Canal ; cf.
Moses, Illinois Historical and Statistical, references in index to Illinois-
Michigan Canal.
9
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The Legislature, as well as private citizens, had made many
efforts to supplement the Canal with a system of railroads. As
early as 1837, the General Assembly had planned an extensive
system of internal improvements, and, without accurate surveys
or estimates, ten million dollars were appropriated to build
twelve hundred miles of railroad, deepen the rivers of the state,
and provide numerous turnpikes. Millions were borrowed, and
expended with a lavish hand, but mismanagement, corruption,
and the exhaustion of public credit at a time when all financial
undertakings were paralyzed by the panic of 1837, brought the
state to the verge of bankruptcy. A few surveys, a hundred
miles of half completed railway embankment, and one poorly
constructed railroad, utterly useless for traffic, were the results
of this chimerical experiment.
3
Private construction of railroads was somewhat more suc-
cessful. In the center of the state, the old Springfield and Mere-
dosia Railroad, from Springfield to Jacksonville, constructed by
the state in 1837, had been entirely rebuilt by private parties,
under the name of the Springfield and Sangamon. In the north,
the Galena and Chicago Union project had been revived, and
the railroad extended to a point about twenty miles west of
Chicago.
4 These lines at their best gave service of but one
freight and one passenger train a day, and the few thousand
tons of wheat and merchandise carried by them was a .mere
bagatelle, compared with the enormous quantities of freight
transported from the neighboring counties a few years later.
Schedule time was slow, and actual time was even slower. Rates
were too high and service too poor to satisfy the necessities of
even the adjoining territory.5
Aside from the few rivers, the lakes, the canal, and the two
short railroads, local transportation did not exist. Words are
lacking to describe properly the wretched condition of Illinois
highways in 1850. There were a few old corduroy roads and
three or four government turnpikes, but they were short and ill-
kept. Elsewhere former Indian trails or newly made section
roads were the only semblances of highways that existed. In
summer these roads were little better than the surrounding
prairies, often worse ; in winter they were mere mud holes. For-
8Newton, Early Illinois Railway Legislation, Chap. iv. Mr. Newton
gives a bibliography on the subject, which may be used for further read-
ing. Cf. Moses, Illinois Historical and Statistical, references in index to
Internal Improvement Act.
4Newton, Railway Legislation in Illinois, 1828 to 1870, pp. 29 ff.
slbid.; cf. Chicago Daily Democrat, 1849, 1850.
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tunate, indeed, was the traveller who was not compelled to help
pry the coach out of the deep mud or wait until morning for a
yoke of oxen to pull him out of some worse than ordinary
slough. Mails were often delayed, and, during the winter storms
and spring rains, farm houses, and even large towns were com-
pletely isolated. Moreover, the state had shown itself utterly
unable to remedy these evils. The statute books were filled with
enactments declaring certain trails or mud roads public turn-
pikes, but even a sovereign state cannot legislate a mud hole
into a turnpike. Charters, almost without number, were
granted to private corporations, but without tangible results of
any importance.6 Local enterprise was equally fruitless, and
the efforts of the counties to improve the public roads had gen-
erally failed.
The absence of good transportation facilities greatly
retarded the economic development of central Illinois. The cost
of carrying freight over ordinary country roads or even on well-
built highways, under the most favorable circumstances, is very
great.
7 On such roads as existed in Illinois in 1850 the expense
of moving heavy freight for any distance was practically pro-
hibitive, and ten to twenty miles was as far as grain or other
bulky goods could be hauled with any degree of profit. As
nearly all the products of the interior counties of Illinois con-
sisted of articles of small value compared with their bulk, an
extensive network of railroads, or canals, was necessary to the
proper economic development of the state. Instead of such a
system of internal transportation, Illinois had less than a hun-
dred and fifty miles of railroads and canals, and all portions of
the state more than ten to twenty miles back from the railroads,
the canal, the lake, and the rivers were practically isolated. A
farmer living in the interior of the state could carry only a
small part of his crop of wheat or corn to market to be
exchanged for "store goods", and the total amount of grain
received at Chicago, St. Louis, Peoria, and other centers which
came from the central counties was insignificant.
The interior counties of Illinois, as stated above, were the
most fertile parts of the state, and their isolation had a retarding
influence on the economic development of the commonwealth.
^Session Laws of Illinois, 1837-1850.
*The cost of carrying a ton of freight from Buffalo to New York was
$100 by wagon, or about 2oc per ton per mile. (Bogart, Economic His-
tory of the United States, p. 191). This was over good roads and the
cost per ton per mile for carrying grain in Illinois must have averaged
considerably more.
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The earliest settlements in Illinois were made by the French at
Cahokia and Kaskaskia near the Mississippi River, and until the
end of the third decade nearly all subsequent settlements were
also near the banks of the Ohio, the Mississippi, and Illinois
rivers, and especially in the southern counties. At that time the
majority of the population were immigrants or descendants of
immigrants from Kentucky, Tennessee, and other parts of the
South.8 Then from 1830 to 1850 there occurred a heavy immi-
gration into the northern and central counties, but most of
these new settlers were from the eastern states or Europe.9 By
1850 Illinois had a population of eight hundred and fifty thou-
sand, and three fourths of the inhabitants were living north of
Vandalia and were of northern or European stock.10 Further-
more, despite the absence of good transportation, three hun-
dred and seventy five thousand people were in the thirty six
counties which possessed neither a canal, a river nor a railroad,
and the number living more than ten miles from such means
of communication must have been considerably larger.11 But
this population was only a fraction of what could be supported
in the same counties when railroads and good turnpikes were
introduced.
As the great bulk of the population in 1850 was engaged
in agriculture, the inadequate system for transportation of farm
products had a depressing influence on that occupation which in
turn affected all other industries of the commonwealth. Farmers
living near the waterways and railroads found good markets
for their produce, but those not so favorably situated shipped
little grain or meat outside the state. Only slight cultivation
of the rich prairie soil was necessary to produce abundant crops,
and the immediate needs of the farmer and his family were easily
8Sixth Census (1840) ; Greene, Government of Illinois, p. 26; cf.
various addresses of Mr. C. W. Alvord, of the University of Illinois, on
this subject in publications of the Illinois State Historical Library.
9Eighth Census (1860).
"Seventh Census (1850), pp. 117, 118. The thirty counties south of
Vandalia had a population of 219,863; the sixty-nine counties north of
Vandalia had 631,607. The foreign born population was as follows:
England, 18,628 ; Scotland, 4,661 ; Wales, 572 ; Ireland, 27,786 ; British
America, 10,699 ; Germany, 38,446 ; total, 1 10,593. Native born of foreign
parentage, not given.
L1
/fcirf. The thirty-six counties not crossed by the Illinois-Michigan
Canal, the Galena and Chicago Union and Springfield and Sangamon
railroads, and the Illinois, Ohio, and Mississippi rivers, had a population
of 375o-29 in 1850, or 44.1 9 of the total population.
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supplied. Labor saving farm machinery was not in general
use, and the work of gathering the crops had to be performed
by hand; farm labor was scarce and commanded high wages.
As a result, there was little incentive to raise large crops, while
the large amount of physical work involved made it impossible
for the farmer to plant or gather more than a moderate yield.
Shiftless methods of farming were the natural consequence and
only a small portion of the arable land was under cultivation.
Out of a total area of thirty five million acres, slightly over
three million were planted in the five staples, wheat, corn, oats,
rye, and potatoes.12 One third of the entire area, or eleven and
a half million acres, was still unoccupied government land,
13
and much of the remainder had never been broken by the
plough.
14
. The yield per acre was much less than could be
expected from the almost virgin soil of the prairies.15 Cultiva-
tion of fruit and vegetables was neglected, and three quarters
of a million dollars would be an ample estimate of the value of
all the orchard and market crops of the state.16 The production
of the three leading grains, wheat, corn, and oats, was, of
course, large, but corn and oats constituted eighty-eight per
cent of the yield of these three crops, as against twelve per cent
for wheat. However, they were so bulky compared with their
value at market that the entire production of both corn and
oats was of little importance, except for use on the farm.
17 In
general, prices were high, but the excessive cost of transporta-
tion and the great expense of gathering the crops, resulting
from poor methods of farming, gave the farmer only a meagre
profit.
18
Perhaps the most profitable form of agriculture at that
time was the raising of live stock, especially swine. Through
stock trains and refrigerator cars did not exist, and all meat
had to be salted or pickled on or near the farm. This seriously
restricted the raising of cattle and sheep, but did not affect the
pork business, which enjoyed a period of prosperity seldom
12Letter of Rantoul, Documents Relating to the Organization of thr
Illinois Central Railroad.
13
Ibid.; Seventh Census (1850), p. 730.
"Seventh Census (1850), p. 730.
"Compendium U. S. Census, 1850, p. 170. Average yield in bushels
per acre was : wheat, 1 1 ; rye, 14 ; corn, 33 ; oats, 29 ; barley, 40.
"IbH.
17The cost of hauling a bushel of wheat was no greater than the cost
of hauling a bushel of corn, and yet the price of the former averaged
about three times that of the latter.
18Cf. Chap. v.
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equalled. Over two million swine were on the various farms
and something like a million were slaughtered each year. 19 A
large part of the corn crop was used for feeding cattle or hogs,
and was thus sent to the market on "the hoof".20
"Mining was affected by lack of cheap transportation to an
even greater extent than agriculture. In 1850 coal was mined
in all parts of the state, especially in the Danville, La Salle,
Springfield, and Du Quoin districts. The mines at Danville,
Du Quoin, and Springfield had been in operation for a com-
paratively short time and were of only local importance.21 The
La Salle field, being located on the Illinois and Michigan Canal,
I and thus possessing comparatively good transportation facilities,
was the most important district in the state. However, it was
liandicapped by the high cost of mining, which was about one
dollar per ton more than in the Ohio mines. This prevented it
from supplying the Chicago market to any considerable extent.22
The Belleville mines were the oldest in the state, and produced
nearly one half the coal mined in Illinois. Their proximity to
St. Louis made the mines of this district very profitable.23 For
some reason lead-mining was of less importance in 1850 than it
had been fifteen or twenty years earlier. The Galena district
was the only part of the state where any considerable amount of
lead was mined, and even there the yield was on the decrease.24
Thus, both coal and lead-mining were of comparatively little im-
portance, and less than a thousand miners were employed in the
entire state in 1850. 25
Illinois was primarily an agricultural state at the close of
the fifth decade of the 19th century and a very small proportion
of the population was engaged in other pursuits. Slightly over
3100 different establishments existed in the state, varying in
size from a small village tannery or carpenter shop employing
two or three men to large plants such as the McCormick Reaper
Company at Chicago. 26 Altogether, the industries of the state
"Compendium U. S. Census, 1850, p. 170.
20Cf. Chap. v.
21
J. W. Foster, Report on Mineral Lands on the Illinois Central Rail-
road.
22Ibid.
2
*Ibid.; Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads, p. 17.
24Wm. Spensley, The Mines of Jo Daviess County; Seventh Census
(1850), p. 115.
28
J. W. Foster, Report on Mineral Resources on the Illinois Central
Railroad; Seventh Census (1850), p. 115. Cf. Chap. v.
26Seventh Census (1850), p. 115.
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had a capital of six and a half million dollars, employed a force
of twelve thousand hands, and produced products valued at
seventeen and a quarter millions. 21 Packing, flouring mills, dis-
tilleries, breweries, iron and steel works, woolen mills, agricultural
implement works, ship building plants, tanneries, and brick works
were the leading industries.
28 Outside of the cities industrial
conditions were backward, but not as primitive as many writers
indicate. The log cabin and homespun were regarded as evi-
dences of lack of progress, and settlers, even on the isolated
farms of the interior, were supplied with many of the luxuries of
civilized life.
The lack of internal transportation, with the accompanying
isolation of the interior counties of the state, the backward agri-
cultural conditions, and the unimportance of mining and manu-
facturing were an effective check on the trade between Illinois
and the eastern and southern states. In the period before the
Civil war there were three principal markets for the surplus
products of the Northwest, (1) the North Atlantic seaboard,
(2) the lower Mississippi valley, and (3) western Europe. In
1850 there was good connection between Chicago or St. Louis
and these markets. The Great Lakes and the Erie Canal afforded
western grain the cheapest means of inland transportation in
the country. The Mississippi River likewise offered cheap
transportation to the population along its banks. The introduc-
tion of the steamboat on both the Great Lakes and the rivers
permitted extensive reductions in the cost of carrying such
bulky goods as grain and lumber. Consequently, farm products
could be sent east or south over the waterways at reasonable
charges after they had been brought to a lake or river port.
However, as already noted, the lack of roads, canals, and
railroads prevented the movement of grain and pork from the
central counties of Illinois to either the lake or the Mississippi
River. Only the counties directly on the banks of the water-
ways could take advantage of the low charges from Chicago or
St. Louis to New York or New Orleans. In other words, the
great agricultural resources of Illinois were unavailable. Illi-
nois wheat, corn, oats, and live stock were shipped east or south
in comparatively slight quantities. Although the state ranked
first among all the states of the Union in the yield of grain,
New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Missouri, Kentucky
"Seventh Census (1850), p. 115; cf. Chap. v.
28For a much more detailed description of the trade routes from
Illinois east and south, cf. Chap. v.
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and Tennessee each supplied a larger portion of the southern,
eastern or European demand than did Illinois. Out of a total
production of seventy-seven million bushels of the three staples,
oats, corn and wheat, less than three million bushels were for-
warded from Chicago and the amount sent from Ohio or Missis-
sippi river towns was not much larger.29 If we compare the
production and shipments of grain in 1850 and 1880, for in-
stance, the difference shows among other things the effects of
poor transportation on the state. Against seven or eight million
bushels shipped east and south in 1850 twenty times as much was
moved in the later year.
With conditions as they were in the middle of the nineteenth
century, the most important need of Illinois was some system of
transportation which would connect the fertile interior counties
with the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River. The develop-
ment of a large portion of the state depended upon the con-
struction of such means of communication. Many schemes came
before the people, but the one that had the greatest possibilities
and which appealed most strongly to the imagination of the
citizens of the state was a central railroad from Galena to
Cairo.30
29Chicago Daily Democrat, January 23, 1850; Seventh Census (1850).
30The most important references used in this and subsequent chapters
are found in the footnotes at the bottom of each page. At the end of
Chapter vu a critical bibliography of all authorities made use of in this
monograph will be found. Many of the topics treated in Chapter i are
discussed at greater length in Chapter v, and cross references are given.
CHAPTER II.
.
THE LAND GRANT AND CHARTER.
A great central highway connecting the northern and
southern counties of Illinois had always been a favorite project
with the legislatures and executives of the state. As early as
1830 Governor Coles suggested that "Lake Michigan . . .
might easily be tapped and the water taken by canals not only
into the Illinois, but on the dividing line between that river and
the Wabash down through the center of the state." 1 Only two
years later, Lieutenant Governor A. M. Jenkins proposed in the
Senate that a survey be made for a central railroad from Cairo
to Peru,
2
and, though somewhat premature, the proposal cre-
ated considerable discussion, both in and out of the legislature.
By 1835, the building of the "Central" had become one of the
important issues in state politics. The project was ably advo-
cated by such newspapers as the Sangamo Journal3 and also
by a number of leading citizens, prominent among them being
Sidney Breese, whose fifteen years of service in promoting the
undertaking entitles him to be called the "Father of the Illinois
Central Railroad".4
With such support it was not long before definite measures
were taken, and on January 18th, 1836, the Illinois legis-
lature incorporated the Central Railroad Company to construct
a railroad from "the mouth of the Ohio to a point
on the Illinois River at or near the termination of the Illinois
and Michigan Canal."5 Fifty-nine incorporators were named,
among them Governor Reynolds, Lieutenant Governors A. M.
Jenkins and Pierre Menard, Judge Sidney Breese, Darius B.
Holbrook and Albert K. Snyder,6 and a capital of two and a
^Illinois Monthly Magazine, Vol. I, No. i, October, 1830.
2Newton, Early Railway Legislation in Illinois, p. 7 ; Ackerman, His-
torical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, pp. 6, 7.
3Sangamo Journal, October 31, 1835.
*Cf. Appendix to Early History of Illinois by Sidney Breese. In this
book Mr. Breese reviews his efforts in behalf of the Illinois Central
Railroad.
^Session Laws of Illinois, 1835-1836, pp. 129 ff.
Among the incorporators were Mr. Holbrook and several other
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half million dollars was authorized. From the first, this road
was regarded as a peculiar state institution, and lest its policy
should be dominated by a foreign monopoly, provision was made
that no person could subscribe to more than five shares of stock
and that at least one fifth of the capital should be offered for
sale in the state.7 Provision was also made that, whenever the
company earned more than twelve per cent on the cost of con-
struction for a period of ten years, the legislature could so
reduce earnings and tolls for the next ten years that the earn-
ings would not exceed that amount, reports being made to the
state to show cost of construction and gross and net receipts.8
In return for this restriction on the powers of the company, the
legislature inserted a clause in the charter agreeing not to incor-
porate any competitive railroad for a period of fifty years.9
However, the promoters of the railroad had chosen a most
inopportune time for commencing this important undertaking.
During the thirties the country was agitated by one of those pop-
ular movements in favor of government aid to internal improve-
ments. In Illinois, after months of agitation, mass meetings,
and conventions, the movement culminated in the celebrated
internal improvement act of 1837. This act provided for an
extensive network of railroads intersecting the state in all direc-
tions. The backbone of the system was to be a central railroad
from Cairo northward, via Vandalia, Shelbyville, Decatur,
Bloomington, and Savannah, to Galena, at that time the most
important city in the state.10 In addition there were several
cross lines extending from the main stem to the important cities
on the eastern or western boundaries. One of these branches
from Shelbyville or Decatur to the state line corresponded very
closely to the Chicago branch under the act of 1851. J1 The
entire system amounted to about twelve hundred miles, but the
estimates as to cost of construction were surprisingly low. Three
gentlemen connected with him in later enterprises, but as the company
never commenced active construction work, it is impossible to say whether
this company was controlled by Mr. Holbrook. As he was not a resident
of Illinois and otherwise would not have been among the incorporators,
the presumption is that he had a very important influence in the organiza-
tion of the company under this act of 1836.
7Session Laws of Illinois, 1835-1836, p. 134.
*Ibid., p. 133.
Ibid., sec. 6.
10Session Laws of Illinois, 1836-1837, p. 121 ; Newton, Early Railway
Legislation in Illinois, pp. 21-23.
"Ibid.
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and a half million dollars was regarded as sufficient to build
the four hundred and fifty miles of the main line, while the
Shelbyville and Alton branches were to cost $650,000 and $600,-
000 respectively, or from seven to ten thousand dollars per
mile;
12 less than one fourth what it cost the present company
fifteen years later.
13 A loan, based on the credit of the state,
was to provide funds, while a board of seven commissioners was
appointed to manage the enterprise during its construction and
after completion.
14
Immediately after the passage of the act
these commissioners commenced work, and for a while it seemed
as if this colossal undertaking might be finished. Grading was
commenced at Cairo, Galena, and intermediate points; tens of
thousands of dollars were expended on the dikes and levee at
Cairo; large quantities of rails were purchased; about forty
miles of embankment north of Cairo were completed; and, alto-
gether, something like a million dollars was expended on the
central route and branches, although certainly not in the most
effectual manner.15 But the task was entirely beyond the ability
of the state; financial difficulties prevented the floating of the
necessary bonds ; and extravagance, corruption, and mismanage-
ment exhausted the money already procured. The result was
that a hundred miles of grading and a few thousand tons of iron
were the only tangible results of this second attempt to con-
struct a railroad through the center of Illinois^
Even this failure did not deter the state or its citizens from
endeavoring to complete the project, and on March 6th, 1843,
only six years after the passage of the Internal Improvement
Act, the legislature incorporated the Great Western Railway
Company, better known as the Holbrook Company.17 To under-
12Session Laws of Illinois, 1836-1837, p. 121 ; Newton, Early Railway
Legislation in Illinois, pp. 21-23.
13Cf. Chap. vi.
14Session Laws of Illinois, 1836-1837, p. 121.
"Chicago Daily Democrat, December 24, 1849. Editorial.
**Ibid. It is interesting to note that the legislature which passed the
Internal Improvement Act is regarded as the strongest legislature ever
convened in Illinois, and contained such men as Lincoln, Logan, Douglas,
Bissell, etc. The act was passed to a large extent through an arrangement
with the Springfield delegation by which the state capital should go to
that city in return for the passage of the act by their votes. Cf. chapters
in Moses, Illinois Historical and Statistical, and Davidson and Stuve,
History of Illinois, relating to the Internal Improvement Act.
"Session Laws of Illinois, 1843-1844, pp. 199, 200; Newton, Early
Railway Legislation in Illinois, p. 33; Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads,
p. 9-
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stand this act it is necessary to go back six years to March
4th, 1837.
On that date, the Cairo City and Canal Company was incor-
porated with power to hold real estate in Alexander County,
especially the tract of land now included in the corporate limits
of Cairo, and to carry on general industrial enterprises.18 Mr.
Darius B. Holbrook, of New York, one of the incorporators of
the Central Railroad of 1836, was elected president, and for
twenty years the enterprise was dominated by his masterful
personality until the two became synonymous.19 During the
prosperous period just before the panic the company borrowed
between two and three million dollars, largely from English
capitalists; purchased several thousand acres of land at the
mouth of the Ohio River
;
established industries of all kinds
;
laid
out an extensive city at what is now Cairo; protected it by
embankments and levees; carried on a general mercantile busi-
ness; and enacted ordinances for the government of the citizens
of Cairo.20 However, the resources of the company were not
equal to the demands made upon it and the failure of the inter-
nal improvement policy in 1840, following closely after the
severe panic of 1837, forced the enterprise into bankruptcy.
English investors refused further financial support and the
stoppage of work on the state railroad destroyed the undeveloped
industries at Cairo. The directors neglected the undertaking;
the property in and near Cairo was abandoned; and for a time
the place was occupied only by squatters and disreputable char-
acters from the river boats.21
The extreme depression existing in Illinois after the panift
of 1837 and the failure of the state policy prevented Mr. Hol-
brook from doing anything with the Cairo City and Canal Com-
pany until 1843. Realizing the possibilities of the "Central"
railroad, he induced the legislature to pass the Great "Western
Railway Act of that year. According to the charter the presi-
18Session Laws of Illinois, 1836-1837, March 4, 1837. The powers
granted the Cairo company by the legislature were almost unlimited and
the company's acts were often in opposition to the general acts of the
General Assembly.
19In nearly all newspaper references to the Cairo City and Canal Com-
pany it is referred to as the Holbrook Company. Mr. Holbrook was
regarded as an unscrupulous promoter and was thoroughly disliked
throughout the state.
20Anon., History of Cairo, Publications of the Cairo City and Canal
Company ; Henry Long, History and Prospects of Cairo.
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dent and directors of the Cairo City and Canal Company were
incorporated as the Great "Western Bailway Company and were
given authority to construct a railway from Cairo to the Illinois
and Michigan Canal. 22 In many ways this act was quite favor-
able to the state. The otherwise worthless grading done in 1837
to 1840 was to be purchased at a fair valuation; twenty-five
per cent of the net receipts from operation, after a twelve per
cent dividend had been paid on the stock, were to go to the
state; and the legislature could alter the charter of both the
Great Western Company and Cairo City and Canal Company
after all the indebtedness of the former was paid. But, for half
a dozen years the Cairo Company had been known as a flagrant
example of speculative and corrupt corporate management, and
to turn over to such a company the most important industrial
enterprise within the state, without reasonable compensation or
even adequate safeguards as to the completion of the work, was,
to say the least, a short sighted policy. Moreover, a clause was
inserted in the closing section of the act surrendering to the
company any public lands which might come into the possession
of the state of Illinois during the life of the charter. Not even a
guarantee was demanded that such lands should be used for the
construction of the railroad. This legislation shows the wretched
financial condition of the state in 1843 and illustrates the lack
of foresight characteristic of the General Assembly during the
period.
23
For a time it seemed as if the company was seriously deter-
mined to proceed with the "Central" railroad. Large sums
were borrowed and expended in finishing the original state sur-
veys and completing the grading. Numerous buildings were
erected at Cairo, and an extensive system of levees was planned
and partially constructed. 24 But conditions were not favorable,
and the company could not obtain capital to continue the work.
Several millions had already been expended by the Cairo com-
pany without dividend paying results; all Illinois credit, both
state and private, was under suspicion on account of the partial
repudiation of the state debt; and eastern and European cap-
22Session Laws of Illinois, 1842-1843, pp. 199 ff. The terms of the
act are peculiar and this provision making the directors of one company
directors of another is typical of the loose charters granted by state legis-
latures before the Civil War. Contrast this charter with the charter of
February 10, 1851.
23Session Laws of Illinois, 1843-1844, pp. 199 ff; p. 203, sec. 18.
24Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, p. 10.
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italists refused to risk further investments in Illinois. 25 Lack
of funds stopped all construction within a few months after
the charter was secured and the directors finally gave up in
despair. On March 3, 1845, with the consent of the company,
the charter was repealed by special act of the legislature; all
work done by the company reverted to the state ; 28 and the third
and most promising attempt to construct the "Central" railroad
ended with heavy loss to the promoters and no profit to the
state.
The failure of the Great Western Railway, following closely
upon the disastrous Internal Improvement project of 1837-1840,
made it evident to the legislature, as well as to local and eastern
capitalists, that under the depressed condition of Illinois credit,
the construction of this important and expensive railroad was
an utter impossibility without substantial aid from the national
government. As a result, the efforts of the state during the
seven years from 1843 to 1850 were directed almost entirely
towards obtaining such support.
Under these circumstances, the people of the state consid-
ered themselves fortunate in having elected to the Senate of the
United States, in 1843, Judge Sidney Breese, who was regarded
as the most enthusiastic advocate of the "Central". On Decem-
ber 23rd, 1843, only a few days after being sworn in as senator,
he introduced into Congress a memorial of the Great Western
Company praying for preemption rights to a portion of the
public lands through which the proposed road would run. Al-
though profit to the railroad could only come from selling the
land at more than a dollar and a quarter an acre, the preemption
price, the measure met with such indifference and opposition
that the committee on public lands, to which the memorial was
referred, refused to report a bill.
27
2SSession Laws of Illinois, 1844-1845, March 3, 1845.
21Sen. J., December 23, 1843; Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the
Illinois Central Railroad, p. 10. As Breese was elected at the session of
the legislature which passed the Great Western Act of March 6, 1843,
containing the provision turning over to that company any federal lands
the state might receive, and immediately after taking his seat in the
Senate introduced a bill granting a preemption right to that company, it
looks as if there might have been some understanding between him and
the Cairo Company. Breese was always a warm supporter of the Cairo
Company. The Cairo City and Canal Company was very unpopular in
Illinois, especially among the people. From the act of 1836 on Judge
Breese was an outspoken advocate of this company and believed the
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Two years later, Judge Breese was appointed chairman of
the Committee on Public Lands and, with the additional pres-
tige and influence of that position, he introduced a bill, in 1846,
granting alternate sections of public land to the Northern Cross
and Central railroads of Illinois.28 Breese himself had little
faith in a direct grant of land and did not push the project
vigorously. As chairman of the Committee on Public Lands, to
which all these bills were referred, he was able to make a strong
report in favor of his proposal, but, for some reason, the bill
was not brought up after leaving the committee.29 Undismayed
by his previous lack of success, he again introduced, at the
second session of the twenty-ninth Congress, his favorite project
of a preemption grant.30 The Committee on Public Lands advo-
cated the measure in a vigorous report, which ranks among the
ablest congressional documents on the land question. The argu-
ments advanced in favor of the bills were convincing, and Sena-
tor Breese followed up his report by active work on the floor
of the Senate. His persistent and energetic support of the plan
had its influence, and the Senate finally passed his measure.31
The bill went to the House, but none of the Illinois delegation
took an active interest in it, and there is no evidence in the
House records that an attempt was made to secure its passage.32
When the condition of political affairs at the time is con-
sidered it is evident that Breese was contending against almost
insurmountable difficulties, and, although his proposals met with
little success, he must be given great credit for accustoming the
members of Congress to the novel project of granting public
land to assist, directly or indirectly, in the construction of pri-
vate railroads. His reports from the Committee on Public Lands
railroad should be built by the Great Western Company. He feared a
direct grant of land would be used by the legislature to renew the Internal
Improvement policy of 1837, and for that reason, together with his gen-
eral support of the Holbrook corporations, he endeavored to get a right
of preemption for the Great Western. The Illinois members of the house
desired the construction of the central railroad, but not under the direc-
tion of Mr. Holbrook. There are no grounds to question Mr. Breese's
good faith in his advocacy of the Holbrook companies.
2SCongressional Globe, 29 Cong., i sess., p. 208; Sanborn, Congres-
sional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways, p. 25.
"Ibid.
^Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess. ; Sanborn, p. 26.
S1lbid.; Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad,
p. 10.
"Ibid.
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were clear and logical statements of the arguments in favor of
congressional aid. He lacked, however, the political prestige
and aggressive personality necessary to secure the assent of his
colleagues to such an unusual policy. He also failed in securing
the support of the Illinois delegation in the House, and complete
success was, thus, almost impossible.
33
Fortunately for the Central project, Stephen A. Douglas
entered the United States Senate in 1847, and within a short
time became the recognized leader of the dominant party in that
body. Like Breese he was an ardent advocate of a railroad
through central Illinois, and believed that the federal govern-
ment should assist in its construction. But the two men differed
in the methods to be adopted by the government. Breese advo-
cated conferring the right of preemption upon a private com-
pany. Douglas favored a direct grant of land, not to a private
corporation but to the state of Illinois. In this position he was
ably seconded by the Illinois delegation in the House of Repre-
sentatives.34
At the commencement of the long session of 1847-8, each
senator introduced a measure in accordance with his respective
view. Breese presented his previous plan for a preemption
right to the Cairo company for a railroad from Cairo to Ga-
lena.35 On the other hand his colleague advocated a direct grant
of land to the state of Illinois to be used in building a first class
railroad from Cairo to Galena, as in Breese 's plan. In addition
he proposed that there be a branch from this "main" line to
Chicago ; 36 in effect this meant a trunk line from the Great Lakes
at Chicago to the Mississippi River at Cairo. By his plan
whatever profit would come from an increased value of the land
would inure to the benefit of the state, not to the advantage of
a private corporation. The whole plan was one of those shrewd
schemes for which Douglas was famous. From an ill-fated and
ill-managed local project of one of the less important western
states the Illinois Central became a national enterprise.
In deference to his colleague, Judge Breese consented to
postpone his preemption bill, though he still kept it on the
calendar that, as he said, he might call it up after the failure
38Cf. correspondence between Douglas and Breese in Appendix, Early
History of Illinois, by Sidney Breese.
^Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess.
**Ibid., 30 Cong., I sess.
"Ibid.
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of the land grant measure.37 The bill introduced by Senator
Douglas was reported favorably from the Committee on Public
Lands, and was made a special order on May 3rd, 1848. From
that time its passage through the Senate was comparatively
easy. In general the measure was supported by members from
the western states and opposed by representatives of the eastern
and southern states.38 Although introduced by the Democratic
leader of the Senate, the land grant received much better sup-
port from the Whigs than from their opponents. As distribu-
tion of the public lands in this way was distinctly a Whig
policy, it was natural that the minority should favor the bill.
'Moreover, most of the unoccupied government land was in the
West, and representatives of states where the amount was large
aided the measure on the assumption that its success might
mean a similar grant to them later on. Likewise members from
the eastern states opposed this new policy on the ground that
the whole nation should share the benefits of the western lands.
Senators and representatives from the southern and gulf states
were strict constructionists and opposed Congressional action
which would assist either the North or West at the expense of
the South. Their position was entirely consistent with the im-
mediate interests of their constituency. After the fashion of
the time, most of the speeches defended or opposed the land
grant on constitutional grounds, the main point of dispute being
37Breese to Douglas, January 5, 1850, quoted in Illinois State Journal,
February 6, 1851 ; Sanborn, Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Rail-
ways, p. .26.
^Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., i sess., p. 314; Appendix, pp. 535,
536, 537 ; Sanborn, Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways, pp.
26 ff. The vote on the measure in the House and Senate was distributed
as follows :
FOR AGAINST
SENATE HOUSE SENATE HOUSE
New England 2 10 35
Middle 2 25 i 22
South 2 7 3 3i
Gulf 43 34
West (land) 10 27 o 9
West (non-land) 41 I 8
TOTAL 24 73 n 79
Democrat 14 30 10 42
Whig 10 43 i 37
26 HISTORY OP ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD [310
whether Congress had a constitutional right to give away the
national lands in aid of internal improvements.89
With the members of Congress divided along the lines indi-
cated above, the success of the bill depended upon the relative
strength of the West as opposed to the East and South. Al-
though the bulk of the population was in the eastern and south-
ern states the number of western states was as large as the
number of eastern states. As all states had an equal repre-
sentation in the Senate the passage of the bill was comparatively
easy, the final vote standing twenty-four for, as against eleven
opposed to the bill.40 In the House, however, where representa-
tion was in proportion to population, the large middle and
southern states were able to defeat the act. The vote was close,
and had some of the western members supported the grant more
vigorously it would probably have been passed. As it was, the
majority against it was only seven.41 In accordance with a pre-
vious understanding, Judge Breese again introduced his pre-
emption bill at the short session, and, though not in conformity
with the views of Douglas, the latter, as a personal and political
favor to his colleague, allowed it to pass the Senate, with the
tacit understanding that it was to be rejected in the House of
Representatives.
42
In the six years since Judge Breese introduced his first pre-
emption bill, sentiment in both the Senate and House had
become quite favorable to some kind of a land grant or pre-
emption right in aid of the Illinois Central Railroad. Any
measure would undoubtedly be of considerable value to the state
of Illinois or to private parties who might build the road, and
the Cairo City and Canal Company determined to make use of
the apparently favorable conditions. Accordingly, after the
failure of the first land grant bill and probably in anticipation
of greater success at the next session, the Cairo City and Canal
Company petitioned the legislature for a renewal of their pre-
S9Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., I sess. ; Appendix. The views of the
members of Congress are gathered from speeches in the Globe.
40Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., i sess., p. 314.
41Cf . p. 18, n. 38. The bill was refused a third reading by vote of 74-
78 (73-79?) Ho. ]., 30 Cong., i sess., p. 1270; Congressional Globe, 30 Cong.,
I sess., p. 1071; Sanborn, Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Rail-
ways, pp. 29, 30.
42Douglas to Breese, letter quoted in Illinois State Journal, February
6, 1851. Cf. correspondence between Breese and Douglas in Appendix to
Breese's Early History of Illinois.
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vious rights, which had been repealed by the act of March 3rd,
1845. Although the Holbrook companies generally were disliked
throughout the state, they represented the wealthiest aggregation
of capital in Illinois, and apparently were the best able to com-
plete the Illinois Central Railroad. In recognition of this fact
the legislature on February 10th, 1849 reincorporated the Great
"Western Eailway Company,43 with all its former privileges, and,
in addition, gave it outright the remains of the old state surveys,
gradings, and embankments, and a right of way two hundred
feet wide from Cairo to Galena.44 The surprising feature of the
act is that the legislature included in the charter the clause
surrendering to the company whatever lands the federal govern-
ment should grant the state. No restriction whatever was placed
on the use of these lands, and, so far as the charter was con-
cerned, these lands, once in the possession of the corporation,
might have been used for the personal advantage of the presi-
dent or directors. Moreover, the only condition imposed upon
the company in return for the charter was that it should spend
at least $200,000 each year until the road was completed, and
even this condition was vague and ill defined.45
"With this remarkable enactment of the legislature before
them, it was only natural that members of Congress should hesi-
43Session Laws of Illinois, 1849-50, February 10, 1849.
"Ibid.
45The provision in the acts of 1843 and 1849, granting the Great
Western Railroad whatever federal lands should come into the posses-
sion of the state, is one of the most peculiar ever passed by an Illinois
legislature. In 1843 there was little prospect that the national government
would ever turn over lands to Illinois to aid in railroad construction, but
in 1849 several bills had passed the Senate and one had passed the House
giving either preemption or direct grants to Illinois, and it was consid-
ered almost certain the 3ist Congress would pass the desired legislation.
It is very probable that the clause was inserted in both acts as a "joker"
and escaped the notice of the members. At the time charters were
granted giving private companies almost unlimited powers and evidently
this is an example.
At the same time it is very likely that the Cairo City and Canal Com-
pany resorted to underhand methods to secure the insertion of this provi-
sion. From the bitter criticism of the provision in 1849 and 1850 after the
passage of the federal act, especially in the Springfield Register and Jour
nal, two of the leading papers in the state, it is certain this clause could
not have been inserted with the open approval of the legislature. The
advantage to the company from such a provision is too obvious to require
further reasons in defence of the attitude of the company.
The action of the Great Western Railroad indicates that it was incor-
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tate to give to Illinois public lands which might be turned over
to a speculative private corporation without materially further-
ing the "Central" railroad. No one saw this more clearly, than
Senator Douglas, and, even before the first session of the thirty-
first Congress opened, he made vigorous attempts to obtain a re-
peal of the obnoxious features of the charter. He was not at first
successful, but his colleagues at "Washington and prominent citi-
zens of the state assisted him and just before Congress convened
he was able to induce the president and directors of the Cairo
City and Canal Company to execute a release of the charter of
the Great Western Railroad Company. The surrender was only
conditional, however, and the Cairo company insisted that the
release should be accepted at the next session of the legislature
and that another company be immediately incorporated to
carry on the project.46
The Great Western tangle having been straigtened out, the
Illinois delegation in Congress was in a position to renew their
efforts in behalf of the Illinois Central grant. At the previous
election several changes were made in the personnel of the dele-
gation, which gave new strength to the advocates of a direct
grant. In the Senate Judge Breese was succeeded by General
Shields, and the new representatives were in sympathy with the
plans of Douglas.
47 Judge Douglas was an able politician, as
porated with the object of securing the land grant. From its incorpora-
tion until the passage of the federal land grant the company did practically
nothing. Then with the passage of the Act of September 2Oth several
thousand dollars were expended in and near Cairo, evidently to fulfill the
legal requirements of the charter. For a full discussion of this matter,
the reader is referred to the files of the Journal and Register, Springfield,
during the Fall and Winter of 1849. (Illinois Weekly State Journal,
October 16, 1850.)
^Illinois State Journal, October 16, 1850. There was a very bitter
fight in Illinois over the release of the charter of the Great Western
Company. The Cairo Company was, of course, reluctant to surrender the
charter, and they were supported by many political opponents of Douglas.
The company obtained considerable aid from politicians in the southern
part of the state, but was almost unanimously opposed by the central and
northern parts of the state. The two Springfield newspapers were the
most bitter opponents of the Hobrook company. Cf. the conflict over the
passage of the repeal act of February 10, 1851. In October, 1850, Mr. Hoi-
brook, as President of the company, executed a release, but Mr. Douglas
did not accept it. Cf. correspondence between Breese and Douglas, in
Appendix to Breese's Early History of Illinois.
47General Shields was a warm personal friend of Senator Douglas,
while Senator Breese was not always on intimate terms with him. Shields
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well as a statesman of national prominence, and the experience
of the previous session showed the necessity of aggressive action.
As a matter of course, the friends of the land grant, both in and
out of Congress, secured a large number of memorials and peti-
tions requesting definite action by the federal government.48
In addition, Senator Douglas resorted to various political bar-
gains to insure complete success of his policy. In the previous
session he had added to his plan a branch from the proposed
main line of the railroad to Chicago, and thus made the enter-
prise one which appealed to the interests of many eastern repre
sentatives.49 In his plans for the thirty-first Congress he made
the railroad even more comprehensive. He extended the pro-
posed grant to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which was then
endeavoring to get a foothold in southern Alabama, and to
certain other southern roads. A trunk line from Chicago to
Mobile was a project which appealed to the imagination of the
people of the entire Mississippi valley; even the strict construc-
tionists had to admit it was a matter of more than state impor-
tance. At the same time, the southern part of the plan removed
the opposition of the gulf states and secured the active support
of certain northern members who were very much interested in
the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. 50 . He also removed the opposition
of certain New England and Pennsylvania Congressmen by a
compromise on the tariff. Douglas cared very little about new
was also one of the most popular politicians in Illinois. Among the lead-
ing supporters of the measure were Representatives Bissell, Baker, and
Wentworth of Illinois.
48Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, p. 17.
Wentworth, Congressional Reminiscences (Fergus Historical Series).
49The addition of the Chicago branch is interesting as showing the
increased importance of northern Illinois and the district around Chicago.
In the early plans the northeastern part of the state was neglected and
this addition by Douglas is a recognition of the changes which took place
in the previous fifteen years. Senator Douglas was accused of making
the change in order to increase the value of Chicago real estate, in which
he was deeply interested. There may be some truth in the statement, but
it also shows that he recognized the future importance of Chicago. The
entire success of the Illinois Central has depended upon the Chicago
branch, and if this extension had not been made, the road would have
become a merely local undertaking.
80Sanborn, Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways, p. 31 ;
Breese to Douglas, Illinois State Journal, February 6, 1851 ; Wentworth,
Congressional Reminiscences (Fergus Historical Series).
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tariff legislation, while the eastern representatives were not
interested in the land grant, but did desire a change in the tariff.
A compromise was easy and the eastern Congressmen agreed to
support the Illinois Central measure in return for active efforts
on the part of the western members in favor of a change of
tariff.51 A third agreement, though of less importance than the
other two, was arranged late in the session by which Dunleith,
opposite Dubuque, Iowa, instead of Galena, became the northern
terminus of the proposed road.52 These various agreements and
compromises materially strengthened the Illinois delegation
and made the passage of the land grant act a practical certainty.
A few days before the second release was executed Senator
Douglas introduced in the Senate a bill granting to Illinois
alternate sections of public land for six miles on each side of a
proposed railroad from Cairo to Galena and from Chicago to a
junction with the main line.53 With the consent, and probably
at the suggestion of the Illinois Senators, King of Alabama
added an amendment making a similar grant to the states of
Mississippi and Alabama, 54 and a little later Senator Dodge of
Iowa made another amendment extending the road to Dun-
"Wentworth, Congressional Reminiscences (Fergus Historical Series).
Among the eastern members secured by this agreement were Daniel
Webster and Mr. Ashmun of Massachusetts. It is very likely that the
Boston and New York capitalists who built the Illinois Central were
deeply interested in the success of the land grant act. Mr. Rantoul, one
of the leading promoters, was a close personal friend of the two gentle-
men named above, and succeeded Mr. Webster in the Senate. Mr. Ash-
mun was also interested in the Illinois Central, and the town of that name
on the charter line is named after him.
52Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, p. 17.
Senator Dodge, of Iowa, is credited with being the originator of this
extension. The change was bitterly opposed by Galena and was instru-
mental in causing the decline of that city. Two railroads were being pro-
jected from Dubuque in 1849, one of them, the present Dubuque & Sioux
City Railroad and the extension to Dunleith, made possible a through line
from Chicago and Cairo to central Iowa. The change, although of great
importance to the Illinois Central, attracted little attention in Congress.
53Sen. ]., 31 Cong., I sess.
^Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., i sess., p. 845. It should be noticed
that the Act of September 20, 1850 makes grants of land to the three
states of unoccupied government land inside the state limits to be used in
building a railroad inside the state. This is due to the strict construc-
tionist views of the Democratic majority of Congress. Cf. the Union
Pacific Land Grant Act.
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leith.55 With these amendments securing the support mentioned
on the previous pages the passage of the bill through the Senate
was comparatively easy and the measure was approved by a
vote of 26-14. The real opposition came in the House, but the
Illinois delegation, under the leadership of Bissell, McClernand,
and "Wentworth, forced the Senate bill through the lower house.
At times the opposition was extremely bitter, and it was only
by the various agreements effected in the early part of the ses-
sion that the act secured sufficient votes to be passed. Finally,
a vote was taken, and the bill passed56 the House of Representa-
tives by a majority of twenty-five, the vote taking place on the
17th of September. Three days later, President Fillmore signed
the bill and the construction of the Illinois Central was assured
so far as the United States Congress was concerned.57
By the terms of this act alternate sections six miles on each
side of the proposed railroad were given to the states of Illinois,
Mississippi and Alabama to construct a railroad from Chicago
to Mobile. The act, as it related to Illinois, provided for a railroad
' ' from the southern terminus of the Illinois and Michigan Canal
to a point at or near the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi
rivers, with a branch of the same to Chicago on Lake Michigan,
and another, via the town of Galena, in said state, to Dubuque,
in the state of Iowa." 58 The land in alternate, even numbered,
sections for six miles on both sides of this road was given to the
state to assist this undertaking, but with the provision that the
road should be completed within ten years and that if this were
not done all unsold lands should revert to the federal govern-
ment and the state should pay to the United States whatever
it had received for land already sold. Furthermore, the road
should be a public highway, free of toll, or other charges, for
the transportation of any property or troops of the United
55Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, p. 17.
58The vote on the land grant bill was as follows :
FOR AGAINST
SENATE HOUSE SENATE HOUSE
New England I 10 4 n
Middle 2 28 4 22
South 28 3 23
Gulf 5 13 ii
West (land) 13 34 i 12
West (non-land) 38 17
TOTAL 26 101 14 76
5T f7. S. Statutes at Large, ix, 466.
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States; Congress was to decide what compensation should be
given for carrying the mails. To compensate for the loss of land
Congress ordered that the alternate, odd numbered, sections six
miles on either side of the road, belonging to the government,
should be sold at $2.50 per acre, instead of $1.25 as previously.
Lands already settled were to be retained by the settlers upon
payment to the state of the preemption price, or the latter could
recompense itself by taking other unoccupied land within fifteen
miles of the road.69 The land could never be used for any
purpose other than the construction of the road.
The passage of the land grant act of September 20th marks
an epoch in the history of Illinois. At last, after years of dis-
couragement and failure, the state had in sight the means neces-
sary to build the Illinois Central Railroad. To even the most
conservative citizen, three million acres of land seemed sufficient
to guarantee the construction of the road. The more sanguine
looked forward to the time when the central counties of the state
would be thickly settled and the land grant had paid off all of
the burdensome Internal Improvement Debt. Senator Douglas
and the other representatives in Congress who had secured the
grant were applauded from Cairo to Galena ; mass meetings and
banquets were held in their honor ; and every means was taken
to show the popular appreciation of their services.80 The influ-
ence on the general credit of Illinois was great as was shown by
a rise of several points in the internal improvement stock.61
The mere passage of the federal act was the least difficult
of the many problems confronting the friends of the Illinois
Central. For some fourteen years the questions connected with
this railroad had been before the legislature and the citizens of
69
t7. S. Statutes at Large, IX, 46.
e Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads, p. 35. On their return to Illinois
at the close of the session, Mr. Douglas and Gen. Shields were tendered
a public dinner by the citizens of Chicago, in consideration of their serv-
ices in obtaining the passage of this act. In declining the honor, they mod-
estly awarded to their colleagues in the house the full measure of credit
for having successfully carried the bill through to completion.
61
"The New York Evening Post of the i8th inst. says : A considerable
advance has been obtained in Illinois Internal Improvement stock : S$fy
was bid for it this morning and 60 asked. This is a rise of five to ten per
cent and is due to the advising obtained this morning from Washington
of the donation by congress of lands in Illinois in aid of the railroad con-
structed between Chicago and Mobile, which runs through the whole state
of Illinois also of the swamp land measure." Illinois Daily Register,
September 30, 1850.
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the state, and now that success was probable, all the previous
conflicts were renewed with additional strength. The most
troublesome of these involved the method of construction and
the route.
There were four possible ways of utilizing the land grant,
each of which had its vigorous adherents: (1) State construc-
tion of the railroad by means of the grant, along the line of the
internal improvement plan of 1837; (2) Surrender of the grant
to the bondholders and construction by them on terms similar
to those made by the holders of canal bonds in 1840; (3) Com-
pletion by the Great Western Railway Company under its char-
ter of 1849, including the retention of all state lands ; (4) Crea-
tion of an entirely new private corporation and the transfer to it
of the land grant under certain restrictions and with certain pay-
ments to the state
;
this company to assume entire responsibility
for the completion of the road.
To many citizens state construction of the Illinois Central
still seemed a feasible project. From 1831 to 1843 the various
plans for the railroad depended on government support, and,
despite the collapse of the Internal Improvement plan of 1837,
there was considerable talk of direct construction by the legis-
lature. The cost of building the road was underestimated, while
the value of the land was overestimated. It was expected that
the road could be built without recourse to bond issues and it
was thought that the profits from operation would then quickly
retire the old state debt.62 But the panic of 1840 and the de-
pressing influence of the debt were still vivid in the minds of
the citizens of Illinois, and they generally condemned any fur-
ther attempt by the state. As Senator Shields said: "capital-
ists will not embark in this enterprise unless they have the
control of the servants, agents, etc. ... in a word of the
construction and management of the road.
' '63
Another form of semi-legislative management was contained
in the so-called "bond-holders' plan", which was submitted to
the legislature in January, 1851. As a result of the various
attempts at internal improvement Illinois had accumulated a
debt of some fifteen million dollars and was unable to meet the
62For instance, Mr. John S. Wright, of Chicago, published a pamph-
let in which he took the ground that the grant, being of such immense
value, the State should hold the lands and again attempt the construction
of the road. Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads, p. 35.
63Speech of General Shields, Springfield, 111., November 20, 1850, given
in full in Illinois Weekly Journal, November 20, 1850.
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full interest charges. In fact, the state had barely escaped re-
pudiation or bankruptcy, and the bondholders supposed it would
be utterly incapable of attracting the capital necessary to con-
struct the Illinois Central. Under the circumstances, certain
eastern bondholders suggested an arrangement somewhat sim-
ilar to the one under which the Illinois and Michigan Canal was
built. A company, composed largely of bondholders, was to
be chartered and given power to construct the railroad. Three
dollars of bonds or four dollars of stock, entitled new internal
improvement stock, were to be given for each dollar of cash paid
in. The state was to receive stock at par to an amount equal
to the value of the lands sold, and in return pay all expenses of
surveys, etc. The stock belonging to the state must be set apart
to retire the state debt. The stock of the new company could
also be made the basis for state banking.6 * On the whole, the
terms were about as onerous as could be imposed on a bankrupt
state, and they are in striking contrast to the Illinois Central
charter of 1850. It is impossible to state just what men were
behind the scheme, as it was disowned by many leading bond-
holders. The project never received serious attention from either
the newspapers or the legislature.
65
The proposed construction by the Great Western Railroad,
or in other words by Mr. Holbrook and the Cairo City and Canal
Company, attracted much more attention than either of the other
two plans. In 1849, as already mentioned, the legislature re-
newed the charter of the Great Western, including a grant to
the company of whatever lands the state might receive from
the federal government. Then, in December, 1849, the directors,
under pressure from Senator Douglas, executed a release of both
the charter and the grant, on condition that the legislature would
accept the same at its next session and incorporate another com-
pany to carry on the enterprise. The charter of 1849 was evi-
dently obtained with the distinct object of securing the federal
land grant, and no work was done on the railroad until it was
almost certain that congress would pass the act. Then, construc-
tion work was started, and it was stated that large quantities of
rails were purchased in England. At the same time, active
*A copy of the bill presented by the bondholders is given in the
Chicago Daily Democrat, January n, 1851, and a summary is given in the
Illinois Weekly Journal, January 29, 1851. Cf. Ackerman, Early Illinois
Railroads, p. 37, n.
"Editorial in Illinois Weekly Journal, January 29, 1851 ; ibid., Jan-
uary 22.
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efforts were made to defeat any bill repealing the charter. It is
uncertain whether this company intended to carry on the under-
taking, or, as Senator Douglas alleged, merely sell the charter
in Europe. At any rate, the opposition to the Great "Western,
especially in the southern part of the state, was bitter and deep
seated.66
The last plan was to turn over the grant under proper re-
strictions to a private corporation, other than the Cairo City
and Canal Company. The memorial of the Boston capitalists,
who later built the road, was the first direct proposition of the
kind, but it is probable that the memorialists had early sug-
gested a similar plan to the leading legislators of the state. In all
probability, other capitalists were also deeply interested in the
railroad. However, there was no definite project of the kind
before the people during November and December, 1850.67
More troublesome than the method of construction, though
of less real importance, was the matter of route. When Lieu-
tenant Governor Jenkins made his proposal in 1832, it was for
a railroad from Cairo to Peru at the junction of the canal and
the Illinois river. In the internal improvement act Galena was
made the northern terminus and the route was more distinctly
marked; it included Vandalia, Shelbyville, Decatur, Blooming-
ton, and Savannah. This line was retained in the charters of
1843 and 1849, and in the various bills introduced into the fed-
eral Senate by Sidney Breese. But Judge Douglas, in his bills
of 1847 and 1849, radically altered the route by extending the
road to Dunleith and making a branch to Chicago. As a result,
the whole question of route was reopened, and every city and
county of importance in the central part of the state asserted its
claims. The contests over the Chicago and Dunleith branches
were especially strenuous, and the continued discussion resulted
in greater confusion. The decision was necessarily left to the
legislature and by them transferred to the company.68
Congress passed the land grant act in September, 1850, and
the legislature was elected the following November. On account
66This opposition to the Holbrook companies is evident in the news-
paper discussion of the time.
TNone is given in any of the important state papers and if any project
were before the people it would be given in the newspapers.
"Illinois Weekly Journal, January 22, 1851 ; also numerous articles in
Chicago Daily Democrat, Illinois Weekly Journal, Illinois Daily and
Weekly Register during October, November, and December, 1850, and
January, 1851.
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of the release of the Great Western charter it was necessary to
settle the matter at the first session of the General Assembly, and,
consequently, the selection of proper representatives and sen-
ators was of vital importance. As soon as it became evident that
the federal House of Representatives would act favorably on
Senator Douglas' bill, the advocates of state construction and
the friends and opponents of the Cairo City and Canal Company
commenced an active campaign to secure a majority of the mem-
bers of the legislature. Other state issues were consigned to
the background and the question of the land grant and the
acceptance of the Great Western Release were the important
factors in the election of members to the sixteenth General
Assembly. The newspapers of the state had numerous editorials
and contributed articles defending or opposing the respective
plans, or emphasizing the importance of one route over another.
Mass meetings and conventions were held at various points along
the line of the proposed railroad, and the excitement often was
at fever heat. By November the controversy had become bitter
and personal. Individual motives were impugned; the charac-
ter of some of the leading newspaper editors, of Mr. Holbrook,
Senator Douglas, Judge Breese, and others, was maligned ; and
charges of bribery and fraud were frequent. By the time the
legislature convened in January, the whole discussion had degen-
erated into a typical Illinois political fight. On the whole, the
opponents of both state ownership and of the Holbrook com-
pany had much the better of the argument. Only a few news-
papers, such as the Benton Standard and the Cairo Times, and
a few politicians, the most prominent of them being Sidney
Breese, openly defended the Cairo City and Canal Company or
its subsidiary company, the Great Western. However, the Great
Western was already in possession of the desired charter and,
conditionally, of the land grant. Thus, inaction on the part of
the legislature meant success for the Holbrook party, and the
Cairo City and Canal Company exerted every effort to block
legislation and prevent the incorporation of a rival company.
On account of the many minor fights it was not at such a disad-
vantage as was indicated by newspaper editorials.*9
The following are the most important references to the conflict
between the two factions : Illinois Daily Register, October 30, 1850 ; Illi-
nois Weekly Journal, January 22, 29, 1851 ; Illinois Daily Register, Novem-
ber 8, 1850; December 12, 1850; ibid., October 17, 1850; ibid., October 10,
1850; ibid., October 9, 1850; Illinois Weekly Journal, November 13, 1850;
ibid., November 6, 1850; ibid., October 30, 1850; ibid., October 16, 1850;
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Most of the plans had been thoroughly discussed during
the campaign, and, when the legislature met the first day of
January, 1851, its members were well acquainted with the main
points at issue. In the organization of the House the Holbrook
faction secured a temporary advantage by the election of Judge
Breese as speaker, and during the first two weeks of the session
they were strong enough to prevent radical action. Bills were
presented in both houses repealing the charter of the Great
Western, but both were strongly opposed. The senate passed a
bill concerning the Illinois Central, which did not accept the
release of the Holbrook company ; the house passed a bill accept-
ing the release and refused to adopt the senate measure.70 A
large majority of the members of each body favored the repeal of
the Great Western charter, but until a more reasonable propo-
sition was presented many preferred to retain the Cairo com-
pany rather than to be entirely without a means of building the
road.
At this stage of the contest affairs were entirely altered by a
businesslike memorial presented by Mr. Robert Eantoul of Mas-
sachusetts, acting in the interest of a group of wealthy New
York and Boston capitalists. In brief, the plan of the memorial-
ists was as follows: The legislature should create a corpora-
tion and surrender to it the federal land grant. In return the
incorporators agreed to build a railroad
"
equal in all respects
to the railroad running between Boston and Albany, with such
improvements thereon as experience has shown to be desirable
Chicago Tribune, October 22, 1851 ; Illinois Weekly Journal, January 22,
1851 ; Illinois Daily Register, October 23, 1850; ibid., November 20, 1850.
As the leading advocate of the "Central" Senator Douglas had endeav-
ored to secure an early acceptance of the release and continually urged such
action from the time he received the final release of the Great Western.
Even as early as October, 1849, he had attempted to obtain action by the
legislature, but without success (Illinois Daily Journal, October 31, 1849).
The matter was brought up at the special session and Representative
Denny introduced a resolution "that the committee on internal improve-
ments be instructed to inquire into the expediency of so altering and
amending or repealing the charter of the Great Western Railway as in
their judgment will be best calculated to promote the interests of the
state. . . ." (Illinois Daily Journal, October 31, 1849). The discussion
was at times very heated, but the policy of inaction finally prevailed, it
being thought that the matter could rest until the regular session of 1851.
(Illinois Daily Journal, October 24, 1849).
70Illinois Daily Register, January 15, 1851 ; also Sen. J. and Ho. /.,
January 1-15, 1851.
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and expedient ; to complete the road by July 4, 1854 ; and to pay
the state ___ per cent of the gross receipts in return for the
land."71 The memorialists were men of considerable capital and
experience with railroad promotion in other parts of the country.
On the whole, they made a much more favorable offer than could
have been expected. The Governor recommended the accept-
ance of their proposition in a special message, and most of the
members of the legislature and friends of the Illinois Central
believed that this memorial was a first class opportunity for the
state. This is illustrated by the following quotation from the
Illinois Weekly Journal, "We agree with the legislature that
'this company are seeking no advantages, and that their object
is to build the road without loss to themselves and with advan-
tage to the state.'
"72
Coincident with the transmission of this memorial Mr.
Ashael Gridley introduced in the senate a bill "for an act to
incorporate the Illinois Central Railroad." 73 On February 5th
Mr. J. L. D. Morrison offered a substitute for the original bill,74
and on the next day it passed by a vote of 23 to 3.75 Four days
later it passed the house by an almost unanimous vote of seventy-
two to two,
76 and was immediately signed by Governor French.77
The passage of the charter through both houses was not as
easy as the vote seems to indicate. Shortly after the receipt of
the memorial the whole matter was referred to a committee,
whose members, in connection with Mr. Rantoul and Colonel
Bissell, representatives of the promoters, spent considerable time
in preparing the measure. As the duration of the session was
limited to forty days, the Holbrook interests made every effort
to delay the bill, and during the last week of January and the
first of February it looked as if their efforts would meet with
71 Cf. the copy of the memorial given in the Appendix. In the
original memorial the amount paid to the state was left vacant. It was
proposed in the House that ten per cent be given, but the company, through
the efforts of Robert Rantoul and Representative Bissell, managed to
reduce the amount to seven per cent. The real reasons for the action of
the legislature in this matter are not known, and in his campaign for
election as governor, Colonel Bissell was accused of having obtained the
reduction to the disadvantage of the state.
72Illinois Weekly Journal, January 22, 1851.
73Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads, p. 39.
"Ibid.
76Illinois Weekly Journal, February 12, 1851. Sen. J. and Ho. J.
"Ibid.
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success. At last, as noted above, the bill was passed by both
houses only a few days before the close of the session. The main
difficulty came in the selection of a route, and the legislature
was finally forced to leave the exact location of the road to the
incorporators.
78 The other point of conflict was the percentage
to be paid the state. This was finally fixed at seven per cent
of the gross receipts, but the company was exempted from paying
any state or local taxes.
As passed, the bill incorporated the Illinois Central Bail-
road company, with a perpetual charter, gave it the remains
of the old state surveys and gradings, gave it the federal land
grant and right of way, and exempted its property from taxa-
tion. In return, the railroad was obliged to complete the main
line in four years, and the branches in six, to build the road
"equal in all respects to the Great Western of Massachusetts",
to hold the state free from any responsibility connected with
the grant, and to pay the state seven per cent of the gross earn-
ings.
78Illinois Weekly Journal, February 5, 12, 1851.
CHAPTER III.
CONSTRUCTION OP THE CHARTER LINES.
Chartering a private corporation with liberal powers and
granting it nearly three million acres of public land were merely
a preliminary step in the building of the Illinois Central. In
1851 railroad construction was in its infancy. The largest sys-
tem at that time, the New York and Erie, was only three hun-
dred miles long, and the construction of a first class trunk line
some seven hundred miles in length through the thinly settled
interior counties of a western state involved engineering and
administrative difficulties entirely new to the promoter of the
early fifties. Never before in this country had such an enor-
mous amount of capital been expended on a single private under-
taking, and what the building of the Canadian Northern or
Panama Canal is to-day, the construction of 'the Illinois Central
was in the decade preceding the Civil War.
From the first this final attempt to build a railroad through
the center of the state was supported by some of the ablest rail-
road magnates of the time men who had had abundant experi-
ence in other lines of business activity and who also had the
financial resources necessary to push the enterprise to a suc-
cessful completion. It is doubtful whether twelve men could
have been selected who, at the time, possessed the confidence of
the country to a greater extent than did Robert Schuyler,
Gouverneur Morris, Robert Rantoul, and the other members of
the first board of directors.
In general the promoters represented successful merchants
who constituted the moneyed class of the period; a class whose
activities extended into politics and government, as well as into
strictly commercial enterprises. Of the entire board Robert
Schuyler and Robert Rantoul were probably the best known
and most respected.1
Robert Rantoul, Jr., the man most influential in securing
1For an interesting account of the various persons connected with the
early history of the Illinois Central the reader is referred to Mr. Acker-
man's Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad.
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the passage of the charter by the Illinois Legislature, was a
leading lawyer of Massachusetts. He had held several high
elective and appointive offices under both the federal and state
governments and, in 1852, on the death of Daniel Webster, he
represented his state in the federal senate during the remainder
of the term. During the administration of President Fillmore
he was strongly advocated as successor to Secretary of the Treas-
ury Walker, but did not receive the nomination and died shortly
afterwards. The charter of 1851 is very largely his work, and
during the organization of the company he was influential in
shaping its financial policy. The present city of Rantoul about
one hundred miles south of Chicago, is named after him.2
Second in importance to Rantoul, was the first president,
Robert Schuyler. During the first years of the company's ex-
istence he seems to have been the leading director of its work
and was most active in organizing the corporation. One com-
pany after another, the New York and New Haven, Alton and
Sangamon, Great Western, Boston and Albany, and Illinois
Central, all came under his direction or control, and in general
they were well managed. Up to 1853 his record was entirely
above suspicion, but in that year he became involved in some
extremely questionable proceedings in connection with the New
York and New Haven Railroad by which he fraudulently issued
over a million of stock to himself and friends.3
Although not one of the original directors Mr. William H.
Osborn soon became interested in the Illinois Central, and from
the retirement of President Schuyler in 1853 to the acquisition
of the southern lines in 1882 he was the dominant figure in the
history of the company. A man of great ability and strong
personality, with a broad grasp of affairs, he won the absolute
support of stockholders, employees, and shippers, and for over
twenty years English and Dutch shareholders gave him their
unqualified proxies, thus entrusting to him the complete con-
trol of the Illinois Central. So well did he execute this trust
that even during the periods of deepest depression they did not
condemn his management of the road. The company owes more
to Mr. Osborn than to any other person connected with it.*
The remaining directors were prominent business men, but
2Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, pp.
27-36; Chicago Daily Democrat, January 16, 1851.
Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, pp.
57-60; cf. Chap. vi.
4Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad.
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they did not exert such an influence upon the management of the
property, as did Rantoul, Schuyler, and Osborn. With one or
two exceptions, they are practically unknown to-day.5 How-
ever, as has been the case with most of their successors in the
directorate, they took an active interest in the affairs of the cor-
poration, and much of the financial success of the railroad is
due to their hard and consistent work in directing the construc-
tion of the road and watching over the financial operations.
With such a strong group of promoters, the active work of
organization followed closely upon the chartering of the com-
pany. It is very probable that a preliminary organization had
been created some months before the charter was actually se-
cured. According to the provisions of the charter the promoters
were allowed sixty days to accept it and immediately upon
receipt of the act steps were taken to complete the regular
organization. However, Governor French was ex-officio a
director, and as there were many matters of interest to the
state, action was deferred until his arrival.6 Finally, on March
19, 1851, the incorporators met in a little dimly lighted room at
1 Hanover Street, New York City and there formally organized
the Illinois Central Eailroad Company by accepting the legisla-
tive act of February 10th, by making provision for the various
requirements of the charter, and by electing Robert Schuyler
president.
7
The records of the following meetings have never been
made public, but from newspaper reports, it seems that active
work was not long delayed. One million dollars of stock was
subscribed, later another million was taken, and enough was paid
in to allow Mr. Ketchum, the treasurer, to deposit the guaran-
tee fund of $200,000 required by the charter; officers of the
company were elected; arrangements were made for active
prosecution of the work in Illinois; negotiations were opened
"Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad,.
pp. 21 ff. Credit for the success of the company should also be
given to the English and Dutch stockholders. Up to comparatively
recent date the Illinois Central was owned largely by foreign stock-
holders and these shareholders have always kept a close watch on the
affairs of the company. At times there has been friction between the
stockholders and the management in this country, but on the whole,
much of the success of the railroad is due to the active cooperation of the
English investors. This was especially true in the early history of the
company.
91bid., pp. 21-60.
7
Ibid.; Chicago Daily Democrat, March 10-30, 1851.
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with the federal government in regard to the land grant; and
a definite financial program was prepared.8
The charter provided that work should commence on the
main line not later than January 1, 1852, and, as the entire
route of the road had to be determined long before that date,
there was no time for delay. On March 22nd, or only three
days after the organization of the company, Mr. Roswell B.
Mason, the Engineer and General Superintendent of the New
York and New Haven Railroad, better known on account of his
career as mayor of Chicago, was appointed Engineer-in-Chief
and given entire charge of construction work in Illinois.9 At
that time there were few men who had had either a practical
or theoretical training in railway civil engineering, and the
selection of an efficient engineering staff was by no means an
easy undertaking. But good pay, the importance of the new
railroad, and the high reputation of Colonel Mason overcame
the difficulty, and by the middle of May, a staff of about seventy
engineers had been collected and were on their way to Chi-
cago.
10
The party arrived in Illinois on the 17th of May, and the
work of preliminary survey was immediately started. Only
five specific points were given in the charter, viz. Galena, Chi-
cago, Cairo, southern terminus in the Illinois and Michigan
Canal, and Dubuque. The only other restrictions upon the
route were that the line should pass within five miles of the
northeast corner of Township 21, range 2, east of the third
principal meridian; should not vary more than seventeen miles
either way from a straight line from Cairo to the southern ter-
minus of the canal; and that the Chicago branch should not be
north of the parallel of 39 degrees and 30 minutes. 11 Other-
wise, the company had entire latitude in locating the route.12
As has been the case with practically every new railroad in this
country, various towns entered upon a bitter contest for the
new railroad. In the present instance sectional rivalries had
been fanned into a fierce flame by fifteen years of agitation. So
intense was this competition that the legislature could not decide
the route and left the controversy to the railroad.13
For the main line from Cairo to La Salle there had been
8Cf. Chap. vi.
Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, p. 82.
"Charter of February 10, 1851, sec. 15, H 3.
"Ibid.
13Cf. Chap. n.
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but a single route proposed since 1835, namely the present line,
passing through Du Quoin, Vandalia, Decatur, and Blooming-
ton. The "southern terminus" of the canal was in dispute
between La Salle and Peru, each claiming that it was the legal
terminus and consequently the end of the railroad. From La
Salle to Galena there were two possible routes, one passing
through Freeport and the other through Savannah. Local com-
mittees were appointed to bring pressure on the officials; offers
of free right of way and liberal city franchises were made, and
even railroad bridges and short sections of track promised, if
only the railroad would build through particular districts.
Shelbyville was insistent upon the advantages of that place as
a point on the main line, as also the junction of the Chicago
branch, while the controversies between Peru and La Salle, and
Savannah and Freeport became extremely bitter. Each of these
places took active measures to secure the railroad and even went
so far as to institute legal proceedings to force the company to
choose the particular location desired by the litigant.14 . In the
midst of this "down state" controversy the territory around
Chicago was aroused by a rumor that the "Central" was in-
tending to pass by that city and run its line from a junction
with the Michigan Central at the state line near what is now
Hammond, directly southward along the state border to Jones-
boro.15 But threats, bribes, and litigation alike had little influ-
ence upon the management, and it proceeded to lay out the
route without heeding the demands or threats of the various
rival towns along the proposed right of way.
For the purpose of surveying the various routes Colonel
Mason divided the territory into seven general divisions, each
with the usual surveying party, and within a few days after the
engineers had reached Chicago the surveys were actually com-
menced.16 It was spring in Illinois and to the usual disad-
vantages of reconnoisance work on the frontier were added the
inconvenience of Illinois mud and rain. Mr. Mason himself took
an active part in the work and spent all the time he could spare
from affairs at Chicago to obtain first hand information. Thus,
by the middle of summer he was in a position to make a deci-
sion as to the route.17
^Chicago Daily Democrat, May 15, July 23, 1851.
"Ibid., May 15, 1851.
"Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads, p. 82.
17Ibid. For an interesting description of the difficulties connected with
the construction of the road, the reader is referred to Mr. Ackerman's
account, Early Illinois Railroads, p. 82.
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In deciding the route there were four important considera-
tions: (1) As the company could not take land more than fif-
teen miles from the tracks it was not desirable to run the line
through thickly settled regions where much of the land granted
the company by the federal government had already been occu-
pied. (2) The road should be so located as to build up the
largest and most profitable traffic possible. (3) Wherever
practicable there should be a minimum cost of operation, and
all grades, curves, and sections involving heavy maintenance
work, should be avoided. (4) Finally, the cost of construction
should be confined to the lowest amount consistent with safety
and good operating efficiency; expensive rights of way, heavy
masonry work, long bridges, expensive gradings, and other
costly work were decidedly undesirable.
Thus, the company selected the route entirely upon its
economic and engineering merits and, with slight exceptions,
the line chosen was the most direct and shortest of the possible
routes. From Cairo to Freeport the railroad was as straight as
practicable, only slight variations being made to include the
important towns of Vandalia, Decatur, Bloomington, La Salle,
and Mendota, and there is one stretch of track south of La Salle
which extends sixty miles without a curve. The Chicago branch
from the junction with the main line at Centralia, was also
almost straight, and for the entire distance of two nundred and
fifty miles only three curves, and those of large radius, were
necessary. In selecting the route from Dixon to Galena, the
preference was given to Freeport instead of Savannah ; and the
present line of the Chicago branch was decided upon in prefer-
ence to the line farther east. With the various disputed points
decided, the total length, according to Colonel Mason's first
report, was 699 miles.
18
The questions connected with the route having been settled,
the engineers were free to spend their entire time in completing
the surveys and preparing the preliminary estimates of cost of
construction. Work progressed rapidly, and by September 1,
1851, a preliminary report covering both amount and cost of
construction work was submitted to the president.19 Heavy T
rails, light grades, easy curves, well built embankments and fills,
ample cuts, and brick or stone buildings were to be provided,
"Report of President Schuyler to Directors, September 12, 1851, in
Documents Relating to the Organisation of the Illinois Central Railroad.
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and everything was to be of the highest standard consistent with
the light traffic conditions which would prevail on a western rail-
road.- Although built over the level prairies of Illinois, an
average of thirty thousand cubic yards of earth was to be used
per mile on embankments and fills.21 Including equipment and
all construction expenditures, the total cost was estimated at
$16,537,212, or $23,700 per mile. 22 Even this liberal amount
proved to be insufficient and the final cost exceeded the prelimi-
nary figures by some ten millions of dollars.28
The surveys were hastened as much as possible, but the final
results were submitted none too soon. According to the char-
ter, the main line was to be completed within four years from
February 10th, 1851, and the branches within six years, while
work on the main line was to be commenced by January 1st,
1852; therefore, it was imperative that the construction should
not be delayed.
24 Nor was the undertaking an easy one to com-
plete within this short period. Large construction companies
did not then exist; rails, chairs, fastenings, and bridge iron had
to be imported from England, and other supplies carried west
from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania; the amount
of grading was very great; and labor was far from abundant.29
Thus, even aside from any financial difficulties, the question of
building the road within the time limit was very perplexing, and
the directors, as well as Colonel Mason, were forced to pay close
attention to construction work in Illinois.
Among the various questions which occupied the attention
of the directors was the one "by whom and in what way should
the road be built". As early as April 23rd, 1851, a Mr. Frank-
lin, for several years railroad engineer for the Russian Govern-
ment, offered to build the Illinois Central Railroad and take
bonds in payment on very liberal terms.28 Even before that
date it was rumored that private corporations were willing to
20Report of President Schuyler to Directors, September 12, 1851, in
Documents Relating to the Organisation of the Illinois Central Railroad;
also charter, Illinois Central Railroad, sec. 15, H 3.
"Ibid.
2ilbid.; cf. Chap. vi.
24Charter, Illinois Central Railroad, sec. 15, 11 3; ibid., sec. 23.
25Cf. Chap. n. Practically no railroad material was made in this
country, and it had to be imported from Europe.
^Chicago Daily Democrat, April 23, 1851.
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undertake the construction of large portions of the road.
27 But
the work was entirely beyond the capacity of any private con-
struction company and the officials of the Illinois Central wisely
determined either to build the road themselves or else to let
the work out in small sections. This conclusion was reached
early in 1851, and Colonel Mason's estimates, therefore, were
made with that end in view.
Although the preliminary engineering estimates were sub-
mitted by the first of September, the final estimates were not
submitted until much later, and it was impossible to start active
construction work on the main line that fall. However, in
accordance with the letter of the charter, the Illinois Central,
on December 23rd, 1851, broke ground at both Cairo and Chi-
cago, and amidst elaborate ceremonies, the salutes of cannon,
and the ringing of bells, formally commenced the construction
of this great enterprise.
28
During the winter contracts were
made for supplies, the federal land survey was completed, ar-
rangements were made for transfer of the land to the company,
and other preliminary work was completed.
Specifications had been prepared during the winter, and on
the 15th of March, 1852, the company invited bids for the con-
struction of divisions 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, and 10. The proposals were
to include grading, masonry, bridging, superstructure for the
entire division or a part of the same, or merely for a single item,
such as grading, if desired.
29 Bids could be entered with or
without material. The terms were one-half cash and one-half
seven per cent bonds at par, with the usual arrangement in
regard to inspection, completion within a specified period, and
other matters. At the time the contracts were placed the credit
of the road was exceptionally strong, and there was a ready
response on the part of contractors, both in Illinois and the east-
ern states. Men even came on from Europe and there was not
a section of the line that was not bid for several times. As a
27Chicago Daily Democrat, April 22, 1851. Cf. this method with the
Credit Mobilier in the Union Pacific and the Construction company in the
Iowa Falls and Sioux City, infra Chap. iv.
28Cairo Sun, December 25, 1851.
29Chicago Daily Democrat, April 23, 1851 ; ibid., March 25, 1852. To
facilitate the work of construction, the road was divided into twelve divi-
sions, varying in length from fifty to seventy-five miles, according to the
character and extent of the grading and bridging. Over each division
was placed a division engineer, whose duty it was to supervise the indi-
vidual contracts and direct the construction done directly by the com-
pany.
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result the bids were low and the terms favorable to the company.
This permitted the railroad to let the work out at reasonable
figures. In many cases the division contractors sub-let part of
the work. The strong competition between bidders, and the
financial standing of the company, prevented letting the work
at excessively high prices and the Illinois Central was built as
cheaply as could have been expected under semi-frontier
conditions.30
Contracts for the first six divisions were let early in June,
1852, and bids for the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, llth, and 12th divisions
were accepted later in the summer. Work was commenced im-
mediately on the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th divisions, but the llth
and 12th were not pushed until two years later. 31 The bids
included only the grading and part of the bridge construction;
the company itself laid the rails and erected most of the build-
ings.
32
Thus, by the end of October, 1852, the entire road, with
the exception of 52 miles north of the Big Muddy River, where
the contractors had given up their work, was under contract
and active construction had been started.33
The affairs of the Illinois Central at Chicago did not pro-
ceed as smoothly as in the southern and central parts of the
state. Railroad matters in that city had been in a thoroughly
demoralized condition for many months prior to the passage of
the charter, and the company was forced to take a hand in local
railroad controversies and also in municipal politics in order to
secure adequate terminal facilities and a city franchise. The
conflict between the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern (then
the Southern Michigan) and the Michigan Central involved the
Illinois Central in the greatest difficulties.
For several years these two railroads had been keen rivals
in Michigan and northern Indiana, and during the year 1850
they had extended their tracks to within a few miles of Chicago.
Each endeavored to secure an independent entrance to the city
s Advertisement in railroad journals, March, 1852; also Chicago Daily
Democrat, March 25, 1852. There was undoubtedly a small amount of
mismanagement in the construction of the road, but the amount was
small. Some of the directors were interested in contracts with the com-
pany, but there is no evidence to show that they used their official posi-
tions to defraud the company. For a full discussion of these points,
cf. Chap. vi.
31American Railroad Journal, October 25, 1856.
"Ibid.
**Ibid.
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and to prevent its competitor from obtaining a similar right.
The result was a bitter fight in the legislatures of Illinois, Michi-
gan, and Indiana, in the common council of Chicago, in munici-
pal politics of that city, and even between groups of workmen
along the tracks.
34 The companies were of equal strength, and
neither could secure a charter from the state of Illinois or a fran-
chise from the city. Despite all their efforts the two railroads, in
1851, were halted at the Illinois state line.
The charter for the Illinois Central was before the legisla-
ture at this time, and the Michigan Central allied itself with the
promoters of this road, hoping, thereby, to secure the coveted
entrance to Chicago. The influence of the Michigan company
was brought to bear on the legislature, and it is very probable
that financial assistance was extended to the promoters of the
new company. The charter was eventually passed, and the Illi-
nois Central was allowed to make connections with other rail-
roads.35 At the time, it was commonly understood this provision
applied to the Michigan Central.
Very soon after the "Central" was organized rumors began
to arise that the two companies were to form some kind of a
connection by which the Michigan corporation would enter Chi-
cago over the tracks of the Illinois Central. However, these ru-
mors \vere groundless and nothing more was heard until the
Illinois Central itself commenced surveys southwest of the city
towards the Indiana state line and the Kankakee River.36
While these preliminary surveys were being completed, the
company was making special efforts to secure an ordinance ad-
mitting it to the city of Chicago. Mr. Brayman, of Springfield,
and Representative Bissell, of Belleville, had been appointed
solicitors of the company in Illinois and on July 12, 1851, the
latter, in connection with representatives of the Michigan Cen-
tral Railroad, presented a petition to the city council of Chicago
asking permission to lay down tracks within the city limits.37
A few days later, this memorial was withdrawn for revision on
account of opposition in the council.
38
Three months later Colonel Bissell submitted a second me-
34Cf. Chicago Daily Democrat during the latter half of the year 1850.
Mr. Wentworth, editor of the Democrat, took an active part in the con-
troversy.
35Charter, Illinois Central Railroad, sec. n.
39Chicago Daily Democrat, May 21, 1851.
"Ibid., July 13, 1851.
**Ibid., October 17, 1851.
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morial. 30 Although the construction of the Illinois Central was
regarded as one of the most important events in recent state
history the city council, and to a less extent, the daily newspa-
pers, were hostile to the company. The strife over the Southern
Michigan-Michigan Central entrance had been so bitter that the
supposed alliance between the Illinois Central and the Michigan
Central brought upon the former suspicion and even opposition.
So strong was the feeling that, upon a mere rumor that the
"Central" was planning to build a cut-off to Joliet, thus estab-
lishing a rival railroad center near the Indiana line, a resolution
was introduced into the city council of Chicago, disapproving
such a policy and bitterly attacking the Illinois company.40 The
element opposed to the Michigan Central was strong enough to
pass the resolution and, in addition, appropriate ten thousand
dollars to be used in preventing the establishment of the Joliet
cut-off.41 This action was commonly attributed to representa-
tives of the Southern Michigan Railroad, and immediately after
the passage of the resolution copies were printed and scattered
broadcast throughout the eastern states, England, and Holland
to hinder the floating of the Illinois Central loan.42 The city
council soon found that their action was uncalled for, and a few
days after the passage of the original measure it reconsidered
the matter, modified the extreme statements of the first resolu-
tion,
43 and adopted a more conciliatory policy toward the three
railroad companies.44
Despite the distrust and hostility shown in the action of
the council, Colonel Mason and Solicitor Bissell again presented
their petition for an entrance to the city. After a careful con-
sideration of the various routes the company asked for an en-
trance along the lake front. The railroad was to be built north-
east from Lake Calumet, now Kensington, to the southern limits
of the city at what is now 53rd Street. This, of course, was
outside the old city boundaries. From Hyde Park to Park Row,
12th Street, the company was to have permission to place its
tracks along the lake shore and could purchase what land it
39Chicago Daily Democrat, October 17, 1851.
*Ibid., October 13, 17, 1851.
41 /friW. The files of newspapers for the days in which this resolution
was printed are unobtainable and the only information to be found in
regard to the same comes from editorials of a later date.
43Ibid.
"Ibid.
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needed from private owners of real estate. From Park Row to
the Chicago River the railroad was to receive from the city a
five or six hundred foot right of way just east of Michigan
Avenue. In return for this grant, the company agreed to pro-
vide permanent protection, in the form of levees and piling,
against the encroachments of Lake Michigan. This protection
was to extend from Hyde Park to the Chicago River.45 When
the petition of the company was presented, the city had provided
practically no protection against 'the lake, and most of the terri-
tory north of the city limits and east of the present Illinois
Central tracks was submerged land.
Sixty years ago Michigan Avenue was the aristocratic resi-
dence street of Chicago and the proposition to run a steam
railroad along the avenue provoked strenuous opposition from the
property owners, who believed it would destroy the value of
their investments. On the other hand, the north and west wards
had, for years, paid heavy taxes to protect the lake shore from
encroachments of Lake Michigan, and that portion of Chicago
gladly supported the Illinois Central plan. They argued that
the city was poor and the assumption by the railroads of the
expense of maintaining the south side levees would more than
compensate for any depreciation in the value of residence prop-
erty in the neighborhood.
46 Mass meetings and parades were
held by each side; circulars and petitions were widely circu-
lated
;
the newspapers took an active interest in the matter ; and
both sides threatened to resort to legal proceedings to gain their
point. The fight was carried to the city council and this subject
occupied the attention of the members during the entire month
of December. The Illinois Central finally gained the upper hand
and on December 29, they secured the passage of the ordinance
by a close vote of ten to six.47 The main features of the franchise
were those embodied in the petition of the company with some
minor exceptions. Among these was a reduction of the right of
way from 12th Street to the river to three hundred feet. The
restrictions upon the company were also made more severe.
The decision of the city council did not settle the fight. Wal-
ter Gurnee was Mayor at the time, and on account of a number
of minor objections to the ordinance as passed, and also on
account of his general opposition to the policy of the measure,
^Chicago Daily Democrat, December 3, 1851.
*9
Ibid., daily notices during December, 1851.
"Ibid., December 30, 1851.
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he vetoed the franchise.48 The matter was again taken up in
the council and that body passed the ordinance over his veto.49
The document was immediately forwarded to the directors of
the company in New York for their approval, but on the very
day on which the papers left the city, the whole matter was
reconsidered by the council. The two opposing parties compro-
mised their differences and a new franchise, agreeable to the
south side wards, was passed. It was signed by Mayor Gurnee
and forwarded to New York three days after the first ordi-
nance.80
The original franchise had been duly received in New York
and the directors of the company, unaware of the amending
measure and well satisfied with the provisions, accepted the old
franchise. 51 Three days later, much to their astonishment, there
appeared the second ordinance. Although similar in most ways
to the petition of the company there were some new restrictions
upon the company which the directors did not desire to accept,
and consequently the board declined to accept it and preferred
to wait for more favorable legislation.52
Supposing the first measure had definitely settled the ques-
tions under dispute in regard to an entrance into Chicago the
President immediately directed the engineers to commence active
construction work from Chicago to the state line. When the
second ordinance was not accepted, the company, of course, had
no legal right to enter the city, but rather than delay matters
it was determined to complete the railroad from Lake Calumet to
the city limits at once. There was practically no danger of not
obtaining a proper entrance to the city, and the construction of
this section would provide the Michigan Central with its much
desired entrance into Chicago without a protracted delay.58
Much of the ground south of the city limits, especially near Lake
Calumet and Woodlawn, was low and marshy, and this made it
necessary to place the tracks on trestle work at considerable
additional expense. Rails and ties had been ordered in the fall
of 1851 and by January, 1852, the first shipments had arrived.
Grading and other preliminary work was commenced in Decem-
ber, and the combined energies of the Michigan Central and
48Chicago Daily Democrat, January i, 1852.
**Ibid., January 3, 1852.
*Ibid., January 6, 1852.
n
lbid., January 10, 1852,
*2
Ibid., March 12, 1852.
6
*Ibid., January 10, 1852.
337] CONSTRUCTION OP CHARTER LINES 53
Illinois Central were exerted to finish the line from the Indiana
border to Lake Calumet and from there to Hyde Park.5* Con-
struction was continued when possible during the winter, and
as soon as the weather permitted both companies placed large
gangs of men at work. By May 1 the railroad was within eight
miles of the city limits,
55 and three weeks later that short stretch
was completed. On the twenty-first of the month, the first train,
hauling gravel and construction materials, left Calumet and ran
to the city limits.
56
Temporary freight and passenger stations
had been established just outside the limits and on the morning
of May 22 this first completed section of the Illinois Central
was formally opened, and a passenger train was run from Chi-
cago to the state line.
57
Regular freight and passenger trains
were placed in service a few days later. The Michigan Central
made use of the tracks of the Illinois Central from Calumet to
Chicago, and this piece of roadbed became the final link by which
the former company established a through line from Chicago to
the East.58
The tracks from the city limits south were not completed
without several sharp fights with the Southern Michigan. That
company opposed the construction of the road and endeavored
to prevent the Illinois Central from crossing its tracks. It de-
manded that the latter company put in an overhead crossing at
what is now Grand Crossing, which was refused. The difficulty
could not be settled and each company refused to allow the other
to put in any crossing at all. Finally the Illinois Central impa-
tient of this delay sent laborers to build the crossing under cover
of night. The Southern Michigan was taken by surprise, its
watchmen were overpowered, and the grade crossing was finished
before morning. The Michigan company was forced to accept
the situation and the last obstacle to the completion of this sec-
tion was removed.59
This steady construction work, carried on regardless of the
warring factions in the Chicago city council, exerted a strong
54Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads, p. 82.
^Chicago Daily Democrat, May 3, 1852; cf. March 25, 1852.
50
Ibid., May 22, 1852.
"Ibid., May 23, 1852; Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads, p. 85.
66
Ibid.; also advertisements of train service in Chicago newspapers
after June, 1852.
^Chicago Daily Democratic Press, April 30, 1853. The matter of
Grand Crossing was a sore point between the two roads for several years.
Within a few weeks after the crossing was put in, a bad accident occurred
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pressure upon that body. This influence was further strength-
ened by vague rumors of a cut-off from Joliet to Calumet which
would divert a considerable traffic from Chicago proper.60 No
attempt was made to press the franchise question until the
twentieth of April, only a month before the railroad reached the
city limits. Local objections still continued, but the pressure of
the Illinois Central and Michigan Central overcame this oppo-
sition, and, finally, on June 14th, 1852, the common council re-
enacted the first ordinance originally passed on December 29.
The railroad was admitted to the city via the lake front route
and was granted a three hundred foot right of way from Hyde
Park to the Chicago Eiver. In return for this grant, the rail-
road assumed the responsibility of protecting the lake shore
along its right of way, and agreed not to put up any permanent
buildings from Park Row to Randolph Street. Certain other
obligations and restrictions were imposed upon the company,
but, in the main, the franchise greatly favored the railroad.81
With subsequent purchases of land between Park Row and
the river, partly from private owners and partly from the federal
government, the Illinois Central secured probably the finest ter-
minal property possessed by any single railroad in the world.
Its stations and shops were situated in the heart of the city and
its right of way between Grand Crossing and the river was not
crossed by a railroad and for most of the distance not even by
a highway. From the standpoint of the railroad, the right of
way along the lake front was of almost inestimable value ; from
the standpoint of the public, there is much to criticise in having
the otherwise splendid lake front marred by smoky trains and
unsightly railroad tracks, but it must not be forgotten that in
the early fifties the bargain was in favor of the city. In pro-
tecting the many miles of shore line from the river to Hyde
Park the railroad assumed a responsibility that was both trou-
blesome and expensive, while the city was relieved of expendi-
tures amounting to tens of thousands of dollars a year, not an
inconsiderable item for the Chicago of 1850. Nor must it be
forgotten that this easy and uninterrupted entrance to the very
in which several lives were lost, and the two companies accused each
other of having been to blame for not putting in an overhead crossing.
However, evidence seems to show that both companies were equally to
blame. Cf. articles in Chicago Daily Democratic Press, April 30, 1853.
90Chicago Daily Democrat, May 3, 15, 1852; Ackerman, Historical
Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, p. 81.
^Chicago Daily Democrat, May 3, 15, 1852; Ackerman, Early Illinois
Railroads, p. 85.
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heart of the business district has been an important factor in
the industrial development of the city.
Once the legal difficulties were removed, the work of con-
struction proceeded rapidly. Rails, ties, and piles were already
on hand and within a few weeks after the passage of the fran-
chise admitting the railroad to the city, the track was extended
to Twelfth Street. Temporary freight and passenger stations
were built there and used until the permanent structures were
finished. Much of the right of way was under water and heavy
expenditures were necessary to put the tracks in a safe condition.
The rails were laid on trestle work for nearly the entire distance
from Hyde Park to Eandolph Street and beyond the right of
way a temporary breakwater of piling was erected. The pile
and trestle work was to be filled in at a later time when the
company's finances would justify the outlay.62
The company also purchased large quantities of land in the
heart of the city near Randolph Street and expended something
like $250,000 in purchasing urban property, in addition to half
a million more expended on the lake shore protection, virtually
purchase money for the generous right of way granted by the
city.
63 At the foot of Randolph Street on land purchased from
the federal government, the company, in 1853, commenced the
erection of its famous Chicago passenger station, the total cost
of which was over a quarter of a million of dollars. At the time
it was the most expensive railroad station in the country. The
facilities for handling passengers were excellent, and there was
an abundance of room. The building was used jointly by the
Illinois Central, Michigan Central, and Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy railroads, and the top floor of the station was used as a
general office. North of the passenger station, the company
erected a large in-and-out freight house, which was also the
largest depot of its kind in the country, and the largest brick or
stone building in the city. At Fourteenth Street, near the pres-
ent Park Row passenger station, were placed the terminal shops,
roundhouses, and cleaning yards. Then, in 1856, the Fourteenth
Street works of the American Car Company of Chicago were
purchased and after that date most of the heavy engine and car
2Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, pp.
80-85 ; Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855 ; Chicago newspapers,
1852. The breakwater and trestlework were not filled in until after the
Chicago fire of 1871.
* 3Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1860. Chicago Daily
Democrat, January i, 1852-1860. Cf. Chap. vi.
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repairs on the system were handled at these shops. A number
of locomotives and cars were also built by the company at the
new works. By 1855, nearly a million dollars had been expended
by the company for construction, right of way, lake shore pro-
tection, buildings, and other terminal improvements in the city
limits. The work was continued during the following five years,
in which time an additional million was spent on the Chicago
terminals.
Moreover, on June 23rd, 1852, the company had secured an
amendment to its charter permitting it to build a railroad from
Twelfth Street to the south branch of the Chicago River.84 This
road, known as the St. Charles Air Line, served as an inner belt
railroad for the Illinois Central, Michigan Central, Lake Shore,
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, Galena and Chicago Union, Chi-
cago and Bock Island, and Chicago and Northwestern railroads.
It was built by the Illinois Central and was completed in 1856
at a total cost of $50,000.65
While these large expenditures were being made at Chicago,
work on other portions of the system was not neglected. The
company had little difficulty in securing the right of way and
station ground needed. Nor was there much trouble in obtain-
ing village and town franchises. The Illinois Central created a
majority of the villages and towns along its tracks, and it held
the grounds before there was any municipal organization. The
only opposition to granting a franchise was at Galena. The
railroad, under both the state and Holbrook projects, terminated
at that city, and the citizens were bitterly opposed to the exten-
sion of the line to Dunleith. They realized that the construction
of the "Central" to that point meant disaster to their business
interests. Since the extension of the road was an essential part
of the state charter and of the act of Congress conferring the
land grant, there was no possibility of changing the provision.
The city, however, placed numerous obstacles in the way of the
railroad, and for several months refused to give the company a
franchise. These tactics, of course, were childish, and the city
council finally yielded. The railroad received the right to enter
Galena, but only with many conditions and restrictions.68
"Session Laws of Illinois, 1852-1853, June 23, 1852.
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857. The Illinois
Central subsequently sold three-fourths of its interest in the St. Charles
Air Line to the Michigan Central, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, and
Chicago & Northwestern.
"The following is taken from the Chicago Daily Democratic Press
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The matter of local franchises did not interfere with the
commencement of construction work, and, as noted above, con-
tracts for the entire road were let in the spring and early sum-
mer of 1852. The Illinois Central was more fortunate than most
of the roads of the time in that it had considerable resources
upon which it could draw at a moment's notice. The sale of the
four million loan of February, 1852, and the five million sterling
loan of June, the same year, together with subscriptions by the
stockholders, provided ample funds for starting the work. Part
of the later loans, especially the Free Land issue of 1855-56,
were placed at a considerable discount, but the money market
fluctuations which brought this condition to pass, did not se-
riously interfere with the loans. Moreover, the capital stock of
over fourteen million dollars was issued subject to assessment,
and the directors always had this to fall back upon in emer-
gency. Thus, at all times, the company had either in hand or
in sight, whatever funds were necessary to carry on the enter-
prise in the most economical and expeditious manner. Economy
and good management were always observed, but the directorate
was also in a position to push the work as much as possible.
Materials and labor were paid for in cash or bonds equivalent
to cash and payments were met promptly. With the exception
of a few weeks after the assignment of 1857, all bills, contracts,
notes or other obligations were liquidated when due, and the
credit of the company was always high.67 This condition was a
decided contrast to the ' ' hand-to-mouth ' ' policy pursued by such
southern roads as the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern
or by western lines like the Ohio and Mississippi, and it enabled
the Illinois Central not only to finish the work within the limits
set by the charter, but also to carry on the enterprise at a com-
paratively low cost.68
of March isth, 1853 : "Permission is given the Illinois Central Railroad
(by the city of Galena) to lay down and operate a road through the city
upon a prescribed line, by locomotive engines. Permission was given
the company to bridge Galena river within the limits of the city and a
portion of the levee, three hundred feet in length, was appropriated for
their use. The usual regulations in regard to use of streets, etc. were in-
serted. The company will spend $10,000 under the direction of the city
authorities for dredging the stream in front of the depot grounds."
67As stated in Chapter vi, the assignment did not affect the credit of
the Illinois Central to any great extent. The great bulk of the construction
work was finished in 1855; the floating debts that could not be met were
only indirectly related to contracts for construction.
68In Chapter vi a statement is made that the company was forced to
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Nevertheless, the management in Illinois was involved in
several difficulties during this period. The most important re-
lated to the contracts for material and labor. The road was let
to contractors in the spring and summer of 1852, and at that
time Illinois Central seven per cent bonds were selling at a slight
premium. Accordingly, the directors stipulated that the terms
for all work be one-half cash and one-half seven per cent bonds
at par.
69 This arrangement was accepted, and the first payments
were made on such a basis. The contracts were also based on
the prices prevailing in 1852, and on account of the competition
between bidders they were taken at low figures. During 1853
and 1854 the price of bonds, materials, and labor remained ap-
proximately the same as in 1852. But about the time of the
Schuyler frauds various influences combined to depress the quo-
tations of Illinois Central bonds, while rising prices increased
the cost of railroad supplies and labor throughout the entire
country. This was especially severe in Illinois on account of the
large amount of railroad construction and the abundant crops,
which made enormous demands for unskilled labor. Naturally,
the contractors were unwilling to stand the decline in bonds and
increased cost of construction, and asked for additional compen-
sation from the company. Where definite contracts had been
made the management refused to make any radical changes.
Most of the contractors, however, had taken up the work in such
a way that the company could not force them to continue at the
old terms, or else did not feel it desirable to do so. Under the
circumstances, the provision making half payment in bonds was
not carried out, and the payments to the contractors were largely
increased. In spite of this reasonable action by the railroad
many contractors surrendered their contracts and threw the
unfinished work back upon the company.70
pursue a hand-to-mouth financial policy. This was true; at the same
time there were always sufficient funds in the treasury to meet the con-
tracts when due. The condition was similar to what occasionally exists
on any large railroad when financial stringencies prevent the floating of
Jx>nds at favorable terms and the company is forced to sell short term
note* at a discount. However, this lack of funds very seldom affects
employees of the company or creditors, although it does make any new
work more expensive on account of the difficulty of obtaining cash.
"Chicago Daily Democrat, March 25, 1852; also advertisements.
70Cairo Mirror and City Directory, 1864, 1865; letter of W. H.
Osborn, dated, N. Y., Oct. 16, 1855, quoted in Railway Times, November
10, 1855; official communication from the Board of Directors, dated
November /, 1854, quoted in Railway Times, November 25, 1854; Satter-
343] CONSTRUCTION OF CHARTER LINES 59
In most of these cases the directors did not enter into new
contracts, but carried on the work under its own division super-
intendents. The portions of the line surrendered were the most
difficult, and the responsibility placed upon the company's engi-
neers was large. The most important of these divisions were
the ones from Cairo to Carbondale, and those near Decatur.71
But the same difficulties which enhanced the cost to the con-
tractors made the work more expensive for the company. As
most of the responsible work, such as bridges, trestles, buildings,
culverts, and the heaviest pieces of grading, was performed
directly by the railroad the advance in prices had an important
effect. As high as $1.50 per day was paid for ordinary section
labor and proportionate wages for skilled workmen.72 The re-
sult of greater wages and prices on company work and larger
compensation for contractors was a general advance in the cost
of building the road, amounting to several millions of dollars.
The estimate made by Colonel Mason was found to be much too
low. At about the same time between one and two million of
bonds, taken by contractors in 1852 and 1853, were returned
to the company in such a way that the market for Illinois Cen-
thwaite's Report, Railway Times, July 22, 1854. The greatest difficulty was
experienced in the division north of Cairo and near Decatur.
The Illinois Central profited by the depression and fluctuations in
prices of labor and supplies. The following statements taken from the
report of Mr. F. E. Satterthwaite, American correspondent of the Rail-
way Times, in the number for July 22, 1854, are interesting: "The first
thing done was to buy the iron for the whole road at $45 per ton for
bonds at par. In six month after the purchase the value of iron doubled,
by which the company saved $1,500,000. The high character of the com-
pany and the rapid progress of the road commanded confidence so that
the company was enabled to sell the whole of the $17,000,000 at par (sic),
with the exception of the February (1854) issue. The sales were made
payable in instalments which will be completed in July next
"
Mr. Satterthwaite undoubtedly exaggerates the profits made from buying
the iron and other supplies, nevertheless the saving was considerable.
For instance, the N. O. J. & G. N. paid $85 per ton for poorer rails than
those for which the Illinois Central paid $45, but this was affected
slightly by the lack of confidence in the southern road. There was also
some saving made in contracts, which the contractors were forced to
live up to.
71Cairo Mirror and City Directory, 1864, 1865 ; official communica-
tion from the Board of Directors, November 7, 1854, quoted in Railway
Times, November 25, 1854.
"Ibid,
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tral securities was depressed and, consequently, it was harder to
secure money.
73
Aside from these difficulties, the management had little to
contend with beyond the general engineering problems involved
in such an extensive enterprise. The prairies of Illinois offered
an almost ideal location for a railroad, and except for somewhat
difficult construction on three or four divisions, the building of
the road proceeded without serious delays. Even in the bluffs
along the Illinois and Cache rivers the engineering problem was
extremely simple compared with the building of the Union
Pacific or many eastern lines. The greatest trouble was found
in the distance of the work from the older parts of the country
and in high cost of transportation. The labor problem was
solved by the employment of foreign laborers, largely Irish. In
fact the road was built almost entirely by this class of workmen.
At one time nearly ten thousand men were working on the road,
but the need of help on the farms and demand by other railroads
prevented the "Central" from keeping all the men it needed.
Rails, bridge iron, equipment, and other railroad materials were
carried from the eastern states and England to Cairo, Chicago,
and Dunleith by water. From those places they were either
hauled by wagon across the country or else carried on the rivers,
the canal, and the Galena and Chicago Union railway as near
the construction work as possible and then hauled by wagon.
This method, at best, was slow and expensive, and resulted in
considerable delay. Supplies for the men were hauled long dis-
tances by teams, as most of the country through which the road
went was sparsely settled.
By the 1st of January, 1855, all the main line and over
half of the Galena and Chicago branches were in operation.74
7SMost of the bonds taken by contractors were returned to the com-
pany after the Schuyler frauds, when the price of seven percents had
dropped to 64.
74The following "History of Construction" is taken from the Chicago
Daily Democratic Press, being quoted in the American Railroad Journal,
October 25, 1856: "Published contracts were first made in June, 1852,
and the grading of the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 8th, Qth, and loth divisions let. On
the I4th of October following the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, nth, and I2th were
put under contract. In July the first instalment of the first English loan
was paid and it was not until this payment had been made that the orig-
inators of the enterprise had confidence in its success. In March, 1853,
Colonel Mason was elected Superintendent. On the i6th day of May the
first sixty miles of the Illinois Central from La Salle to Bloomington was
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During the next six months the remainder of the Galena branch,
and the Chicago branch as far south as Mattoon, were finished,
leaving only the line from the St. Louis and Terre Haute Rail-
road to Centralia, seventy-seven miles, incomplete.75 The finan-
cial difficulties in 1855, lack of labor, and the fact that the com-
pany already had a connection with the main line by way of the
Great Western from Tolono to Decatur and by the Terre Haute
road from Mattoon to Pana, made it unadvisable to finish the
work before September, 1856.78 The last rail was laid on Sep-
tember 26.
Although formally opened in September, 1856, the railroad
was only partially completed. Many of the station buildings
were not built, fencing, ballasting, construction of levees and
piling at Chicago, Cairo, La Salle, and Dunleith were incomplete,
and much of the bridge and culvert work was of a temporary
nature. The equipment was also inadequate. Thus, the expen-
ditures during the fall of 1856 and during 1857 were very large.
By the close of the latter year everything was finished, and
opened for business, and the company commenced working the road on
its own account. The following are the dates of opening by sections :
MAIN LINE, CAIRO TO LA SALLE, 308 MILES.
LaSalle to Bloomington
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further construction work was confined to extensions and to
providing for the demands of increasing traffic. 77
Compared with the present charter lines of the Illinois
Central, the construction was poor and the equipment was
very inadequate. Only a portion of the road was ballasted
with gravel, none with stone. The embankments were narrow
and the roadbed was greatly inferior to present Illinois Central
standards. Bridges, culverts, and trestles were weak and un-
adapted to heavy loads. Freight houses were poorly arranged,
and the terminal yards were mere collections of tracks, without
any definite system. Locomotives, both freight and passenger,
were light, the heaviest weighing only thirty tons, and all used
wood instead of coal. Eight tons was the maximum load for
freight cars, while the proportion of tare to net load was about
one to one. In 1857 most of the coal, and some of the house cars,
had only a single pair of trucks, while those possessing two
trucks were classed as two cars. The passenger equipment
lacked most of the conveniences now regarded as essential
steam heat, air brakes, ventilators, improved springs, automatic
couplers, vestibules, good lights. No sleeping cars were included
in the equipment of the road when finished.78
However, the Illinois Central, in 1857, was the best built
railroad in the West and as- good as most eastern lines. The
total cost of construction was $26,568,017.61, or $37,600 per
mile, of which some twenty-one millions were expended on road-
way, buildings, etc.
79 In no sense of the word could the con-
struction work be regarded as temporary. Buildings were of a
permanent character, generally stone or brick. The roadbed
was well built, according to the standards of the time, and was
laid with sixty pound iron T rails, placed on chairs.80 Sidings
were ample for the traffic of the period, and much of the line
was adapted for double tracking. Bridges were made of iron,
with stone abutments, and the culverts were generally built of
stone. The line, following the original surveys, was straight and
free from heavy grades or sharp curves. Terminal facilities
were ample and permitted extensive additions without a large
expenditure for land or right of way. The equipment was more
than sufficient for the needs of the railroad when completed.
"Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857.
7
*Ibid.; cf. Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the
United States.
">Cf. Chap. vi.
The rails were of exceptionally good material and according to
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Both locomotives and freight and passenger cars were up to the
highest standards of the period and, with slight exception, the
rolling stock was entirely new. On the whole, the railroad con-
formed to the provisions of the charter, and "was made equal,
in all respects, to the road leading from Boston to Albany,
usually known as the Great "Western, with such improvements
as experience has shown to be expedient."81
Mr. Ackerman some of them were in use as late as 1881.
"Charter, Illinois Central Railroad, sec. 15, 11 3.
CHAPTER IV.
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, 1857 TO 1870.
The construction of the roadbed and buildings and the pur-
chase of rolling stock were merely the first step in the develop-
ment of the Illinois Central System. Traffic had to be secured,
markets found for the products of the territory tributary to the
railroad, and the agricultural and manufacturing interests of
that region stimulated; an operating organization was necessary
and provision had to be made for the rapid and economical
handling of both freight and passenger business. As further
steps there came the formation of traffic alliances with connect-
ing or branch railroads, trackage agreements for the use of cer-
tain desirable pieces of track, organization and maintenance of
pools and similar arrangements, and finally the physical exten-
sion of the railroad through the lease of old lines or the con-
struction of new. These were the problems before the manage-
ment, in 1857, and their solution is the real history of the
company.
The organization of the various departments was developed
gradually. During the first three years of construction the
operating side was handled by the Chief Engineer, Mr. Mason,
and the net receipts from the traffic went directly into the
construction account. Later Mr. Mason was made general super-
intendent, and a separate operating department was created.1
In 1856 Mr. Arthur was made general superintendent, in place
of Mr. Mason, who resigned,2 and he, in turn, was succeeded by
George B. McClellan, Commander in Chief of the federal armies
during a part of the Civil War. By 1855 most of the road was
completed and the traffic was large enough to make a complete
operating organization necessary. Accordingly traffic, mainte-
nance of way and equipment, operating, financial, and legal
departments were established under the supervision of the gen-
eral superintendent. The president did not transfer his offices
to Illinois until several years after the construction of the road
and the board of directors has always kept New York as its
1Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads, p. 43.
2
Ibid., p. 44.
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official meeting place. For that reason it was necessary to have
some ranking executive officer in Chicago, and Mr. Arthur, Mr.
McClellan, and their successors in the office of general superin-
tendent had full charge of all operating matters, subject, of
course, to the approval of the president and board of directors.
Otherwise the organization of the railroad was similar to that
of other companies doing the same kind of work.
As soon as a stretch of track was completed, freight and
passenger service was commenced. In the passenger department
the standard service was two trains a day in each direction over
all important sections of the road. In addition such extra trains
were run as the traffic demanded, but from 1857 to 1870 this
standard of two trains a day in each direction was maintained.3
The freight traffic was more irregular and the service conformed
to the special needs of the season.
4 As freight traffic developed,
it became necessary to increase the number of trains until by
1870 there was an average of five freight trains a day in each
direction. 5 By that time most of the mixed trains had been
taken off, and the separation of the two branches was complete.
In addition to the regular passenger service the company estab-
lished a suburban service from Hyde Park and later from towns
as far south as Kensington to Chicago.6 From the commence-
ment of passenger service the trains carried both mail and
express. According to the federal act of September 20th, 1850,
the railroad was obliged to carry what mail the Post Office
Department directed on terms prescribed by Congress.7 Mail
was handled on all regular trains, and the Illinois Central be-
came one of the most important arteries of the Post Office
Department. The Adams Express company was given a mo-
nopoly of the express business in 1856, and a regular system
was installed.8
Even before trains were put in operation it was necessary
to issue tariffs. Rate matters, however, were in a chaotic condi-
tion and no formal tariff sheets were printed. In some respects
the regulations as to the making of rates were much stricter
than in later years. The number of different rates was small
and it was an easy matter for the general superintendent or
even the president to adjust the charges personally. Most ship-
sAnnual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.
*Ibid., 1855-1859-
6
Ibid., 1870.
/&trf., 1856.
7Act of September 20, sec. 6.
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856.
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pers regarded railway rates in the same light as ordinary busi-
ness transactions a matter of individual bargaining, and tariffs
were often adjusted by the local station agent.9
The railroad was just getting the various departments well
organized when the development of the road and the country
tributary to it was arrested by the panic of 1857, the assignment
of that year, and a series of droughts and crop failures. The
traffic of 1856 and the early part of 1857 promised a rapid
development of the business of the company. 10 In the last three
or four months of 1857 shipments and earnings decreased con-
siderably. The next year, 1858, a severe drought ruined much
of the corn and wheat, and in 1859 prices for grain were so low
that the farmers did not find it profitable to market their corn
and wheat. 11 Instead of the income of the road increasing it
actually declined in these two years, and the net revenue did
not provide for a third of the interest charges accruing during
the period.
12 New construction work was suspended, purchases
of equipment cancelled, and maintenance work reduced as much
as practicable, but even these savings did not prevent the
decrease in net earnings. The shareholders were forced to pay
assessments on their stock, and the railroad received a setback
which was not overcome for three or four years. 13
By 1860 conditions were again normal, and the first few
months of 1861 were the most profitable the company had en-
jojred to that time. But this prosperity was temporarily checked,
this time by the commencement of the Civil War. State troops
were rushed to Cairo the first week in May, and during the next
four years the regular business of the railroad was constantly
interrupted by the demands of the Government.14 The outbreak
of hostilities destroyed southern shipments of grain and mer-
chandise from Cairo and, for a time, checked the growth of
Illinois. Traffic declined and the officials of the company were
left without plans on account of the rapid change in affairs.
At the same time the working force of the company was disor-
ganized by the enlistment of men in the army and the sudden
demands of the War Department for transportation of troops
or supplies.
15 Thousands of men were sent south to Cairo via
the railroad, and immense quantities of grain, meat, ammuni-
9Statement of station agent at Calumet, 1857.
10Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857.
"Ibid., 1858. 1859.
13
Ibid., 1860.
Ibid., 1861-1865.
16Ibid.; Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads, pp. 45, 46.
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tion, and other materials for the armies were forwarded in the
same direction. In all cases precedence was given to trains
carrying troops or government supplies, and the regular work-
ing of the road was constantly delayed. Moreover, these sudden
calls reduced the amount of equipment available for other uses,
and the company was compelled to pay heavy damages for
failure to furnish cars.18
Nevertheless, the war aided the railroad more than it dam-
aged it. The development of manufacturing in the eastern states
and the needs of the army created a demand for the products of
Illinois and several times as much grain was handled during the
closing years of the war as in 1857 to 1860. Furthermore, the
army traffic was profitable, although the provisions of the land
grant act and the charter compelled the company to carry both
troops and supplies at reduced rates. From 1862 until the- close
of the war the railroad was utterly unable to handle the freight
offered it. 17 As a result both gross and net earnings increased
more than two fold during the conflict, and in 1865 they were
sufficient to provide for dividends on all the stock outstanding.18
The same influences which brought about the traffic development
of the Civil War period produced an even greater growth in the
next five years, and the earnings of 1869 and 1870 were well
ahead of those of any previous years.19
On the other hand the Civil War made impossible the use
of the north and south trade routes. The Illinois Central was
primarily a north and south railroad and the officials of the
company, in 1859 and 1860, had managed to build up a fairly
lucrative trade with the southern Mississippi valley states. But
during the war the grain traffic of the West was sent east to
the Atlantic seaboard. When the war was over the resources of
the south were gone, and the company was unable to revive its
north and south business for a number of years. 20 The pros-
perity of the period under discussion was unnatural, and events
occurring after 1870 inflicted serious damage upon the company.
Most of the growth of business from 1857 to 1870 occurred
on the charter lines of the company, but it was aided by a num-
ber of extensions and traffic alliances made at various times.
The Illinois Central was built in the shape of a Y and in fact
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1865.
"Ibid., 1862-1865.
16
Ibid., 1865.
Ibid., 1869, 1870.
20
Ibid., 1861 ff.; Report of the Delegates Appointed by the English,
and Dutch Shareholders, 1877.
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consisted entirely of main line, although the portion from Chi-
cago to Centralia and from Dubuque to La Salle were then
classed as branches. As a result the territory directly tributary
was confined to the limited area within fifteen or twenty miles
of the tracks. Moreover, there was no connection between the
Chicago branch and the main line, resulting in great inconveni-
ence to the company. As a remedy for the first of these evils
the company, from 1855 to 1870, built up a system of semi-sub-
sidiary branch lines. Until after 1860 the Illinois Central was
the largest and strongest railroad in the central West and, there-
fore, was in a position to assist smaller roads. In pursuance of
such a policy, the railroad, either by direct action of the directors
or else through the personal efforts of individual members, helped
several east and west lines. Among the most important were
the Great Western (now the Wabash) from the Mississippi to
Danville
;
the Terre Haute, Alton and St. Louis ( St. Louis Divi-
sion of the C. C. C. & St. L.) from Alton to Terre Haute; the
Ohio and Mississippi (Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern) from
Illinoistown (E. St. Louis) to Cincinnati; and the Mineral Point
(Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul).21 All of these have devel-
oped into important east and west main line roads, but from
1855 to 1865 or 1866 the cost of rail transportation made it
impossible for them to carry grain from Illinois eastward. More-
over, several of the companies were without eastern connections
until the early sixties.
In addition to the transverse or semi-branch roads the Illi-
nois Central lent its aid to four other companies in an effort to
establish a connection between the two arms of the system. In
1852 or 1853 an arrangement was made with the Galena and
Chicago Union, by which the latter should not build its line
beyond Freeport, but instead should use the tracks of the
' ' Cen-
tral", while the latter should have trackage rights over the for-
mer's line from Freeport to Chicago.22 From 1854 to 1858 or
1859 this connection proved of great service to the company.
But about 1857 disputes arose between the two railroads, and
the Illinois Central was able to make more advantageous arrange-
ments with the Chicago and Northwestern at Dixon and later
with the Chicago and Burlington at Mendota. 23 None of these
agreements allowed the "Central" any profit on the transfer of
freight between the branches, while the movement of equipment
21Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.
"Ibid.
**Ibid., 1857-1860. The cars were hauled through without breaking
bulk.
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was handicapped. The result was a third attempt to establish a
satisfactory connection. This time it assisted the Logansport,
Peoria, and Burlington, later the Peoria and Oquaka, (now the
Toledo, Peoria and Western branch of the Pennsylvania sys-
tem) in floating its loans, took part of the company's bonds and
secured trackage rights from El Paso to Oilman. The terms
were favorable to the "Central" and the arrangement was made
permanent by a provision that a certain percent of the gross
earnings of interchange business should be invested in Peoria
and Oquaka bonds. 24 Through trains were run from the main
line to the branch and the arrangement was so satisfactory that it
was continued until the company built its own line. At various
times prior to 1860 the tracks of the Great "Western, Terre Haute,
Alton and St. Louis, and Ohio and Mississippi, were used to pro-
vide a connection between the two parts of the system, but these
arrangements were merely temporary.25
In addition to the agreements mentioned above, the Illinois
Central had close relations with the Terre Haute, Alton and St.
Louis. As soon as that line was built from Alton to Pana, a
trackage agreement was made by which through trains were run
from Chicago to St. Louis. In fact the Terre Haute-Illinois
Central line was the first through line between those cities.
Solid trains were handled, besides coaches and sleepers.26 The
distance by this route was not much longer than over the St.
Louis, Alton and Chicago and it was regarded as an important
rival of the latter, especially from 1857 to I860.27 Towards the
close of the period a further connection was established between
the Illinois Central and St. Louis by way of the Belleville, South-
ern Illinois, and Du Quoin. The latter company, a lessee of the
Terre Haute company, was finished in 1869, and through con-
nections were immediately established. Three express trains a
day in each direction were run from St. Louis to Cairo, and the
"Cairo Short Line" as it was termed proved profitable for both
companies.
28
While these arrangements were of great value to the Illinois
Central, it made the serious mistake of pursuing a too conserva-
tive course. Several of the roads, for example, the Mineral
Point, Great Western, Peoria and Oquaka, and Chicago, Fulton
-^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1858-1860.
**Ibid., 1855-1857-
29
Ibid., 1856 ff; cf. advertisements in St. Louis newspapers.
"Ibid.
^Railroad Gazette, II, 252.
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and Iowa (Northwestern) could have been leased or purchased
on favorable terms. If this had been done it would have pre-
vented their development into rival systems, and would also have
furnished the "Central" with the necessary branches. Instead,
loose traffic agreements were made and all of these lines grew
into strong competitors, while the Illinois Central in 1870 had
practically no branches or connecting lines.
29
There was one exception to this statement. Of all the rail-
roads connected with the "Central" from 1856 to 1870 only one
became a permanent part of its system.30 This was the Dubuque
and Sioux City Railroad of Iowa. Originally chartered as the
Dubuque and Pacific, before the Civil "War, it was finished dur-
ing that period, being built westward from Dubuque. 31 As soon
as a short portion beyond Dubuque was finished a traffic agree-
ment was made with the Illinois Central for mutual exchange of
freight.
32 Both roads developed rapidly, and by 1867 this inter-
change of freight was of considerable value, especially to the
Illinois Central.33 At first the "Central" was the only com-
pany connecting the Iowa company with Chicago or Milwaukee,
but in 1866 and 1867 other railroads, principally lines now
forming the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul system, made
traffic agreements with the Dubuque and Sioux City, and threat-
ened to divert its traffic to Milwaukee. 34 In order to prevent the
loss of such a valuable feeder, the directors of the Illinois Central
leased the Iowa lines for twenty years, the first ten at thirty five
per cent of the gross earnings and the next ten at thirty six per
cent, with the right of perpetual lease at the latter figure.35
But the Dubuque and Sioux City was building branch lines
by means of two subsidiary companies, the Iowa Falls and Sioux
City and the Cedar Falls and Minnesota. To obtain the parent
company it was necessary to lease the branch lines on the latter 's
own terms. The Dubuque and Sioux City was built by persons
closely connected with the Credit Mobilier and the Union Pacific,
and they applied similar methods to the construction of the Iowa
Z9Report of the Delegates Appointed by the English and Dutch Share-
holders, 1877.
80Except Belleville and Southern.
^Annual Report, Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad, May 31, 1864.
^Annual Report, Iowa State Agricultural Society, 1861 ff. American
Railroad Journal, March 20, 1858.
34Dubuque newspapers, 1865-1867.
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1867.
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company.36 A majority of the board of directors of the Dubuque
corporation organized the Iowa Palls and Sioux City Railroad
Company and also a construction company, with which the rail-
road company made a contract to build the road in return for
a certain amount of stocks and bonds per mile of line. Then
as directors of the Dubuque and Sioux City they leased their
own road, before it was constructed, to the Dubuque and Sioux
City for a minimum annual rental of $1500 per mile, which
amount just covered the interest charges on the bonds they had
agreed to turn over to the construction company.
37 The Iowa
Falls line had no equipment, was not completed and passed
through a thinly settled territory from which the traffic would,
necessarily, remain small for years. While there is no direct
evidence to show that fraud existed, the inference from the
reports of the House Committee and the minutes of the board
of directors of the Dubuque and Sioux City, is to that effect.
Despite the apparent unprofitableness of the Iowa Falls and
Sioux City lines the Illinois Central was forced to include them
in the lease in order to obtain the profitable Dubuque and Sioux
City. Since control of these lines secured a large and profitable
traffic for the Illinois lines the directors of the Illinois Central
were justified in making the arrangement. It was a good busi-
ness proposition despite the peculiar methods pursued in leas-
ing the Iowa Falls to the Dubuque and Sioux City.
Aside from the lease of the Dubuque and Sioux City the
only important action taken by the directors of the company
occurred in the celebrated Lake Front Case.38 With the devel-
opment of passenger traffic taking place in the sixties the Michi-
gan Central, Chicago, Burlington and Quiney, and the Illinois
Central found their Chicago station inadequate and a new build-
ing became necessary. A location on the lake front was especially
fitted to the business of the three roads and, accordingly, they
asked the legislature for the right to fill in certain parts of the
submerged land along the lake front. The legislature was finally
36Report of Credit Mobilier and Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad,
House Reports.
"Official statement by solicitor of Dubuque and Sioux City Rail-
road in Annual Report, 1887. Cites proceedings of Board of Directors.
4
As this monograph deals with the charter lines of the Illinois Central,
and as the Dubuque and Sioux City was not leased until the close of
the period under discussion, the above description is regarded as suffi-
cient.
38As yet the author has not been able to find sufficient material on
this subject to give a thorough treatment.
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induced to grant their request, and a bill giving the three com-
panies the right to the submerged land was passed. Governor
Palmer vetoed it in a vigorous message to the General Assembly
which body, however, passed it over his veto. While the main
features of the bill were not bad, there were several provisions
which worked a gross injustice upon the city of Chicago and
gave excessive rights to the company. The common council of
Chicago refused to accept the provisions of the bill, public opin-
ion was aroused by certain parts of the measure and by the
way the legislature passed it over the governor's veto, and the
legislature repealed the act. The case was carried to the courts
and finally decided against the company. The act was com-
monly known as the Lake Front Steal, and by its connection
with the matter the Illinois Central incurred the ill will of the
public.
The physical development of the Illinois Central railroad
from 1856 to 1870 was much less important than its extensions
through traffic agreements or leases. The increased traffic
demanded many improvements that could not be charged to
maintenance of way. As a result, large expenditures were made
both from capital and from income, and the condition of the
property in 1870 was much better than in 1857. However, there
were no radical changes. Only a few miles of steel rails were ia
use and the weight of rail remained the same. The entire line,
except from Kensington to Chicago, was single tracked, and
bridges, culverts, roadbed, sidings, ballast, buildings, and ter-
minals were still in accordance with the general standards
adopted in 1851.89
On the other hand the development of the equipment was
much greater than the improvement of roadbed and buildings.
Forty per cent of all the money charged to capital from 1857 to
1870 was expended on new equipment, and the amount of roll-
ing stock was over twice as great in the latter year as in the
former. There was also a marked improvement in certain kinds
of equipment, especially in the passenger service. Sleepers
were introduced in the first part of the seventh decade and by
1870 they were in common use on all night trains on the system.
Air brakes, automatic couplers, vestibules, improved seats,
heavier cars with better riding qualities, steel springs, more ex-
pensive furnishings, these were the important advances made
during the period. Many of these improvements would have
*9Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870; especially
annual reports of Maintenance of Way Department; cf. Chap. vi.
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been classed as curiosities a generation later, but at the time
they were considered of great importance and so they were. The
greatest change in locomotives was the substitution of coal for
wood as fuel, the use of iron or steel boiler tubes, somewhat
heavier engines, and the development of distinct freight and pas-
senger types. The general character and size of freight cars
remained about the same, although a few cars capable of carry-
ing twenty tons were in use and the old four wheel cars had
been sent to the scrap heap.
40
The conditions which confronted the management of the
Illinois Central from 1857 to 1870 were peculiar. Panics, crop
failures, and the Civil War prevented the natural development
of the system and forced it into policies not suited to its geo-
graphical location. Moreover, the officers of the company were
handicapped by its foreign control and often adopted more con-
servative methods than would have been followed under a dif-
ferent system of ownership. As a result, the company could not
pursue the policy adopted by some of the more aggressive of its
competitors and often lost traffic as a result. Moreover, many of
the successes obtained by the Illinois Central from 1857 to 1870
were merely temporary, and they inflicted loss upon the com-
pany later on.
40
'Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1870; Ringwalt, De-
velopment of the Railway System of the United States, various chapters;
American Railway Journal, technical articles and advertisements, 1857-
1870.
CHAPTER V.
TRAFFIC, 1857 TO 1870.
In 1851 Illinois was practically isolated from the remainder
of the country. There was comparatively little trade with other
portions of the nation, and intercourse even between local com-
munities was of slight importance. Moreover, the central coun-
ties, comprising fully one-half of the arable land of the state,
were thinly settled and the people living there raised only such
crops as were necessary for their own immediate wants. Even
along the banks of the rivers, where there was the greatest
opportunity for commerce, the industrial and agricultural con-
ditions were more backward than in Ohio or western New York.1
The total yield of wheat, corn, and oats, according to the seventh
census, was only seventy-seven million bushels, slightly over
one-sixth the crop of 1879 and but little more than the amount
raised in either Indiana, Ohio, or Pennsylvania. Of the amount
grown less than one-tenth was shipped to markets outside the
state. Fully two-thirds of such shipments were sent south by
way of the Mississippi River, while less than one-third went
east via the Great Lakes. 2 The lower Mississippi valley states,
especially Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, were the chief
domestic market for the agricultural products of Illinois. The
exports to Europe from the central West were also handled by
way of New Orleans. Thus, the trade of Illinois, as well as that
of the other upper Mississippi valley states, was along north
and south lines.
Consequently, from the traffic standpoint, the construction
of the Illinois Central railroad involved peculiar problems.
When Senator Douglas secured the land grant of 1850, it
was given by Congress for the definite object of building a rail-
road from the Great Lakes and the upper Mississippi River to-
the Gulf of Mexico, with Chicago, Dubuque, and Mobile, the re-
spective termini. The Illinois Central was only a part of a
larger project, and a similar grant of land was given to the
*Cf. Chap. i.
2
Ibid.; Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders,.
1877.
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Mobile and Ohio and other southern railroads to complete the
line from Cairo to the Gulf.3 This all-rail route from the north
to the south was intended to supplement the Mississippi Eiver
and to provide an economical trade route which would retain
the commerce of the Mississippi valley in existing channels.
4
The importance of this north and south railroad was clearly
understood by the promoters, and they built the road on the
most direct line from Chicago and Dubuque to Cairo. The
latter city, not Chicago, was expected to be the main terminus
of the system, although not necessarily the larger city.
5 So far
as the company was concerned the location of the line meant that
the only profitable route for the grain of central Illinois, espe-
cially that portion along the main line from Dixon to Vandalia,
was south to Cairo. Otherwise, the road would get only a short
haul to some junction point. From Cairo, it was thought, the
Mississippi River, and the Mobile and Ohio, the New Orleans,
Jackson and Great Northern, and the Mississippi Central rail-
roads, with connections, would form the southern part of a
through route from the Great Lakes and the upper Mississippi
to Mobile and New Orleans.6
However, in the sixth and seventh decades of the 19th
century, the old trade routes between the west and the other
portions of the United States were radically altered. The devel-
opment of steam navigation on the Great Lakes, the construction
of a vast network of railroads, the industrial expansion of west-
ern Europe and of the north Atlantic seaboard, and the Civil
3Cf. Chap. ii. Section 7 of the Act of September 20, 1850, states:
"That in order to aid in the continuation of said Central Railroad from
the mouth of the Ohio river to the city of Mobile, all the rights, privi-
leges, and liabilities shall be conferred on the states of Ala-
bama and Mississippi."
*Report of the Delegates Appointed by the English and Dutch Share-
holders, 1877; Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, reports of the
President and Directors, 1861-1875.
BEver since the establishment of Cairo the capitalists interested in
the promotion of the city have had extremely sanguine ideas as to the
future importance of the place. When the Illinois Central was incor-
porated Chicago had a population of only thirty thousand, and frequent
prophecies were made that Cairo would soon be the metropolis of the state.
Sober statements were made that the city would have a population of
half a million before the end of the century.
Reports of Robert Rantoul and David Neal in Documents Relating
to the Organization of the Illinois Central Railroad; Annual Report, Illi-
nois Central Railroad, 1861-1874.
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War, with the resulting prostration of the South, resulted in a
readjustment of the commerce between different sections of the
country. Trade was forced out of the paths it had followed
prior to the war and was established on new lines. The com-
merce of the North and South was almost destroyed and trade
was carried on along lines of latitude, not longitude.
7
The most important influence which brought about this
change was the industrial expansion of the north Atlantic states.
By 1850 this portion of the country had become largely industrial
in character, while agriculture was relatively of much less im-
portance than a generation previous. Then, from 1850 on, the
rapid settlement of the west, the prosperity of the southern
states, abundance of capital, and various tariff measures, cul-
minating in the highly protective Merrill act of 1861, combined
to stimulate this movement. As early as the close of the fifth
decade these states had reached practically their limit of agri-
cultural production ; in other words, the food supplies necessary
for their rapidly growing population could no longer be furnished
by the farms east of the Alleghany mountains. This condition
was made more prominent by the large immigration of the period
and the higher standard of living which meant larger per capita
consumption of all articles. Thus, there was an enormous
demand for food stuffs over and above that supplied by the
agricultural population of those states, and even in 1870 consider-
ably over one-third of the total grain used was purchased from
the west.8
7The influence of the Civil War in changing the routes by which
western produce was sent to market can hardly be overestimated. As
stated in the text, the commerce of the upper Mississippi valley was
almost entirely with the southern states. In the publications of the time,
it is taken for granted that the Mississippi river is the natural outlet of
this region. At the present time we are so accustomed to having western
produce sent east by way of the Great Lakes that the southern route is
the unnatural one. Looking at the matter purely from the standpoint
of natural advantages the southern route is by all odds the most advan-
tageous one. As shown by the correspondence between Breese and Doug-
las, it was clearly the purpose of Breese and Douglas to make the Illinois
Central a north and south line which would develop New Orleans or
Mobile in preference to New York.
^Transportation Routes to the Seaboard, p. 14; Bogart, Economic His-
tory of the United States, Chaps, xi, xn.
CONSUMPTION OF WESTERN GRAIN IN NORTH ATLANTIC STATES : 1872.
Shipments of western grain to New England states 41,132,225 bus.
Shipments of western grain to Atlantic states 63,744,897
"
TOTAL 104,877,122
"
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A similarly increasing demand occurred in Great Britain,
Holland, and other countries of western Europe. English and
continental industries grew very rapidly during the middle of
the 19th century and this movement was necessarily accompanied
by a steady growth in population. In 1846 the Corn Laws of
England were repealed,9 and the industrial population was free
to purchase wheat and corn from abroad. The bulk of this
supply came from the United States, and the export of grain
(including flour and meal) rose from thirteen million bushels in
1850 to over fifty million in 1870.
10
The third market for Illinois products was the southern
Mississippi valley. The cotton states, such as Mississippi,
Alabama, Louisiana and Georgia, although well adapted to the
raising of corn and oats, found it more profitable to devote their
energies to the production of cotton and sugar, and to purchase
many of their food supplies from the west. The high price of
cotton prior to the Rebellion made it especially profitable to
pursue this policy, and in the three or four years immediately
preceding the war the demands for western corn and pork were
especially heavy. However, the Civil War destroyed this market
and diverted the grain traffic to the eastern seaboard. After
1865 attempts were made to revive this trade, but the enormous
losses of the southern planters, the emancipation of the slaves,
the lack of capital, the falling price of cotton, and the destruc-
9In 1841 the population of the United Kingdom was 26,730,000; in
1871 this was 31,484,000, or an increase of 4,754,000 million in the thirty
years. During the same time the agricultural population actually de-
creased. Gibbins, Industry in England, p. 446; Levi, History of British
Commerce, p. 297; Seignobos, Political History of Europe since 1814,
P- 59-
10
Levi, History of British Commerce, p. 297; cf. Tenth Census (1880),
volume on Agriculture, monograph on Cereal Production in the United
States, especially p. 468.
In 1870 the United Kingdom consumed 14,100,000 quarters of wheat
grown on English farms, and imported 7,950,000 quarters, or 63,600,000
bushels. The exports of the United States in 1870 were : wheat, 36,584-
ooo bushels ; flour, 3,463,000 barrels ; corn, 1,392,000 bushels ; corn meal,
187,000 barrels. This was the greatest amount exported since 1863. From
1850 to 1870 the continental demand for American grain or grain products
was slight. During occasional years the exports were sufficient to attract
attention, but usually they were not. Until the Civil War the West
Indies were an important market for grain, especially grain sent south
by way of the Mississippi River. The competitors of the United States
for the English market were France, Russia, and Turkey.
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*
tion or diversion of the transportation facilities made it difficult
to develop the old commerce, while the changed economic condi-
tions forced the planters to raise more of their food supplies than
before. Therefore, in 1870, the southern market for Illinois and
Iowa grain was almost negligible.
11
Moreover, the same influences
which affected the domestic market ruined the exportation of
western products via New Orleans. Prior to 1850 the southern
port was as important a grain center as New York, but various
causes, some of them originating before the war, reduced the
amount of grain exported to an insignificant figure, and in the
fifteen years from 1856 to 1870 the total shipments of corn, flour,
and wheat from New Orleans were less than fifteen million
bushels, as against three hundred million bushels from New
York City.
The industrial development of the country and the growth
of a non-agricultural population were not confined to the eastern
states. The northwestern and upper Mississippi valley states
grew very rapidly in population from 1850 to 1870, and this
growth was especially noticeable in the towns and cities. Cleve-
land, Indianapolis, Toledo, Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, and
St. Louis became large cities, while the general urban population
grew much faster than the agricultural population. This large
increase of an element which did not produce its own food sup-
plies made necessary a correspondingly larger production of
grain and meat by the agricultural districts.
Thus, the combined demands of Europe, of the north
Atlantic states, and of the urban population of the central west
necessitated a large increase in the grain production of the
country.
12 This demand could be met in only two ways: either
a highly intensive system of cultivation must be adopted in such
states as New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana, or else the
uncultivated prairies of Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri,
and Iowa would have to be utilized. To depend upon highly
intensive farming was uneconomical at that time and the natural
alternative was the utilization of the western lands. Of this
11Olmsted, The Lower South, A Journey Through the Back Country;
Helper, The Impending Crisis, especially Chap. I, pp. 9, 10; Annual Re-
port, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1861; Eighth Census (1860), volume
on Agriculture, Introduction ; Report of the Delegates Appointed by the
English and Dutch Shareholders, 1877; Bogart, Economic History of the
United States, Chap, xx, p. 273.
12The following table shows the concentration of grain production in
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territory the most available part, as well as the richest in poten-
tial agricultural resources, was the corn belt of Illinois and
Iowa, particularly the region traversed by the charter lines of
the Illinois Central Railroad. Because of these advantages, this
section, during the period from 1850 to 1870, developed into the
most important single source of grain production in the United
States and the center of supply for both the eastern states and
for Europe.
13
However, as explained in Chapter I, it was this very part of
Illinois, possessing as it did the greatest opportunities for
exploitation, that was the largest area unprovided with adequate
transportation. Accordingly, in 1850 there was a pressing need
on the part of the grain consuming territory in the east and
south, as well as on the part of the grain growing territory of
central Illinois, for a system of transportation that would open
up to development these slightly touched resources. The means
for the accomplishment of this result was an adequate system of
transportation, both local and external, for the interior of the
state the construction of railroads such as the Illinois Central;
for the country as a whole, the improvement of the existing
natural waterways and the construction of new railroads, or
the central western states. The statistics in the table are obtained from
the United States Census, volumes on Agriculture.
INCREASE IN PRODUCTION OF CORN, WHEAT, AND OATS, 1850-1870.
1850 1870 INCREASE PER CENT
Group 1 151,408,000 190,097,000 38,689,000 25.6
Group II 151,870,000 208,161,000 56,291,000 35.4
Group III 156,450,000 521,255,000 364,805,000 232.7
Group IV 47,000 57,799,ooo 57,752,000
Group V 376,069,000 304,762,000 61,307,000 16.3
United States 624,600,000 1,408,044,000 784,044,000 1254
Group I Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Rhode Island, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont.
Group II Ohio, Indiana.
Group III Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Wisconsin.
Group IV Kansas, Minnesota.
Group V Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, Tennessee.
13Cf. tables I to V. The 20 counties directly tributary to the I. C.
R. R. produced in 1870 four per cent of all the grain produced in the
country and nearly eleven per cent of that produced in Illinois, Iowa,
Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin. The proportion of corn and oats
was considerably larger.
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extension of old ones, from Illinois to the Gulf of Mexico and to
the Atlantic seaboard.
From an examination of the map one perceives that Illinois
is located between the two great natural highways of North
America the Great Lakes St. Lawrence River (Erie Canal
after 1825) route to the north and east, and the Mississippi
River route to the south. Because of these natural connections
there was a small movement of grain outward from Illinois
prior to 1850, but, in the absence of railroads connecting the
interior counties with either of these two routes, the amount
shipped did not satisfy the growing needs of the country. More-
over, the efficiency of water transportation, as then existing,
was not such as to permit an economical movement of grain,
even when brought to the terminals of the waterways. Accord-
ingly, the development of central Illinois was dependent, in the
first place, upon the construction of the Illinois Central Rail-
road, or another railroad answering the same purpose; and, in
the second place, upon the improvement of the waterways and
railroads mentioned in the previous paragraph. Moreover, as
is likewise evident from an examination of the map, Illinois is
a watershed for both of these great waterways, so that, by only
a short land haul, traffic can be diverted to one or the other of
these routes. Consequently, the state can supply either or both
of the great domestic markets for food stuffs: the lower south
by way of the Mississippi River, and the eastern states by way
of the Great Lakes. Furthermore, in these two routes and the
ports of New Orleans and New York, it possesses alternative
trade routes to the main European markets.14
MFrom the standpoint of geology, geography, history, politics, and
industry Illinois is the connecting link between the eastern, the southern,
the northern, and the western parts of North America east of the Rocky
Mountains. By geological formation and geographical location central
Illinois, as noted in the text, forms a plain tributary to both Lake Michi-
gan and the Mississippi River. Southern Illinois was settled mainly from
the southern slave states, while northern Illinois was settled by immigrants
from northern Europe, New England, and New York. Politically, the
state has had active and, at times, a leading place in the affairs of the
parties : Whig, Democrat, Republican, Populist, Progressive, and Socialist.
In industry it is not only the most important agricultural state, but, as is
seen in the great industrial developments around Chicago, E. St. Louis,
and in southern Illinois, it is the natural center of industrial production
for the central west. (St. Louis, Gary, etc., although just outside the
borders of the state are, in reality, an integral part of the greater com-
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This naturally advantageous position of Illinois was im-
proved and strengthened by the construction of the Illinois
Central Railroad during the years 1851 to 1857, as told in detail
in Chapters III and IV. The main line and the Dubuque
branch extended in the form of a great bow from the upper
waters of the Mississippi, at Dubuque, to its junction with the
Ohio River, at Cairo. The Chicago branch extended from Lake
Michigan, at Chicago, directly south to Centralia on the main
line and from there to Cairo, thus connecting the Great Lakes
and the Mississippi River at its junction with the Ohio River.
Moreover, by the leases, trackage agreements, and traffic alli-
ances mentioned in Chapter IV, the company gradually estab-
lished connections from the Great Lakes, at Chicago, directly
west across the state to the upper Mississippi River, at Dubuque,
and the Missouri River, at Sioux City; from the Great Lakes,
southwest across the state, to the Mississippi River, at St. Louis,
just below its junction with the Missouri River; and between
the two main terminals of the central Mississippi, i.e. Cairo and
St. Louis.15 This strategic location of the railroad gave it two
important advantages that have proven of vital importance in
later years: first, the Illinois Central system constituted the
best, and at first the only means by which the farmers of the
greater part of Illinois could reach Chicago and St. Louis, the
two main grain and live stock markets of the West ; second, the
fact that the system was tributary to both of the main natural
highways of the continent permitted the railroad, acting as
agent for its territory, to route traffic either to the south or to
the east as proved more advantageous, or to Europe via either
of the two gateways.
Of no less importance than the actual construction of the
monwealth.) These facts, though only slightly understood at the time,
played an important part in the early history of the Illinois Central and
have influenced in a dominant way its traffic development.
16Cf. Chap, iv; viz. (i) Chicago (a) Galena & Chicago Union R. R.,
or (b) Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R., or (c) Peoria & Oquaka
R. R. to main line of I. C. R. R. at Freeport, Mendota, and El Paso,
respectively; I. C. R. R. to Dubuque; Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. (west-
ern lines) to Sioux City. (2) Chicago Chicago Branch to (a) Sando-
val: Mississippi & Ohio R. R. (now B. & O. S. W.) to St. Louis, or
(b) Pana : St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute R. R. (now C. C. C. & St. L.
R. R.) to St. Louis. (3) Cairo main line to Odin; M. & O. R. R. to St.
Louis, or, about 1868, main line to Du Quoin; St. L. A. & T. H. R. R.
(now Cairo Short Line stem of I. C. R. R.) to St. Louis.
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railroad was the cost of transportation, both from the farm to
Chicago, Cairo, or St. Louis, and from these terminals to the
ultimate destination in the South, the East, or Europe. If the
company and the territory tributary to it were to prosper it
was necessary, not only that the rates from the farm to the
final market be less than before the construction of the railroad,
but also that they be low enough to allow Illinois grain to travel
eastward or southward in competition with grain from such
states as New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky,
or Tennessee, which were much nearer the consumer. Thus, the
traffic development of the Illinois Central Railroad and of its
territory was determined by two factors, both of them largely
beyond the control of the management: first and essential, such
an improvement in the efficiency of railroad and water trans-
portation that the cost of carrying grain from the farm to the
final market, plus the cost of raising the grain in Illinois, would
be less than the cost of producing and shipping it from the farms
which supplied the demand in 1850; second, and incidental,
such an improvement in transportation having been effected,
the determination of the question whether the best market
would be the existing one in the South or the newly developing
one in the East. In short, therefore, the traffic history of the
Illinois Central Railroad from 1857 to 1870, as discussed in the
following pages, is the story of the adaptation of the railroad
to the absolute and relative developments of the east and wrest
trade route via Chicago and of the north and south route via
Cairo.
Of these two routes, the one from Chicago east gained the
most from improvements in transportation facilities taking place
between 1850 and 1870. The water route, via the Great Lakes,
the Erie Canal, and the Hudson River, had provided reasonably
cheap rates for through traffic ever since 1825, but in the decades
before and after the Civil War, improvements were made which
reduced the charges to a basis much lower than what existed
in the thirties and forties. Larger and faster lake vessels were
put in service, steam generally supplanted sails, and various
economies of operation were made, the result of which greatly
decreased the actual cost of making a trip from Chicago to
Buffalo. 16 In 1862 the deepening of the Erie Canal wras finished
and it became possible for canal boats of 250 tons to go from
18Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United
States, p. 135; Tenth Census (1880), volume on Agriculture, monograph
on Cereal Production.
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Buffalo to New York City, thus reducing the cost of carriage per
ton.
17 At the same time, the important harbors on the Great
Lakes were dredged and the canals at Detroit, Sault Ste. Marie,
and Niagara Falls were enlarged to accommodate large lake
vessels. 18 Moreover, the reduced cost of carriage was accom-
panied by even more important improvements in the handling
of freight at Chicago, Buffalo, and other terminals, especially
through the erection of elevators, the introduction of steam
shovels, power conveyors and other labor saving machinery, and
the better arrangement of the docks.
19 The natural result of
these various devices to cheapen cost of transportation was a
large expansion of the lake and canal trade, which, in turn,
permitted further economies and allowed still more extensive
reductions in rates.
Quite as important as the improvement of water transporta-
tion was the development of all-rail connections between Chicago
and New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. In 1853
the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern was finished from Buf-
falo to Chicago; in 1854 Cornelius Vanderbilt consolidated sev-
eral disjointed lines into the New York Central and Hudson
River Railroad; in 1855 the Erie was built to Buffalo; in 1856
the Baltimore and Ohio, and Ohio and Mississippi route was
completed ; and in 1857 the Pennsylvania Central, and Pittsburg,
Fort Wayne, and Chicago line was extended to Chicago. Other
railroads were completed from Buffalo to the seaboard, so that
in 1870 there were a number of strong, competitive lines from
Lake Michigan to the Atlantic.
At first the all-rail lines were unable to compete with the
water route for the low grade freight, but between 1860 and
1870 further consolidations among the railroads, and extensive
reductions in cost of operation enabled the New York Central
and Pennsylvania to obtain a large share of the east and west
traffic. Fierce competition between the two rival lines caused
temporary reductions in rates, but more permanent influences,
such as consolidation of competing and connecting lines, reduc-
tion of curves and grades, technical improvements in motor
power, equipment, and roadbed, better methods of organization,
accounting and operation, largely increased traffic, and the adop-
17Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United
States, p. 135; Tenth Census (1880), volume on Agriculture, monograph
on Cereal Production.
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tion of fast freight lines, enabled the railroads to carry most of
the flour and much of the wheat and other grain in competition
with the lake and canal boats.20
The extensive improvements in both rail and water trans-
portation during the sixth and seventh decades of the 19th cen-
tury had a direct influence on rates. Not only were there rad-
ical reductions of a temporary nature, caused by rate wars and
tariff controversies, but reductions in cost of operation allowed
permanent decreases hardly less important. As most of the
grain traffic from 1850 to 1868 or 1869 was handled by the lake
vessels the changes in lake rates were of primary importance.
In the twelve years from 1858 to 1870 the average lake rates
from Chicago to Buffalo decreased as follows : 20
"
CORN WHEAT
1858 I2.7C per bu. 15.500 per bu.
1870 6.0
" "
6.77
" "
DECREASE 6.7
" "
8.73
" "
This reduction in lake rates was accompanied by similar reduc-
tions in freight charges on the Erie Canal and in 1870 the aver-
age rate per ton on down freight was $3.06 as against $4.81 in
1854, or a reduction from 14.4c per bushel to 9.2c.21 The through
rate on wheat from Chicago to New York City, including all
tolls, declined from 28.36c per bushel in 1864 to 20.24c in 1871
(ll.llc in 1870), with rates on corn from Ic to 3c lower per
bushel. 22 As the price of corn, oats and wheat were over fifty
per cent higher in 1870 than in 1855, the decline in nominal
rates meant a much greater decline in absolute charges. Thus,
in 1858 one bushel of wheat at Chicago paid for the transporta-
tion of two bushels to New York, while in 1871 it provided for
the carriage of 6.1 bushels.28
Although at first unimportant, all-rail shipments of grain
from the west to the east had become common by 1^860 and by
1870 were fully as frequent as all-water shipments. -The econo-
mies mentioned above permitted even more radical reductions
in rates by railroads than took place on the lake. In 1850 the
20Johnson, American Railway Transportation, pp. 25-27; Ringwalt,
Transportation Systems in the United States, pp. 140-209.
20
*Annual Report, Chicago Board of Trade, 1905, p. 108.
^Transportation Routes to the Seaboard, in Sen. Rep., 43 Cong., i
sess., Appendix, p. 168.
22Annual Report, Chicago Board of Trade, 1905, p. 108.
28A1drich Report, II, pp. 7, 8, 60. 61.
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usual charge for grain traffic was 4e per ton per mile, or occa-
sionally 3c, irrespective of distance.
24 By 1870 the New York
Central had reduced the general average rate per ton per mile
to 1.9 cents, as against 2.5c in the earlier year, 1856. On the
Erie there was a further reduction from 2.5c in the earlier period
to 1.4c in the later. 25 Moreover, during the summer months
wheat was carried by rail from Chicago to New York for 27c a
bushel, or 93c per ton per mile.
26 At times, on account of rate
wars, the tariff charges were reduced to an even lower figure
per ton per mile. However, the average rates for all-rail ship-
ments from Lake Michigan to the Atlantic seaboard declined
from 36.19c per bushel in 1858 to 28c in 1870 for corn, and from
38.61c to 30c for wheat.27 Moreover, the railroads from Buffalo
to New York, especially the New York Central and Erie, made
special efforts to handle grain between these points in competi-
tion with the Erie Canal. As a result the average rail rate in
1871 was 18.3c for wheat and 17.0c for corn, as against 13.1c
and 11.3c respectively on the canal. The average lake and rail
rate, i.e. via lake to Buffalo and from there to New York by rail,
was 22.2c per bushel on corn and 22.5c on wheat.28
Conditions existing in the east and west traffic did not hold
good for shipments from Chicago south. The actual cost of
handling freight from Cairo or St. Louis to New Orleans had
not materially decreased from 1850 to 1870, and, as a result,
rates between those points declined much more slowly than the
rates on east and west lines of transportation, so that in the
latter year charges from central Illinois to the Gulf were only
slightly less than the lake and canal tariffs to New York. The
barge rates from St. Louis were exceedingly low, but the gen-
eral introduction of this system of carriage did not take place
much before 1870 and, consequently, exerted only a slight influ-
ence on rates from 1850 to 1870.29 The steamboat charges were
nearly twice those made by the barge lines, but quicker time and
less danger to the freight compensated the shipper for the dif-
ference.30 Considering merely the tariff rates, there was a
^Transportation Routes to the Seaboard, p. 61.
25Ibid.f p. 61.
**Ibid., p. 52.
"Annual Report, Chicago Board of Trade, 1905, p. 108.
^Transportation Routes to the Seaboard, I, 24, 52 ; ibid., Appendix, pp.
19, 20, 53, 96, 167, 168; ibid., II, 897-900.
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difference of about y2e per hundred on fourth class shipments
and from lOc to 12c per bushel on grain from central Illinois to
market in favor of New Orleans.31 However, service and other
conditions reversed this advantage. (1) The lowest north and
south rates were for shipment in bulk by barges and this service
was not in general use before 1866. Moreover, most of the lines
stopped at St. Louis, not Cairo, and the Illinois Central received
no advantage in sending grain to St. Louis in preference to
Chicago, as the rates from central Illinois to the two cities were
practically the same. (2) Shipments of grain by steamboat
from Cairo south had to be sacked and the cost of sacking aver-
aged several cents per bushel. (3) On account of the longer
route and the semi-tropical climate, loss from shrinkage via the
north and south route was much greater than via the east and
west one. This loss would run from ten to twenty per cent of
the weight of corn shipments. (4) Terminal, storage, and trans-
fer facilities were much poorer at New Orleans than at New
York. (5) The local southern demand for grain was small, and
Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri were in a better position than
Illinois to compete for the traffic.
Moreover, through export traffic was practically prevented
by the higher steamer rates from New Orleans to Liverpool than
from New York to Liverpool. In 1870 there were no quotations
for the transportation of corn via steamer from New Orleans to
Liverpool and in only five months were there any quotations
for shipment by sailing vessels. In 1872, the only year for which
there is a good basis for comparison, the difference was as fol-
lows: (quotations in pence per bushel, corn)
STEAM SAIL
New York to Liverpool 7%d 6uA*d
New Orleans to Liverpool n/4d io?4d
Difference in favor of New York 4<i(8c) 4d(8c) 32
This difference of nearly eight cents per bushel in favor of New
York offset most of the advantages received by New Orleans
from lower domestic rates. Higher insurance, higher elevator
and wharfage charges, longer time en route, with increased
interest on the shipment, eliminated the remaining advantages
New Orleans possessed over New York and placed the two ports
^Transportation Routes to the Seaboard, I, 24, 52; ibid., Appendix,
pp. 19, 20, 53, 96, 167, 168; ibid., II, 897-900.
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Ibid., Appendix, pp. 20, 54. It should be noted that the comparison
of rates is based on a single year and is liable to error, but it was the
best that could be secured.
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on an equality so far as transportation charges were concerned.
But even had equal rates existed the disadvantages of the south-
ern route were too great to permit any important export of
grain by way of New Orleans or Mobile.33
The second important item affecting the movement of grain
from Illinois to the East was the local transportation charge,
that is, the rate from the local station to Chicago or Cairo. In
Chapter I it was shown that the cost of handling grain over
Illinois roads was so high that territory more than ten to fifteen
miles from railroad or river transportation could not send its
produce to outside markets, and that the Illinois Central Rail-
road was necessary to remedy this trouble. On the macadam-
ized turnpikes of the eastern states the cost of carrying grain
by wagon was about ten cents per ton per mile, but over the
Illinois roads this cost must have been increased fifty to one
hundred per cent.34 With the completion of the railroad this
charge was reduced materially. Moreover, there was a slight
reduction in rates from 1856 to 1870, primarily in bulky articles
such as grain, lumber, coal, and salt. The higher class goods
had practically the same rates in 1870 as in 1856, although some
difference must be made for inflation of the currency. As early
as 1856 a rate of 1.75c per ton per mile was made on coal35 and <
in the next fourteen years this charge was reduced to less than
lc. 36 Grain from local stations was carried to Cairo in 1858
for 2.2c per ton per mile and for about 1.5c in 1870. On
through grain shipments to New Orleans the Illinois Central
received a rate of 1.3c per ton per mile in 1870.
3T A somewhat
^Transportation Routes to the Seaboard, Appendix, pp. 20, 54.
Prior to 1861 a few stretches of railroad were constructed parallel
to the Mississippi River, (mainly, what is now the Mobile & Ohio
R. R., built under the Land Grant Act of 1850, the Mississippi Central
R. R. and the New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern R. R., now the
southern lines of the I. C. R. R.) and, though incomplete, they were just
beginning to form a southern connection for the Illinois Central Rail-
road when the Civil War paralyzed all communication with the South.
Following the war efforts were made to rehabilitate and complete these
southern lines, but with little success until after 1870. Accordingly, dur-
ing the period covered in this monograph, railroad communication be-
tween Illinois and the Gulf of Mexico was almost non existent
34Ringwalt, Transportation Systems in the United States.
35
J. W. Foster, Mineral Resources of the Illinois Central Railroad,
p. 10.
3tAnnual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1870.
3TCoiro Times, February 17, 1858; cf. pp. 115-117; also, Transporta-
tion Routes to the Seaboard, II, 897-900.
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better basis of comparison is the average rate on different classes
of traffic. The per ton per mile rates on local and through
traffic in 1859 and 1870 were as follows:
1859 1870
Local freight north 2.ipc 2.440 per ton per mile.
Local freight south 2.06 2.35
" " "
Through
"
north 1.70 1.12
" " " "
" "
south 1.86 1.55
" " "
"
n.&s 1.80 1.36
" " " "
All " n.&s 2.14 2.31
" " " " 38
Nearly all of the local traffic moving south consisted of lumber,
coal, and a little grain; three-fourths of the local traffic north
was grain, so that the rates on north and south local traffic give
an approximate idea of the rates charged for lumber, coal, and
grain. However, the true standard by which local rates must
be judged, is whether they permitted grain from central Illinois
to be carried east or south, in competition with grain from other
parts of the state, and from Missouri, Wisconsin, Michigan, and
Indiana. Up to about 1868 the farmer along the Illinois Cen-
tral competed on favorable terms with the farmers of the states
farther east and south, but this was due to the high price of
wheat and corn and the richness of the soil, rather than to
favorable railway rates.39
Reduced local and through rates on agricultural products
made it possible for farmers to take up the millions of acres
of vacant land in the northwestern and upper Mississippi valley
states and produce grain for eastern and European markets.
As a result, the two decades from 1850 to 1870 witnessed an
unprecedented immigration into Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin,
Missouri, Minnesota, and Kansas, and by 1870 the population of
this territory was nearly four times what it was in 1850.40 This
is shown in the following table :
I.
SETTLEMENT OF THE CENTRAL WEST. PER
GROUP 1850 1870 INCREASE CENT
Illinois & Iowa. 1,043,000 3,733,ooo 2,710,000 259
Mich., Wis. & Mo 1,384,000 3,9S9,ooo 2,575,000 186
Minn. & Kansas - 6,000 803,000
TOTAL 2,433,000 8,496,000 6,063,000 249
3
*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1859, 1870. Cf. Chap. vi.
39Eighth Census (1860), volume on Agriculture, Introduction; cf.
Martin, The Granger Agitation.
"Seventh and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1870).
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The immigrants may be divided into groups according to the
relation to the Illinois Central of the territory settled by them:
(1) those settling in Illinois and Iowa tributary to the railroad;
(2) those taking up land in parts of Illinois and Iowa in direct
competition with the Illinois Central territory in Wisconsin,
Michigan and Missouri; (3) Those going to Minnesota and
Kansas, where they did not compete actively with central Illi-
nois until about 1870. The two latter groups are outside the
field of this history, but it may be said that their growth was
much slower than that of Illinois and Iowa directly tributary
to the Illinois Central and subsidiary lines.
While this immigration went into every portion of the
state, the central counties along the Illinois Central Railroad,
and especially those between La Salle and Shelby counties, were
the least settled in 1850 and, consequently, offered the greatest
opportunity to farmers. In the twenty years from 1850 to 1870 out
of a total increase of population of 1,688,000, 981,292 occurred
in the belt of counties near the "Central", and in the latter year
slightly over one half of the inhabitants of the state lived in the
forty four counties tributary to this railroad.41 In 1850 the
central counties were thinly settled, and what is now called the
"corn belt" was almost entirely unoccupied government land,
but by 1870 this portion of Illinois had been transformed into
II.
SETTLEMENT OF THE FORTY FOUR COUNTIES IN ILLINOIS TRIBUTARY TO THE
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD.
l85O PERCENT i860 PERCENT l8/O PERCENT
Group I ii5,H3 124 291,829 17.0 495,253 19-5
Group II 248,868 30.2 585,548 34-3 923,579 36.6
Cook Co 43,385 4-2 144,954 84 349,966 13.8
TOTAL ~ 292,253 344 730,502 42.7 1,273,545 504
State 851,000 100.0 1,711,000 100.0 2,539,000 100.0
Group I consists of the following agricultural counties in the central
part of the state : Bureau, Champaign, Coles, De Witt, Douglas, Ford,
Iriquois, Cumberland, Kankakee, La Salle, Livingstone, Logan, McLean,
Macon, Marshall, Moultrie, Putnam, Shelby, Woodford, Piatt.
Group II consists of the above counties and Alexander, Bond, Clay,
Clinton, Effingham, Franklin, Fayette, Jackson, Johnson, Jefferson, Jo
Daviess, Lee, Marion, Montgomery, Ogle, Perry, Pulaski, Stephenson,
Union, Will, Williamson, Washington. All of these counties are within
fifteen miles of the Illinois Central Railroad and are tributary to it.
"Seventh and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1870).
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a well settled farming community. With the growth of popu-
lation the area not under cultivation steadily declined, and by
1870 practically all the land surface of the state, especially in the
central part, was either under crop or else used for meadow or
woodland.42 Early in the sixth decade the federal land was sold
and the railroad grant, with the exception of less than three
hundred thousand acres, was disposed of by 1870.43
The rapid settlement of Illinois and Iowa was accompanied,
it might almost be said, was caused by important improvements
in agriculture. Improved plows and harrows, seeders, cultiva-
tors, binders, reapers, threshers, corn shelters and other imple-
ments were introduced and it became possible for one farmer with
the aid of farm machinery to raise several times as much grain
as under the old hand method, and, that too, with much less
physical exertion. Naturally, this decreased the cost of raising
a crop and prevented any considerable increase in the price of
food stuffs. Accordingly, it was possible for the farmers tribu-
tary to the Illinois Central Railroad, despite the large enlist-
ment in the federal armies during the Civil War and the
growth of the industries of the state, to increase their production
of food stuffs sufficiently to meet the enormously increased de-
mand of the eastern states during the decade from 1861 to 1870,
and at a cost of production low enough to permit good profits
to themselves and high rates to the railroad.44
Coincident with the development in the sources of demand
and supply outlined so far, viz., increased eastern and European
consumption of grain, and improved rail and water connections,
on the one hand, and settlement of the interior counties of Illi-
nois, together with improved farming practice, on the other
hand, came the development of the traffic organization of the
Illinois Central Railroad as the connecting link between the two.
The railroad was built to connect these sources of demand and
supply in food stuffs and, until long after 1870, it was primarily
a carrier of agricultural products. Therefore the prosperity of
the company was dependent upon the ability of the adjacent
territory to raise and ship large quantities of grain and of live
stock.
42Seventh and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1870).
*3Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1870.
44
Bogart, Economic History of the United States, pp. 228-303; Quin-
tance, The Influence of Farm Machinery on Crop Production and Labor;
File, The Agricultural Development of the West during the Civil War,
Quar. Jour. Econ., XX, 259-278. Cf. Transactions of Illinois State Agri-
cultural Society during this period.
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Prior to 1870 the Illinois Central Eailroad was the vital
factor in developing central and southern Illinois, and this influ-
ence commenced as soon the first piece of track was laid in May,
1852. Of course, the amount of traffic handled during the con-
struction of the road was small and consisted largely of local
freight, principally immigrant's goods, but even in this way it
was of great assistance in settling the interior counties. At
first, work trains, and then regular freight and passenger trains
were operated on sections of track as soon as completed, and in
this way it became much easier for settlers to reach either the
government or railroad lands which were on the market. How-
ever, the real traffic history of the company does not commence
until 1855, at which time all the railroad, with the exception of
seventy-seven miles from Mattoon to Centralia, was in use.45
From 1857 to 1870 all of the charter lines, together with
such connections as were added from time to time, were open
for traffic. As stated in Chapter IV, a regular freight and
passenger service was established, tariffs were promulgated,
connections were secured, aid was extended to farmers along
the line
;
in a word, everything was done to build up the traffic
of the road, especially that of grain and live stock. That the
railroad, next to the federal government, was the largest single
land owner in the country naturally stimulated its interest in
agricultural production, even beyond that of the other granger
railroads.
Moreover, the traffic policy of the Illinois Central Eailroad
was greatly influenced by the fact that it was tributary to the
Great Lakes as well as to the Mississippi River. The Civil War
and other causes beyond the control of the management almost
destroyed the historical southern market of Illinois and had the
railroad been constructed as originally planned its traffic would
have been insignificant. Having been built tributary to Chicago
as well as to Cairo it was, however, in a position to divert busi-
ness northward when its natural connections with the South
were prostrate and Chicago became its main terminal. For that
reason prices and facilities there were the determining factor
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857. The net earn-
ings to January i, 1855, amounted to $276,540.59. Estimates of the gross
earnings are given, but they are so incorrect, it is not worth while to
repeat them. However, the approximate gross earnings are supposed to
have been about three quarters of a million dollars in the period prior to
the first annual report in 1855.
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in the growth of the railroad and of that part of Illinois and,
later, of Iowa dependent upon it.48
As Illinois was primarily an agricultural state the move-
ment of its crops, especially corn and wheat, depended upon
demands outside the state, in other words upon the needs of the
industrial population of the East and South. But whether the
farmer in McLean or Macon county would ship his grain at all
the vital problem for the railroad was decided by the price of
grain at Chicago. Unless the New York price, less the cost of
transportation, in other words the Chicago price, would yield
a profit on a bushel of corn or wheat, the farmer would not ship
it, at least he would not produce and ship it for any length of
time. Fortunately for the Illinois Central, the price of all farm
products was high from 1861 to 1870, and was excessively low
in only one or two years before that period. These high prices
were accompanied by large demands from other parts of the coun-
try, as mentioned above, especially in the period from 1861 to
1870, and, at times, the supply of grain was insufficient to meet
all the necessary demands of the north Atlantic states and Eu-
rope. On account of the inflation of the currency the increase
in currency prices was very great, but there was a fair advance
in gold prices, while the expenses of the farmer for labor and
supplies did not increase as rapidly as the receipts from his grain
or cattle.47 Of the different grains corn had the greatest rise in
price
48 and wheat the least,49 but as the territory dependent on
the Illinois Central was largely corn country this proved of ad-
vantage to both the farmer and the railroad. There was also a
large increase in the price of cattle; again favoring the central
counties of the state.50
The general adoption of labor saving machinery, combined
with high Chicago prices for grain and a large demand for food
stuffs, had a very strong influence on the production of grain in
the territory along the Illinois Central Railroad. Vacant gov-
46The rise of Chicago as the leading grain and live stock market of
the world was coincident with the developments in the traffic of the Illi-
lois Central Railroad mentioned in the text and was of great importance
>.o its territory in affording a convenient market for grain and live stock.
47
Fite, The Agricultural Development of the West During the Civil
War, Quar. Jour. Econ., XX, 259-278. Cf. Mitchell, History of the Green-
backs.
48Aldrich Report, II, pp. 7, 8.
*9
Ibid., pp. 60, 61.
p. 26.
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ernment and railroad land was occupied and the acreage under
cultivation increased rapidly from census period to census period.
The growth in some of the interior counties was remarkable.
Champaign county increased its area under cultivation from
twenty two thousand acres in 1850 to four hundred and nine-
teen thousand in 1870; Livingstone from thirteen thousand to
three hundred and seventy seven thousand, and Iroquois from
thirty thousand to three hundred and twenty two thousand.81
The twenty one typically agricultural counties had more than
seven times as many acres under cultivation in 1870 as in 1850,
as is shown in the following table :
III.
ACRES UNDER CULTIVATION, 1850 TO 1870.
l8SO PERCENT i860 PERCENT 1870 PERCENT
Group 1 744,ooo 14.8 2,902,000 22.2 5,337,000 27.6
Group II 1,590,000 31.6 5,101,000 38.3 8,839,000 43.2
Cook Co 154,000 3.1 267,000 2.4 348,000 1.8
TOTAL 1,744,000 34.7 5,368,000 40.7 9,187,000 45.0
State 5,039,000 100.0 13,096,000 100.0 19,329,000 loo.o52
The larger area in farms was accompanied by a greater yield of
farm products, especially corn, wheat and oats. It was also
accompanied by a greater diversity of farming, and the total pro-
duction of the three staples, consequently, did not increase as rap-
idly as the acreage did.
53 At the same time the growth of the
grain crops was large enough to attract attention. This was espe-
cially true of the central agricultural counties. The following
tables show the increased yield of the three staples, but the figures
for 1869 (census of 1870) were unduly small, owing to droughts,
and to obtain a correct estimate of the increase during the decade
the total should be considered about twenty-five per cent larger.
84
"Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1860, 1870), volumes on
Agriculture.
52
Ibid.; for the counties comprised in each group, see Table II; per
cent refers to per cent of total acreage contained in each county or group
of counties. Group II includes Group I.
"Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1860, 1870), volumes on
Agriculture, Introduction.
**Ibid., 1870.
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IV.
PRODUCTION OF CORN, 1850 TO 1870.
l8SO PERCENT i860 PERCENT 1870 PERCENT
Group 1 9,985,000 17.7 29,613,000 25.8 39,265,000 30.2
Group II... 16,890,000 29.3 44,302,000 38.6 59,257,000 45.6
B5Cook Co 429,000 .7 877,000 .7 770,000 .5
TOTAL 17,319,000 30.0 45,179,000 39.3 60,827,000 46.1
State 57,646,000 100.0 115,174,000 100.0 129,921,000 100.0
V.
PRODUCTION OF WHEAT, 1850 TO 1870.
1850 PERCENT i860 PERCENT 1870 PERCENT
Group 1 949,000 10.1 4,105,000 17.6 4,043,000 12.8
Group II 2,171,000 25.1 8,870,000 37.2 10,625,000 35.4
Cook Co 238,000 2.7 299,000 1.3 149,000 .5
TOTAL 2,409,000 25.8 9,169,000 38.5 10,774,000 35.9
State 9,414,000 100.0 23,837,000 100.0 30,128,000 IOO.O58
VI.
PRODUCTION OF OATS, 1850 TO 1870.
1850 PERCENT i860 PERCENT 1870 PERCENT
Group 1 1,275,000 12.0 2,330,000 154 10,619,000 24.8
Group II 3,174,000 30.2 5,865,000 38.8 20,421,000 47.7
Cook Co 403,000 4.0 1,092,000 7.2 1,584,000 2.8
TOTAL 3,577,ooo 34.2 6,957,000 46.0 22,005,000 50.5
State 10,087,000 100.0 15,220,000 100.0 42,780,000 loo.o57
These tables show not only a large increase in all crops, but also
an especial emphasis, particularly in the corn belt, on the pro-
duction of oats and corn instead of wheat. The increase in the
production of wheat in the state between 1850 and 1860 amounted
to 35.9 per cent, of corn 46 per cent, and of oats 50.5 per cent. At
the same time the total amount of grain produced in the forty
three counties along the Illinois Central (excluding Cook county)
increased from 21,200,000 bushels in 1850 to 80,500,000 bushels
"Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1860, 1870), volumes on
Agriculture.
MIbid.
"Ibid.
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in 1870, or 369%. The number of sheep, cattle and swine on the
farms will be taken up later on in this chapter.
Having seen the growth of grain production in the territory
tributary to the Illinois Central it is possible to ascertain what
influence these large crops had upon the railroad. In the preced-
ing pages it was shown that the Illinois Central was placed in a
very disadvantageous position in 1856 to 1870 in regard to ship-
ping grain south to New Orleans and that economic conditions
diverted western grain to Chicago and the east and west trade
route. Although not to its interests, the "Central" was forced
to yield to outside forces and make Chicago, not Cairo, its prin-
cipal terminus for the handling of grain. The phenomenal rise
of the former city as a grain center is a familiar story, and in the
period under discussion the Illinois Central did as much as any
other road to build up the interests of this city. It accomplished
this result despite its unfavorable location. In studying the map
of the Illinois Central one is impressed by its poor arrangement
so far as shipments to Chicago are concerned. It is better situ-
ated than any other Illinois road for the handling of corn and
oats from a large portion of the corn belt, but is in a weak posi-
tion so far as wheat from the northern counties is concerned. To
carry wheat from, say, La Salle county over its own rails it must
send the grain south to Centralia and then north again to Chi-
cago, or about three times as great a distance as that of the Chi-
cago, Bock Island and Pacific route.58 The same condition ex-
isted in the handling of grain from many of the counties on the
main line north of Vandalia. This was obviated by traffic and
trackage agreements, but not in a manner profitable to the
' ' Cen-
tral." Up to 1860, the Galena and Chicago Union line from
Freeport to Chicago had an agreement with the "Central" by
which the latter 's business from points north and south of Free-
port was sent to Chicago over the rails of the Galena road in the
' ' Central 's ' ' cars.59 Later a similar agreement was made with the
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy from Dixon, but on somewhat
less favorable terms. However, on most of the grain originating
north of the Illinois river the Illinois Central obtained only the
short haul to Freeport or Dixon, while the other railroad received
liberal returns for carrying the cars to Chicago. Relations with
the Galena or Burlington lines were not always friendly, and
from 1858 to 1870 another means of uniting the main line and
the Chicago branch was obtained. The Illinois Central assisted
58Cf. Chap. iv.
^'Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1859.
96 HISTORY OP ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD [380
in the construction of the Peoria and Oquaka, now the Toledo,
Peoria and Western branch of the Pennsylvania system, and
made a trackage agreement with that company by which its trains
could run from El Paso to Oilman over the latter 's tracks. By
this connection the two arms of the system were united one hun-
dred and sixty miles above Centralia and the company was in a
position to get the long haul on shipments to Chicago.
60
Other traffic agreements were made with roads intersecting
the Central by which the latter got the haul to Chicago. Impor-
tant among these alliances was one with the Great Western, now
the Wabash, at Tolono and Decatur, the Ohio and Mississippi at
Odin and Sandoval, the Alton and Terre Haute, now the St.
Louis Division of the Big Four, at Pana and Mattoon, and the
Mineral Point railroads.61 By far the most permanent alliance
was the one with the Dubuque and Sioux City, which, as de-
scribed above, was leased by the Illinois Central in 1867. By this
arrangement all grain originating on the leased lines could be car-
ried by the Illinois Central over the charter lines. Iowa, at this
time, was a very important wheat growing district and most of
the grain transferred at Dubuque was wheat. Naturally, this
extension of the system had an important influence on the Illinois
portion, and during the first few years of the lease control of the
Dubuque and Sioux City was profitable to the Illinois Central.62
During the time these various traffic and trackage agree-
ments were being completed, the receipts of wheat, corn, and oats
at Chicago over the tracks of the Illinois Central grew very rap-
idly. In 1855 only a part of the road was in operation and in
1856, 1857, and 1858 there were poor crops, while most of the
land near the railroad had not yet been settled. As a result the
receipts of grain at Chicago from this territory were small. In
1859, 1860, and 1861, and most of the remaining years of the
decade crops were good and the shipments by the railroad in-
creased to considerable proportions. Had it not been for the
exceedingly low prices prevailing during much of the period from
1857 to 1862 and the large shipments south to Cairo from 1860
to the close of the war, the movement would undoubtedly have
been much greater. The largest amount of any one grain con-
*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1860. The Illinois
Central had merely a trackage agreement with this company and in later
years allowed other and rival railroads to control this company.
^Ibid., 1855-1870.
C2Cf. Chap, vi, for statements as to net profits accruing to the Illinois
Central from this lease.
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sisted of corn, which increased from 758,901 bushels in 1858 to
6,903,430 bushels in 1867 and 10,475,680 bushels in 1871.63 Wheat
shipments grew at a somewhat slower rate, from 1,100,482
bushels in the earlier year to 5,244,540 bushels in the latter.
64
The amount of oats handled remained under half a million bush-
els a year up to 1865, when it jumped to 1,678,087 bushels and
to 4,258,340 bushels in 1870. This rapid increase was brought
about by the more general cultivation of this grain after I860.65
Compared with other railroads and the Illinois and Michigan
Canal the Illinois Central was always one of the leading grain
lines, and during the Civil War period it handled more grain
than any other road, with the possible exception of the Chicago,
Burlington, and Quincy. In 1858 the Central was third in its
receipts of corn at Chicago, being surpassed by the Chicago, Bur-
lington, and Quincy and the Illinois and Michigan Canal, with
the Chicago and Northwestern only a few thousand bushels be-
hind. In 1871 the Illinois Central handled more corn than any
other line entering Chicago, and during the thirteen years
increased its proportion of the total receipts from 8.1% to
24.8%.66 In 1858 the "Central" was second in the receipts of
wheat, which position it held in 1870, being led in both years by
the Chicago and Northwestern. Its proportion of the total num-
ber of bushels reported, however, increased from 11.5% to 30.2% -
67
The growth in the handling of oats was even larger. From third
place in 1858 the Illinois Central advanced to first place in 1870
and led its nearest competitor by two and and a half million
bushels. In the latter year it delivered 40.9% of all the oats re-
ceived, as against only 4.9% in the former year.68 Moreover,
these figures do not include grain handled by the Galena or Chi-
cago, Burlington and Quincy or Northwestern railroads for the
Illinois Central on trackage agreements. Had this been included
63Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1858, 1867, 1871. Itemized
figures are not given before 1858.
**Ibid. There is a slight difference between the figures given by the
Chicago Board of Trade and the railroad due to different "fiscal years.
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1858-1870. Cf. Ninth Cen-
sus (1870), volume on Agriculture, Introduction, under heading, Oats.
"Annual Report, Chicago Board of Trade, 1858-1870.
"Ibid.
*slbid. From 1867 to 1870 there is a discrepancy in the reports of
the Illinois Central, and the figures given by the company cannot be given
for the period.
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the proportion belonging to the latter road would have been
much larger. As it was, 27.2% of all the grain received at Chi-
cago came in over the tracks of the Illinois Central, although the
Burlington, Northwestern, and Rock Island systems had each a
much larger mileage.69
While the great bulk of the grain handled by the company,
despite its efforts to divert the traffic southward, was forwarded
to Chicago, the receipts at Cairo showed a healthy growth during
the period, and for occasional years were almost as large as the
receipts at the northern end of the road. Prior to 1860 the
amount of wheat, corn and oats handled at Cairo was only nom-
inal, but in that year, and the first few months of 1861, the south-
ern movement assumed considerable importance as the result of
energetic efforts on the part of the traffic department. River and
railroad connections to Mobile and New Orleans were improving
and the company believed this growth was permanent.70 . These
prospects were rudely shattered by the outbreak of the Civil
War and the occupation of Cairo by the federal troops entirely
destroyed the southern grain trade. During the struggle a large
proportion of the supplies furnished the Union armies in Ken-
tucky and Tennessee were forwarded by way of Cairo, and the
receipts at that city were larger from 1861 to 1867 than ever
before. The demand for oats was especially large, and from
49,068 bushels in 1855 the movement increased to 4,629,408
bushels in 1864. 71 The demands of the army for corn, although
not as large as the demands for oats, were considerable and were
supplemented by the requirements of the civil population of the
South. Thus, the maximum receipts occurred in 1866, just after
the close of the war, and amounted to 2,350,841 bushels, as
against only 6,873 bushels in 1855.
72 The war had practically
no influence on the receipts of wheat and the tonnage of both
wheat and flour increased until after the war. After the re-
sumption of peace the receipts of all grains at Cairo continued
large, but the amount received from year to year varied consid-
69Annual Report, Chicago Board of Trade, 1858-1870; Annual Report,
Illinois Central Railroad, 1856-1870, showing number of bushels of grain
turned over to the respective connecting lines.
70Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1860, 1861.
71
Ibid., 1861-1870. Most of the grain was destined, directly or indi-
rectly, for the army.
1855-1870.
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erably.
73 Corn more than held its own in 1865, 1866, and 1867,
but dropped to only 109,370 bushels in 1868, 23,460 bushels in
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870. The following
tables show the proportion of grain received at Chicago and Cairo from
1855 to 1870, being taken from the Annual Reports, Illinois Central
Railroad.
VII.
COMPARATIVE RECEIPTS OF CORN AT CHICAGO AND CAIRO, 1855 TO 1870.
MISCEL-
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1869 and 287,880 bushels in 1870, as against an average of over
sixteen hundred bushels in the three preceding years. Oats de-
creased in a similar way in 1868 and 1869, but recovered in 1870.
Wheat actually increased after the war. These fluctuations were
much greater than at Chicago and indicate the lack of strength
in the southern movement of cereals. In the aggregate the total
number of bushels forwarded to Cairo as compared with Chi-
cago was small, except during the six years from 1861 to 1867.
74
Next to grain the most important agricultural commodity
carried by the Illinois Central was live stock sheep, hogs and
cattle. Conditions in the packing industry from 1856 to 1870
were radically different from what they are now and there were
serious restrictions upon the development of the industry. Re-
frigerator cars were not in general use and the transportation
of fresh meat was not possible. This prevented the centralization
of meat packing in the West, which took place a few years later,
and the shipment of pork, beef and mutton to the eastern states.
Instead, most of the meat used in that territory was packed in
local establishments from homebred live stock, or animals sent
from the West on the hoof. Even the shipment of western live
stock for slaughter in eastern cities was handicapped by the high
cost of railroad transportation shipment by lake being out of
the question and by the difficulty of carrying the animals long
distances without great depreciation in value. Moreover, the
number of small, local packing houses was large in the West as
well as in the East. On the other hand great quantities of pork
and beef were salted or pickled and in that condition could be car.
ried long distances. Thus, the market for meat products was not
confined entirely to the territory within a few miles of the pack-
ing house.
1860 1,329,108 202,967 77.0 934,007 71.1 13.1
1861 793,244 262,209 69.1 457,398 59.2 7-8
1862 1,760,066 534,659 72.1 427,693 24.2 45.4
1863 4,581,731 605,040 86.5 2,083,639 43.3 43-3
1864 7,794,095 214,158 73-5 4,629,408 59-5 13-0
1865 4,518,731 1,605,443 7i-5 2,141,806 46-4 18.2
1866 4,002,825 2,358,285 67.8 836,115 20.4 20.9
1867 4,863,110 3,302,140 764 1,136,530 234 8.1
1868 5,082,090 5,082,090 350,900
1869 3,830,620 4,015,590 522,340
1870 5,641,870 4,258,340 1,414,180
74Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870; cf. Report of the
Delegates Appointed by the English and Dutch Shareholders, 1877.
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The conditions outlined above affected the Illinois Central
in two ways. The high cost of transporting live stock prevented
the use of the territory beyond the Mississippi until after the
close of the Civil War, and made Illinois the natural center of
the industry. Moreover, from 1856 to about 1863 or 1864 only
that portion of the state within a hundred and fifty miles of
Chicago, which even then was the center of live stock shipment,
could send its sheep, hogs or cattle to market. But while this
gave the central counties of the state an advantage over their
competitors it limited the number of animals which could be
slaughtered at Chicago or sent east from there to the packing
houses on the Atlantic coast. As the number of farmers was
comparatively small at this time, it was profitable for them to
raise live stock, but restricted the number of cattle carried on
the railroad. After the Civil War railway rates were reduced
and the trans-Mississippi territory became a strong competitor
of central Illinois.
There were other influences of a somewhat local nature
which affected the industry in the counties along the Illinois
Central. One of the most important of these was the cost of corn.
Prior to 1860 corn on the farm was of little value and it was
usually cheaper to feed it to swine or cattle than to attempt to
ship it. Thus, the amount of grain forwarded from local stations
along the railroad was much smaller than the large crops would
have permitted. During the Civil War period the price of corn
was high and the farmers found it more profitable to ship it in
bulk than ''on the hoof". After the war there was a decline in
the price of corn, and the high prices of meat induced the farm-
ers to raise a much larger number of animals than before.
As would be expected from these changing conditions, the
number of live stock on the farms of the state fluctuated, although
the general tendency was upwards. The central counties profited
the most by this increase. Evidently the growers of the period
did not find it profitable to fatten hogs and cattle entirely on
corn, for the census returns show that the counties raising the
largest amount of grain did not have the largest number of meat
cattle. For some reason or other, possibly the high price of cot-
ton which stimulated the production of wool as a substitute for
cotton in the making of clothing, the number of sheep much more
than doubled in the decade from 1860 to 1870 and nearly tripled
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in the central agricultural counties along the Illinois Central
Railroad.
In the decade from 1860 to 1870 Chicago became the lead-
ing packing center of the country, and, thus, afforded a market
for the growing number of live stock in the state and especially
in that portion near the Illinois Central. Prior to the war the
Illinois Central ranked second among the railroads entering
Chicago in the number of hogs and cattle received, being preceded
by the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy and closely followed by
the Northwestern, the Rock Island and the Alton.78 During the
war the high price of corn and other unfavorable conditions
affected the Illinois Central more than the other roads, and it
7BThe growth of the live stock industry in the state is shown by the
following tables, which are taken from the census reports :
IX.
NUMBER OF SWINE ON FARMS, 1850 TO 1870.
l85O PERCENT i860 PERCENT 1870 PERCENT
251,187 13.1 449,079 17-9 581,178 21.5
620,536 32.6 1,110,097 44.3 1,074,946 39.8
9,398 .5 13,587 -5 15,552
Group I
Group II
Cook Co.
TOTAL
State
.6
630,934 33-1
1,915,907 100.00
1,113,684
2,502,308
X.
44-8
IOO.O
1,094,467
2,703,343
40.4
IOO.O
Group I
Group II
Cook Co.
TOTAL
State
Group I
Group II
Cook Co.
NUMBER OF CATTLE ON FARMS, 1850 TO 1870.
l85O PERCENT i860 PERCENT 1870 PERCENT
90,332 16.7 l66,6l5 17-2 265,683 25.1
187,954 34-6 436,096 45-1 454,495 43-O
11,155 2.6 14432 2.00 14431 1.4
199,109
541,209
37-2
IOO.O
455,408
9/0,799
XL
47-1
IOO.O
468,926
1,055,499
444
IOO.O
NUMBER OF SHEEP ON FARMS, 1850 TO 1870.
l85O PERCENT i860 PERCENT 1870 PERCENT
138403 15.5 111,669 14-5 292,605 18.6
285,964 32.0 163,514 21.2 593,368 37.8
13496 1.5 8,653 i.i 10,622 .6
TOTAL 299,460 33.5 172,167 22.3 603,990
State 894,043 loo.o 769,735 100.0 1,568,286
^Annual Report, Chicago Board of Trade, 1858-1861.
38.4
IOO.O
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brought in the smallest number of any of the large systems. 77
Beginning with 1866 the territory tributary to the "Central" was
better situated than its competitors, and the railroad again as-
sumed second position, with the Burlington still ahead.78 The
other three important roads were not far behind, and excepting
the Burlington, there was not a great difference between the num-
ber handled by each.
The shipments of live stock constituted an appreciable part
of the traffic of the road. There were over four times as many
hogs and cattle shipped to Chicago in 1870 as the average from
1858 to 1860. For instance, in 1870, the Chicago Board of Trade
credits the railroad with receipts of 379,513 hogs, 87,915 cattle,
and 89,597 sheep, equivalent to about eighty eight thousand tons.79
This was equivalent to 6.5% of the total tonnage handled by the
system in that year.
80 As the rates and the average haul of this
class of freight were considerably greater than the average the
business must have amounted to at least ten per cent of the gross
earnings.
81 The company endeavored to encourage live stock
shipments, though entirely as an addition to the regular move-
ment of grain, and the results, judging from the above, were
satisfactory.
Nearly all the live stock handled by the company was sent to
Chicago, and, in 1867, the last year for whiqh complete data is
available, 82.5% of the cattle, 85.8% of the sheep and 82.5% of
the hogs were forwarded to that city. The demands of the local
butchers were undoubtedly satisfied by animals driven into town
on the hoof. Moreover, from a comparison of tables IX, X,
and XI, it is evident that the shipments over the Illinois Central
constituted a large proportion of the number of animals on the
farms immediately contiguous to the railroad. Thus, from the
rapid increase in the shipments to Chicago and the correspond-
ingly rapid growth after 1860 on the farms, it is safe to assume
that the live stock industry was a reasonably profitable one.
The minor lines of agriculture, such as truck farming, fruit
growing, dairying, the production of hay, vegetables, etc., were
''''Annual Report, Chicago Board of Trade, 1861-1866.
Ibid., 1866-1870.
79
/fcuf., 1870. The figures are not given by the railroad company.
Sheep and hogs are estimated at 200 pounds each, cattle at 1000.
60Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1870.
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comparatively unimportant. Except for a small territory adja-
cent to Chicago there was little demand for truck or dairy prod-
ucts. Small quantities of butter, eggs, cheese, and vegetables
were carried on the railroad, but the aggregate tonnage or earn-
ings were insignificant, never exceeding one per cent of the gross
tonnage.
82 As the territory adjacent to the Illinois Central,
except a few counties in the northern part of the state, is not
adapted to either truck farming or dairying this is not surpris-
ing. The amount of hay handled was also small and constituted
a little more than one per cent of the gross tonnage and about
the same proportion of earnings.
83
Fruit growing was more important. Southern Illinois be-
tween Cairo and Centralia was well adapted to fruit raising and
by the close of the Civil War this region was sending considerable
quantities of apples, peaches, strawberries, and other small fruit
to the Chicago market. During the height of the season special
trains were run from Cairo to Chicago on passenger schedule and
the fruit was placed in the city in time for the morning markets.
The railroad encouraged the development of this traffic by special
service, and reduced rates, and a large proportion of the perish-
able fruit supply of Chicago came from southern Illinois. Ex-
press rates were charged for the freight not unreasonable con-
sidering the service and character of the commodity but the
total revenue was small. As late as 1870 only ten thousand tons
of both vegetables and fruit were handled by the railroad.84
On the whole, the Illinois Central developed the agricultural
resources of the territory dependent upon it as much as could
reasonably have been expected. While rates on grain, live stock,
and other farm products were high and prevented a larger move-
ment than took place, the railroad established as low charges as
would yield it a good profit. Methods of operation common to
all railroads of the period, the lack of a large tonnage, the geo-
graphical location of the line, the direction of traffic, all com-
bined to make low charges impracticable. The Illinois Central
was not the only railroad handicapped by these difficulties and,
taking everything into consideration, it did as much to build up
the portion of the state through which it passed as the North-
western, Burlington, Rock Island, or Alton did to assist the coun-
ties of Illinois, Wisconsin or Iowa through which they ran. On the
other hand, the farms of the state developed the railroad as much
82Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.
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as the railroad developed their interests. The over sanguine
prophecies of vice president Neal were not fulfilled until after
the Civil War, but after the central part of the state once com-
menced to grow it turned over to the railroad all the grain and
live stock it could handle.
Next to agricultural products lumber was the most important
commodity handled by the railroad. Except along the streams
central Illinois between Kankakee and Effingham was very
sparsely wooded, and what timber was found was poorly adapted
for fuel or building purposes. Necessarily, most of the lumber
and wood used in this region had to be brought from places where
timber was more abundant. In 1856 to 1870 there were three
sources from which the supply came; (1) southern Illinois; (2)
northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin; (3) the timber re-
gions of the Northwest (handled by way of Chicago). As the
amount of building going on during the settlement of the state
was large in proportion to the population and as wood was the
common fuel until long after 1870 the demands for lumber and
wood were large.85
Places along the main line and the Chicago branch as far
north as Vandalia and Mattoon were supplied from the forests
of southern Illinois. A small territory just south of the Illinois
river depended on northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin. The
remainder of the supply came from Chicago. Practically all the
lumber that left the city by railroad was sent south over the
tracks of the Illinois Central, and this one item amounted to over
half of the total tonnage forwarded from Chicago by the com-
pany. At first the rates on lumber were placed so high it could
not be transported more than a hundred to a hundred and fifty
miles and the poorer wood from the southern part of the state was
used in considerable quantities. Later improved methods of
operation and the presence of a large number of empty cars in
Chicago, arising from the excess of northbound over southbound
shipments, enabled the company to reduce its charges. These
reductions stimulated the growth of shipments from Chicago, and
by the close of the decade from 1860 to 1870 nearly ninety per
cent of the lumber handled by the railroad originated in Chi-
cago.
86 At the same time the absolute tonnage forwarded steadily
increased, though much more slowly than the general traffic of
"Letters of David Neal and Robert Rantoul on resources of Illinois,
in Documents Relating to the Organisation of the Illinois Central Rail-
road.
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1867.
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the system. As the heavy movement of grain and live stock to
Chicago greatly exceeded the return shipments of merchandise
and miscellanies, the growth of the lumber traffic provided south-
bound loads for a large proportion of the equipment. By this
arrangement the cost of carriage of both grain and lumber could
be reduced and lower rates established. The result was benefi-
cial to the agricultural districts of the state in that it increased
the price of their corn or wheat and decreased the cost of lum-
ber and fuel.87
The third largest single article of freight handled by the
railroad was coal. As stated in Chapter I, there were three im-
portant coal fields near the Illinois Central: the Danville, Du
Quoin, and La Salle mines. A few scattered mines were in exist-
ence, but their output was of slight importance. When the rail-
road was built it was supposed that the mines near Danville
would ship large quantities of coal to Chicago by way of the
Great Western, now the Wabash, to Tolono, and by the Illinois
Central from there north.88 The company was disappointed in
this expectation and for various reasons, principally the compe-
tition of the Ohio coal, the tonnage handled was negligible.8*
The other two fields were of more importance. At first the mines
at both places were handicapped by a high cost of operation, but
as the country became more thickly settled and the mines larger
this difficulty was removed. Their usefulness, however, was lim-
ited by the high railway charges in effect. In 1856 to 1870 the
small amount of tonnage handled, the poor methods of operation,
and other causes, made it absolutely impossible for the railroad
to make low rates on such bulky goods as coal. From a cent to
a cent and a half a ton-mile was the lowest charge the Illinois
Central made under the most favorable conditions. As the coal
fields were from two hundred to two hundred and fifty miles
from a large market the high tariff prevented the transportation
of coal to those markets. Under ordinary circumstances a hun-
dred miles was about as far as the coal could be carried and the
87The fact that the Illinois Central had a large return tonnage from
Chicago was an important factor in keeping the rates on grain and live
stock from advancing. Instead of the northbound freight having to
stand the cost of carriage both ways, loaded up and empty down, it had
to provide for only the upbound expenses.
88Letter of D. Neal, Documents Relating to the Organization of the-
Illinois Central Railroad.
89Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1860.
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production of the mines was limited to the demands of such a
territory.
90
Moreover, coal, as a fuel, was forced to compete with wood.
When the Illinois Central was built, wood was the universal fuel,
and even the company's locomotives were wood burners. After
a series of tests, the railroad began to use coal instead of wood
on its engines, and, to increase its traffic, endeavored to stimulate
the demand for "stone coal" as it was termed.91 For a long
time the prejudice in favor of wood, supplemented by an abun-
dance in districts near the mines, prevented its general use, and
it was not until after the Civil War that coal was burnt to any
considerable extent. Furthermore, Ohio or Pennsylvania coal,
owing to the all water route, was much cheaper at Chicago than
Illinois coal. Only a few mines on the Chicago and Alton, and
Rock Island were in a position to compete with the eastern prod-
uct.92 Under the circumstances, the market for coal mined on
the Illinois Central was not great.
Nevertheless, there was a steady increase in product. Slightly
over two hundred thousand tons, in addition to that used by the
company, was forwarded from the mines in 1870. This was some-
thing over three times as much as was shipped in 1857, and thir-
teen times as much as in 1855.93 From 1857 to 1864 the amount
mined remained nearly stationary, but in the next seven years
it increased to over two hundred thousand tons.94 This was
caused by the exhaustion of the forests, the growing demands
for industrial purposes and the decline of the prejudice against
coal. In 1870 it amounted to 14.9% of all the tonnage handled
by the railroad. Both the rates and the length of haul were less
than the average and the total gross receipts must have formed
a much smaller percentage of the total earnings. Taking into con-
sideration earnings and cost of service, coal was of less impor-
tance to the railroad than the live stock traffic if the two are
compared on the basis of gross and net earnings. The chief value
of the coal traffic was in its indirect benefits to the manufacturing
and commercial interests of the state.
The least prominent of the industries of Illinois affecting the
90
J. W. Foster, Mineral Resources of the Illinois Central Railroad.
91Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1858.
92The Chicago & Alton was the only railroad which brought any con-
siderable amount of coal into Chicago. Annual Report, Chicago Board of
Trade.
esAnnual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.
"Ibid., 1870.
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Illinois Central was manufacturing. As has been stated, Illinois
was primarily an agricultural commonwealth in 1870, and the
territory tributary to the "Central", aside from Chicago, was
the distinctly farming portion. From Kensington to Cairo and
from Centralia to Dunleith there were only three cities that were
manufacturing centers of any prominence Galena, Decatur, and
Bloomington, and none of these places had any large industries.
Even Chicago was not an industrial center of the first rank. Its
commercial interests, such as shipping, the handling of lumber,
live stock and grain and the transfer of freight between east and
west lines, were very large, but it did not manufacture many
kinds of merchandise which were consumed by the agricultural
population of the state. Farm machinery and such goods formed
the great bulk of the merchandise or miscellaneous shipments
originating there.
95 In the remainder of the territory tributary
to the Illinois Central manufacturing was confined to the produc-
tion of simple articles for local use, the important lines being
the making of boots and shoes, clothing, woodenware and other
articles of wood, some farm machinery, whiskey and other alco-
holic liquors. In 1860 less than one per cent of the total popu-
lation of the counties between Shelby and La Salle were engaged
in manufacturing, and the proportion in 1870 was not much
larger.
96
Moreover, the products made in these village or city plants
were those used in the immediate locality. With the exception
of a few factories in Chicago and a much smaller number in the
remainder of the Illinois Central territory the manufacturing
establishments enumerated in the censuses did not send freight
over the railroad. Nor did they bring in large quantities of raw
material, since most of the goods they manufactured were made
from materials raised locally or else were of comparatively small
value. Thus, the total amount of freight handled to or from the
manufacturies of the state was of much less importance than the
products of mines, farms or forests.
However, there was a large tonnage of merchandise and sun-
dries either brought from the east for domestic consumption or
sent over the railroad for points beyond its rails. Including
domestic manufactures, the absolute amount and relative propor-
tion of this high class freight steadily increased from 1857 to
95Eighth and Ninth Censuses (1860, 1870), volumes on Manufac-
tures.
'Eighth Census (1860), volumes on Manufactures and Agriculture.
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1870. In the former year it formed 14.5% of the total traffic and
21.1% in 1870. 97 During this time the absolute tonnage increased
from 64,298 tons to 283,756 tons, or 342%.98 As most of the
freight classed as merchandise or sundry was carried at rates
higher than the average and for longer distances, the gross receipts
in 1870 must have amounted to nearly a quarter of the total
earnings of the road, while the net results from this traffic,
presumably, were even more satisfactory. However, it is uncer-
tain just what items are included in sundries, and, for that rea-
son, the above proportion may be too large. Furthermore, much
of the merchandise was carried at through rates which were very
much lower than the local charges. This, again, may be
a cause of error. At any rate, the tonnage and gross earnings
of the two items make them second only to agriculture in impor-
tance.
The traffic of the railroad, viewed as a unit, increased quite
as rapidly as did the special lines mentioned above. In
1855 the central part of the state was thinly settled, there was
not a large amount of surplus product to be shipped, nor were
the settlers able to purchase any considerable quantity of mer-
chandise, lumber, salt, or other necessities or luxuries. But as
the railroad became better established, the number of people
in the tributary territory larger, and their purchasing power
greater, there was a rapid development of the traffic of the road.
In the sixteen years from 1855 to 1870 the number of tons of
freight handled by the road as a whole, including the leased
lines, grew nearly six fold and the number of ton miles nearly
nine fold." On the charter lines alone over five times as much
tonnage was handled in 1870 as in 1855.100 As the average rates
remained about constant during the period gross earnings in-
creased in about the same proportion as the number of ton
miles.101 By 1870 the traffic on the Illinois lines was about all
that the company was able to handle with its equipment and the
97Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.
"Ibid.
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poor operating methods then in use, and this condition had existed
since the commencement of the war.102
The great bulk of the freight handled by the railroad was
classed as local, that is, it both originated and terminated at the
company's stations. In 1868 over ninety six per cent was local,
and only four per cent through. In no year was the proportion
of the latter to total traffic more than fifteen per cent, and usually
it was less than ten.103 Moreover, the local traffic increased more
rapidly than the through traffic, despite the efforts of the com-
pany to increase its interchange business and to develop through
connections. As the railroad reached the important distributing
and receiving centers of the state over its own rails, through busi-
l02Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870; see following
table :
XII.
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ness was necessarily confined to shipments of merchandise and
small quantities of miscellaneous articles. After the lease of the
Dubuque and Sioux City the company had only one valuable
traffic connection over which freight was sent on through bill-
ing the St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute, which included the
Belleville and Southern Illinois, which crossed the lines of the
Illinois Central at Pana, Mattoon, and Du Quoin. By means of
this system through trains were run from St. Louis to Chicago,
via Mattoon, and to Cairo, via Du Quoin. The line from Chicago
to St. Louis handled a large share of the freight between those
two cities and on the whole was very important. At the same
time, the tonnage routed over this connection was only a small
fraction of the total traffic of the system.
While local freight, in the technical meaning of the word,
was much more important than through business, local traffic,
in the common usage, referring to freight handled between local
stations, was unimportant. Grain, lumber, merchandise, and live
stock, the leading articles forwarded or received, originated at
or were destined to the three main termini of the road, Chicago,
Dunleith or Dubuque, and Cairo. Shipments between local sta-
tions were confined to coal, certain kinds of merchandise, and a
few miscellaneous goods. At the most, less than thirty per cent
of all the traffic on the road was carried between local stations.
As indicated in the previous pages the bulk of the traffic was
seasonal, that is, most of the shipments were made in a few
months of the year. In the fall grain was shipped north to Chi-
cago and during the remainder of the year this kind of traffic
was not of great importance. The same condition existed in the
handling of coal, live stock, and, to a less extent, lumber. More-
over, the preponderance of agricultural shipments over merchan-
dise and lumber meant that the inbound tonnage at Chicago and
Cairo greatly exceeded the outbound.
104
Furthermore, except
during the Civil War period, the bulk of the agricultural ship-
ments were forwarded to Chicago, while the receipts at Cairo
were slight.
105
However, the northbound and southbound traffic
during the period from 1858 to 1870, inclusively, taken as a
whole, was evenly balanced.
106
The large increase in traffic which commenced with 1860
was brought about by the general development of the country,
104Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.
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and not by any marked reduction of rates. The tariffs on
through freight were considerably lower in 1870, but, as stated
above, local rates were higher during the latter year than when
the railroad was put in operation.
107
. However, the rates seem
to have been as low as was necessary to move the traffic. Lower
charges on certain articles such as coal and possibly lumber
might have increased the tonnage turned over to the railroad, but
it is almost certain that a reduction on the tariffs for grain and
live stock would not have attracted a much larger traffic. As it
was, the territory immediately adjacent to the Illinois Central
increased its production of agricultural products at a much faster
rate than the state as a whole and it is difficult to see how the
country could have grown much faster than it did. In the few
years immediately after the war, conditions were somewhat
different, but the statements made above still hold good for that
period.
Thus, it is safe to say that the Illinois Central Railroad, so
far as freight traffic was concerned, fulfilled the object for which
it was built. Compared with the results accomplished by other
railroads in the central West, the achievements of the Illinois
Central were as satisfactory as could reasonably have been de-
manded. The territory tributary to it made gigantic strides in
agriculture, stock raising, mining, and manufacturing. The
country was well settled and the population, as a whole, was
prosperous and contented.108
In the first few years in which the railroad was in operation
the passenger business was of more importance than the trans-
portation of freight. Before the war there was a large immi-
gration into all parts of Illinois and a large proportion of these
settlers used the Illinois Central railroad. Other reasons induced
a large passenger traffic and during 1856 and 1857 there was a
larger number of passengers carried on the railroad than in the
years immediately following the war. The Civil War also had
an important influence on travel over the railroad through the
107Cf. Chap. vi.
108These remarks do not apply to the years after 1868. After the war
there were important changes in economic conditions in the central west.
It became less and less profitable for the farmers to ship grain and the
agriculture communities suffered severely. This dissatisfaction led to the
Granger agitation of the early Seventies. However, these influences had
just begun to affect central Illinois and the results were not sufficient to
change the statement made in the text.
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transportation of troops and the movement of persons to and
from the armies south of Cairo. With the removal of the tem-
porary stimuli to pasesnger traffic this part of the railroad's
business became of less relative importance than in the period
from 1855 to 1865.109
The large traffic during the construction of the road and
the Civil War was accompanied by extremely low rates. In
order to induce settlers to come to Illinois and to develop the re-
sources of the state the tariffs from 1856 to 1860 were very low.
In 1857, the year of greatest travel, the average rate per passen-
ger was only two cents a mile. Local tariffs were placed at four
cents a mile, but most of the people using the road travelled for
much less, and the charges for immigrant and excursion traffic
were considerably below the average. During the war large
numbers of troops were carried at approximately half rates and
this made the charges appear lower than they really were. After
1865 conditions were normal and the local fare of four cents a
mile seems to have been the universal charge.
The bulk of the passenger business, as of the freight, was
local, but the proportion of through to local was much greater,
as the number of passenger connections was larger than the num-
ber of freight connections. In 1860 fourteen railroads, besides
those at Chicago, connected the Illinois Central with points east
or west, and this number had increased to twenty ten years later.
The most valuable of these connections were the eastern lines at
Chicago; the Toledo, Peoria, and Western at El Paso and Oil-
man
;
the Toledo, Wabash, and Western at Decatur and Tolono ;
the St. Louis, Vandalia and Terre Haute and the Terre Haute
and Indianapolis at Vaudalia and Effingham; the Chicago and
Northwestern at Freeport ; the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy
at Mendota
;
and the Ohio and Mississippi at Odin and Sandoval.
Taking the through passenger business as a whole the Illinois
Central received about as many persons from other lines as it
turned over to them, and the business was quite profitable.110
109Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.
ll Ibid. The number of persons received from and delivered to C|ich
of the connections of the railroad is given in the annual reports. The
summarized totals are as follows :
1860 1870
Received 66,127 95,046
Delivered 73,686 102,286
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Although the Illinois Central Railroad was built to fit into
economic conditions in the upper Mississippi valley in which
the important lines of trade were north and south, not east and
west, it adapted itself, in the years from 1856 to 1870, to an east
and west movement of western produce. Had the original plans
of its promoters been carried out to their full extent, the Illinois
Central would, probably, have built up the territory dependent
on it to an even greater extent than it did. At the same time
the profits to its owners and promoters would have been greater.
As it was, economic conditions in the central West and upper
Mississippi valley were such that the peculiar location of the
railroad did not interfere with its usefulness. The Illinois Cen-
tral was more influential than some of the distinctly east and
west roads, such as the Northwestern or Rock Island, in building
up the commercial interests of Chicago. Thus, the traffic his-
tory of this railroad from 1856 to 1870 presents the curious in-
stance of a road built to develop one line of commerce, in the
particular case, trade along north and south lines, actually doing
more than any other company to build up trade on a competitive
route.
Much of this success was due to an unusually fortunate
combination of circumstances. The favorable location of the
railroad, making it tributary both to the Great Lakes and to the
Mississippi River; the phenomenal industrial development of
the United States and of England, together with a considerable
increase in the price of farm products ; the exploitation of a rich
and virgin agricultural territory at a time when the revolution
in farming practice of the middle of the 19th century tremen-
dously stimulated grain production ; and the absence of all com-
petition in fact, practically every railroad touching the Illinois
Central Railroad was tributary to it all of these factors com-
bined to make the period from 1861 to 1870 the most prosperous
one in the history of the railroad.
However, most of these favorable influences were temporary
in their effect. The agricultural resources of Illinois were lim-
ited and after 1870 most of the causes which had worked for
the prosperity of the road before that time were to work for its
impoverishment for several years afterward. The most impor-
tant single influence, and one which was becoming influential
even before 1870, was the extension of the trunk lines, i.e.
Wabash, Pennsylvania, New York Central, Baltimore and Ohio,
and Erie railroads, with their connections, directly into the
territory of the Illinois Central Railroad. With these extensions
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there followed a period of radical rate reductions which made it
possible for these roads to divert grain from central Illinois
directly east over their own rails, thus eliminating Chicago as
a terminal for this territory and giving the Illinois Central Rail-
road only a short haul to junction points. While these events
belong to the period after 1870 their influence commenced soon
after the Civil War and made clear to careful observers even
then the temporary nature of the railroad's prosperity during
this period.
On the whole, however, notwithstanding these accidental
influences, the period from 1857 to 1870 was one of solid traffic
development. Central Illinois was settled; a prosperous agri-
cultural population was made tributary to the railroad;
numerous towns and cities were established
;
industries in these
places and at Chicago were well under way; a number of coal
mines had been opened and the coal introduced both for domestic
and industrial purposes. These results constituted the outward
achievements of the company. Supplementing them was the
internal development of the railroad in the way of traffic
organization and connections, the establishment of policies, and
the perfection of the machinery of operation and management.
Most important of all was the fact that the Illinois Central
Railroad had built itself firmly into the very center of the
economic organization of Illinois. Other systems might be
stronger or larger, but no system has ever been able to supplant
the "Central" in its hold on the industries of the state. What
the Pennsylvania Railroad is to Pennsylvania, the New Haven
to southern New England, and the Southern Pacific to Cali-
fornia, that, though perhaps to a slightly less extent, the Illinois
Central Railroad is to Illinois. Whatever else was won or lost
during the period to 1870, the fact remains that during this
time solid foundations were laid for the industries of central
Illinois as well as for the traffic of the company. These results,
moreover, were secured by a service more valuable than that
rendered by any other railroad of the period. Thus, in 1870,
the Illinois Central Railroad was established as the keystone in
the economic organization of Illinois; for that purpose it was
planned; for that purpose it was constructed; and the years
from 1857 to 1870 were the years during which that purpose
was fulfilled.
CHAPTER VI.
FINANCES OF CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION, 1851 TO 1870.
As already indicated, financial difficulties connected with
building a railroad through the center of Illinois prevented its
construction before 1850. Three successive private companies
and the state itself failed to secure the financial support neces-
sary to complete the enterprise and it must have been with many
misgivings that Robert Schuyler and his associates assumed re-
sponsibility for this previously illfated project.
Before 1851, the fiscal operations connected with the road
were neglected. As far as can be found from the records of the
Cairo City and Canal Company and of the state of Illinois, no
definite estimates of cost of construction were ever made. In
the Internal Improvement Act of 1837 a gross appropriation
of $3,500,000, only $10,000 per mile, was made, and the Cairo
companies evidenty regarded this sum as sufficient.1 . Thus, one
of the first duties of the promoters of the new company was to
secure an approximate statement of the cost of the railroad. To
make a regular survey was too expensive, and, as a substitute,
Mr. Rantoul, late in 1850, through certain friends in the East,
secured the cost of the Alton and Sangamon and seven leading
eastern railroads. Upon these figures he prepared a prelimi-
nary estimate, which became the basis of the fiscal program of
the memorialists. According to this statement, the total cost
would vary from $14,950,000 ($23,000 per mile) to $32,078,843
($41,681.81 per mile), depending upon length of line and char-
acter of construction. 2
In financing the enterprise the promoters had three methods
open to them. The one most common at that time, especially in
the East and South, was to sell sufficient stock to provide for
^Session Laws of Illinois, 1836-1837, p. 121; cf. Chap, n; also records
of the various Cairo companies in the office of the Cairo Title and Trust
Company, Cairo, 111.
^Illinois State Journal (Springfield), February 12, 1851. The estimate
was forwarded to Representative U. F. Lender.
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most of the expenditures, this being supplemented, if necessary,
by the issue of mortgage or income bonds. The second and less
conservative method, nevertheless rapidly growing in favor, was
to build the railroad by selling mortgage bqnds, usually at a
heavy sacrifice, and distribute the stock as a bonus to the pro-
moters.3 With the Illinois Central there was a third possibility. ( J
The company had a federal land grant of from two and a half to \ \f
three million acres of farming land and this allowed the company
to pursue a policy entirely different from what would otherwise
have been possible.
To the eastern capitalists the land grant was considered the
most valuable part of the undertaking, and a few years later
Mr. Richard Cobden expressed the opinion of these men very
clearly when he said "It is not as a railroad investment that I
regard so favorably this undertaking, but its value in my eyes
depends on the landed estate. . . ."* However, the value
of even three million acres of rich prairie land, hundreds of miles
from good transportation, was not great. Between every section
of railroad land the federal government held another section,
equally fertile, which it was willing to sell as low as two dollars
and a half an acre. Six miles back from the tracks lay a vast,
practically unoccupied stretch of government land, the maximum
price for which was a dollar and a quarter an acre. At imme-
diate sale, this enormous domain belonging to the "Central"
would not yield over eight or ten millions of dollars, less than half
the total cost of the railroad, and to supply the remaining mil-
lions themselves was not an inviting prospect to the promoters. To
avoid this difficulty the directors adopted a plan by which the
grant could be held until a large return would be received and
yet the land remain the basis of all fiscal operations.
This policy was worked out in detail in the report made by
President Schuyler to the board on April 23rd, 1851, the main
features of which are as follows. The land grant was to be
the basis of all financial operations, but to secure money for im-
mediate expenditures, mortgage bonds would be issued. (1)
All the railroad track, right of way, stations, etc., and two
million acres of land, were to be mortgaged to the extent of
$21,400,000, which was then considered the approximate cost of
8Cf. Thompson, Cost and Capitalization of American Railroads.
4Mss. letter from Richard Cobden to Sir Joshua Walmsley, written
from Midhurst, England, September 18, 1857. Original in office of the
President, Illinois Central Railroad.
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I construction.5 These two million acres would be held for ten or
I fifteen years, and then sold at such prices that the cash realized
would equal the total amount of bonds issued. The entire issue
would be retired not later than the year 1875. (2) Two hun-
dred and fifty thousand acres were set apart as a guarantee of
interest on the mortgage bonds and could be sold at the discre-
tion of the directors. (3) The remainder of the land amount-
ing to something between one quarter and three quarters of a
million acres, according to the exact route selected, was to be free
land, that is available for any contingency. (4) The stock,
equal in amount to the cash expenditures, was to be distributed
as a bonus to purchasers of bonds, promoters, directors, or sold
to outside parties, a moderate payment of $5 to $10 per share
being made to meet incidental and extraordinary expenses.8
Thus, in return for an investment of a million or two dol-
lars, the stockholders were to receive, free of debt by 1875, a
first class trunk line, seven hundred miles in length, and five
or six hundred thousand acres of rich Illinois prairie land, worth
altogether eighteen to twenty million dollars. It was a business-
like proposition to secure to the promoters of the Illinois Central
the greatest profits ever realized to that time by a group of
American capitalists. Had it not been for a serious underesti-
mate of the cost of construction by Colonel Mason; the panic of
1857
;
and the Civil War events entirely unforseen in 1851
these prospects would undoubtedly have been realized.
President Schuyler 's plan of April 23rd was based on Ran-
toul's statement, and definite action was necessarily deferred
until Colonel Mason submitted his preliminary estimate in Sep-
tember, 1851. According to his report, the railroad would be
699 miles in length and for that distance the cost of roadway,
buildings, equipment, and incidentals was placed at $16,537,212,
or $23,600 per mile, as against $21,400,000 aUowed by Rantoul.7
5The lands were divided as follows :
400,000 acres inferior agricultural land at $ 6 acre $ 2,400,000
1,200,000
" " " 10 " 12,000,000
300,000
"
superior
" "
15
"
4,500,000
loo.ooo
"
especially valuable
" "
25
"
2,500,000
TOTAL $2 1 ,400,000
Letter of Robert Schuyler to Board of Directors, April 23, 1851, in
Documents Relating to the Organization of the Illinois Central Railroad;
cf. mortgage of September 13, 1851, in same pamphlet.
7Report of President Schuyler to Board of Directors, September 12,
1851.
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The schedules were prepared with great care and represented a
reliable estimate of the cost according to prices current in the
summer of 1851. At the same time, either through errors in
the surveys, wrong estimates of bridge work, grading, and build-
ings, or else through a desire to present to the outside world as
favorable a showing as possible, the report greatly underesti-
mated the cost of construction. The seriousness of this error is
shown by a difference of $10,030,805.61 between the estimate of
September, 1851, and the actual cost to December 31st, 1857.8
For an engineer of Mason's standing this difference of 60.5%
was inexcusable, and many subsequent financial difficulties were
caused by this mistake.
With the estimated cost of construction decreased from $21,-
400,000 to $16,500,000, the directors deemed it wise to decrease
the amount of money to be borrowed to $17,000,000. Accord-
ingly, on September 13, 1851, the Illinois Central Railroad Com-
pany mortgaged its right of way, track, buildings, and two mil-
lion acres of land, but not the rolling stock or remaining five
hundred thousand acres of land, as security for $13,000,000 seven
per cent, and $4,000,000 six per cent, coupon bonds, due in 1875,
with interest payable semi-annually in gold. The main fea-
tures of the mortgage were the same as outlined in the president 's
report of April 23, 1851, with the exception of the size of the
mortgage.
9 Three trustees were appointed to handle matters
relating to the mortgage. Two of these were appointed by the
Governor of Illinois and the third by the company.10
In the charter the amount of capital stock was fixed at one
million dollars and could be "increased ... to any sum not
exceeding the entire amount expended on account of said road.
' ni
No restriction, other than the above, was placed on the issu-
ing of stock, and the directors had entire power to fix the terms
of sale. Accordingly, in line with the letter, and perhaps with
the spirit, of the charter, the directors determined to keep the
stock at an amount equal to the total cost of the railroad, irre-
"Construction expenditures to December 31, 1857, $26,568,017.61
Estimate of September 12, 1851, 16,537,212.00
DIFFERENCE $10,030,805.61
9Mortgage of September 13, 1851. Documents Relating to the Organi-
zation of the Illinois Central Railroad.
10John C. Moore and Samuel C. Lockwood were appointed by Gov-
ernor French, and Morris Ketchum represented the railroad.
11Act of February 10, 1851 (Illinois Central Charter), sec. 4.
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spective of the cash paid in by the shareholders. Originally this
amount was fixed at $17,000,000, but later was increased to $25,-
500,000.
12 Under the president's plan, the bonds, and ultimately
the land grant, were intended to provide funds for construction,
and the stock was to be assessed only a nominal amount, say
$10 to $20 per share.13
The charter provided that $200,000 should be deposited with
the state treasurer as a guarantee of good faith and that $20 per
share should be paid on the first one million of stock. Immedi-
ately after the company was organized one million dollars was
subscribed by the incorporators and $50,000, or $5 per share,
paid in to provide for the various expenses of organization.14
Shortly afterwards this first assessment was increased to $20 per
share and another million dollars subscribed. A payment of
$10 per share was asked on the second issue. This gave a total
of $300,000 received from the first two issues of stock ($200,000
from the first issue and $100,000 from the second). As a guar-
antee that the road would be built two hundred thousand dollars
was deposited with the banking firm of Ketchum, Rogers, and
Bement and with Mr. John Griswold, of New York, subject to
the order of the state of Illinois.15
The receipts from the sale of the first two million of stock
paid the expenses of organization, but by winter it became neces-
sary to secure adequate funds for construction, and, in accord-
ance with President Schuyler's plan, mortgage bonds were
issued. In 1851, after several years of depression, the country
entered upon a period of great financial prosperity during which
there was a heavy demand in the United States and Europe for
good investment securities and the directors of the Illinois Cen-
tral were able to take immediate advantage of the favorable
financial situation.
^Chicago Daily Democrat, August 17, 1853; also Annual Report, Illi-
nois Central Railroad, 1855, 1870.
13Report of President Schuyler, September 12, April 23, 1851.
^Chicago Daily Democrat, August 17, 1853.
15At this time Mr. Moore was severely criticized for depositing the
money with men connected with the Illinois Central, but there is no ground
for believing that he was influenced by other than business motives.
Messrs. Griswold, Ketchum, Rogers, and Bement paid the state interest
at five per cent and gave as security additional certificates of deposit more
than covering the money borrowed. See letter of John Moore, dated
Springfield, January 24, 1852, quoted in Chicago Daily Democrat, February
6, 1852.
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According to newspaper reports, one banking firm had
already agreed to take the entire $17,000,000 at par or over,
when a slight stock market flurry occurred, preventing comple-
tion of the arrangements.
16
Probably the real reason was that
investors hesitated to advance such a large amount before a
shovelful of earth had been removed.17 This made it necessary
to reduce the issue to four or five millions, and numerous offers
were made for the smaller amount, including, it is said, a very
flattering proposition from the Rothschilds.18 The success of
the smaller loan was immediate. By December, 1851, bankers
in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia had promised to take
$4,000,000 seven per cent bonds at par, and in February, 1852,
the negotiations were completed.
19 The sale at once placed the
credit of the Illinois Central on a sound basis, and showed that
it could borrow money on as good terms as well established roads
like the Hudson River and the New York and New Haven rail-
roads. It also enabled the company to pay cash for all construc-
tion work.20 The success of the undertaking was thus assured.
Even before the mortgage had been signed, plans were made
to place part of the loan in Great Britain, and in August, 1851,
ex-secretary of the treasury Robert J. Walker and vice-president
David A. Neal were appointed as agents to visit Europe. They
reached London in November and before selling any bonds they
spent several months disseminating information in regard to the
"Central"; consulting bankers, brokers, and investors; and
making arrangements with manufacturers of railroad materials.21
The results were entirely satisfactory. Before the formal an-
nouncement on June 12th, 1852, a large number of investors and
manufacturers had promised to take bonds, and within a few
weeks after the bids were asked for, the entire amount was dis-
posed of at a small premium.22 The strength of the company's
credit was illustrated in a striking way when a number of large
rail makers took bonds rather than cash in payment of materials
purchased. It was also emphasized by the fact that the whole
^Chicago Daily Democrat, November 5, 1851.
"See editorials in American Railway Journal, December, 1851. Mr.
Poor was editor of the Journal and my conclusions are based very largely
on his editorials.
18Chicago Daily Democrat, November 5, December 15, 1851.
19
Ibid., February 16, 1852.
20
Ibid., February 15, 1852.
z
*Ibid., September 8, 1851.
22Railway Times (editorial), June 12, 1852; ibid., advertisement.
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loan of 1,000,000 sterling, or five millions of dollars, although
most of it23 was bearing only six per cent interest one per cent
less than the New York issue was over subscribed at a small
premium.
24
However, the British purchasers were allowed to
subscribe to five shares of stock for every $1000 bond and as
Illinois stock, subject to possible assessments of $80 per share,
was selling at or near par, many investors bought high grade
bonds to secure such valuable stock. 25 Thus, by August 1st,
1852, $9,000,000 of six and seven per cent bonds had been sold
at par.
26 On the other hand, the shareholders had contributed
only $300,000.
From June, 1852, to June, 1853, there was a small increase
in the amount of stocks and bonds outstanding. No new bond
issues were sold, but a number of contractors and manufacturers
agreed to take bonds instead of cash in settlement of contracts.
Likewise, subscriptions from contractors and manufacturers,
stock subscriptions by purchasers of six per cent bonds, and pur-
chases by investors generally increased the amount of stock out-
standing.
27
Furthermore, on June 15th, 1853, seven per cent
bonds to the amount of three million dollars were disposed of at
par, although it is probable that nearly all of this loan had been
unofficially promised several months prior to that time. 28 Thus,
by August 1st, 1853, 109,293 shares of stock had been subscribed.
Payments from $5 to $20 per share were made, and the total
amount received was $746,465, while $13,086,000 of bonds had
been sold or contracted for, of which $6,195,117.66 had been
paid.
29 All of the bonds had been disposed of, at or above par,
and, including differences in exchange and discount, there was a
premium of $84,014.27. Miscellaneous accounts, principally bills
payable, brought the total cash receipts to $7,840,525.68. Con-
struction and general office expenses, interest charges, and the
cost of organization took $6,558,216.45, leaving a nominal bal-
23Of the $5,000,000, $1,000,000 bore seven per cent interest, and the
remainder, $4,000,000, bore six per cent.
24American Railway Journal, May 14, 1853; also official statement of
Daily Democrat, August 17, 1853.
^Railway Times, June 12, 1852; also miscellaneous editorials, adver-
tisements and notices during July, 1852.
2 Statement of the treasurer, Chicago Daily Democrat, August 17, 1853.
"Ibid.; also Railway Times, June 12, 1852.
29Ibid.
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ance of $1,382,309.23. After deducting current liabilities, how-
ever, this was reduced to $370,232.45.30
This is a favorable report, and had the financial situation
remained the same in 1854 as in 1852 and 1853 there would have
been no danger from the small cash balance. However, these
years had been times of tremendous expansion in all lines of busi-
ness and the demand for new capital was so great that it was soon
impossible to borrow on anything like reasonable terms. When
ten per cent bonds of reputable companies such as the Ohio and
Mississippi were selling at sixty or seventy, it was out of the ques-
tion to dispose of six and seven per cent Illinois Central bonds
at par. The money market was also affected by the outbreak of
the Crimean war which created large additional demands for
money, especially in England and prevented free investment
in industrial and railroad securities. By the middle of October,
1853, the six per cent bonds, which only a few months before
had been eagerly sought for at a premium, were selling for 95, 31
and by the last of April a further drop of fifteen points had
taken place.
32 This rapid decline was accentuated by the actions
of President Schuyler. He was president of the New York and
New Haven Railroad, as well as of the Illinois Central, and in the
name of the former company he had fraudulently issued a million
of stock, selling the same for the personal profit of himself and
friends. The leading railroad magnate of his time and a promi-
nent stock exchange broker, his defalcation had a disastrous influ-
ence on the stock market. A Wall Street panic commenced on the
24th of July, the day his embezzlement became known, and
securities dropped rapidly in price.33 The effect on the Illinois
Central was especially damaging. Robert Schuyler, its president,
was a fugitive in Canada and Gouverneur Morris, one of the lead-
ing directors, was a bankrupt. The stock declined over forty
points in a few days and seven per cent bonds became a drug on
the market at 63. 34 With its treasury depleted and payments on
80Statement of the treasurer, I. C. R. R., Chicago Daily Democrat,
August 17, 1853.
^Railway Times, October 24, 1853.
32
Ibid., Feb. 4, 1854; seven per cent bonds sold at %i l/2 to 81^; ibid.,
July 22, November 24, 1854.
^Railway Times, November 14, 1854; editorial references in each
number July 24 to November II, 1854; cf- New York and Chicago news-
papers of the same dates.
3tlbid.
124 HISTORY OF ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD [408
millions of dollars worth of construction work due within the
year, the situation was critical.
Fortunately at this time Mr. W. H. Osborn, who, more than
any other person connected with the road, had helped to place
its finances on the substantial basis of today, assumed complete
control of the financial affairs of the company. From August
1st, 1853, to December 31st, 1857, not quite four and a half years,
a total of $23,339,722.76 was expended on construction work and
interest payments. After deducting bills and accounts payable,
the company, at the commencement of this period, had only
$370,232.45 in cash, leaving some twenty-three million dollars to
be raised within this short period. Against these expenditures,
the company had potential assets to the extent of eight millions
in the form of unpaid installments on bonds already subscribed.
However, a large proportion had been taken by contractors or
manufacturers in payment of work or supplies, and when the
bonds dropped below par they refused to accept anything but
cash in settlement of their contracts. Thus, less than six million
dollars was actually received in cash from these unpaid instal-
ments.38 At the same time rapid increases in the price of raw
material and the wages of laborers forced the contractors to de-
mand a larger compensation for work already commenced. These
demands the company was bound to respect, in order to prevent
a complete demoralization of the work through contractors giving
up their contracts. 36 Under the circumstances the directors were
forced to sell construction bonds at a discount. The charter pro-
hibited this, but by the act of February 27, 1854, this restriction
was removed.37 As early as February, 1854, the company sold
bonds at a small discount, and in spite of the low quotations for
Illinois Central securities further issues were sold at current
market rates, sometimes as low as only $600 per bond. 38 Thus,
by the 31st of December, 1857, the management had disposed of
approximately four and a half millions of seven per cent bonds
at 65, as against par for six per cent issues sold in 1852 and
1853.39 Including instalments on loans made prior to 1854, i.e.
the four and five million loans of 1852 and the three million loan
of 1853, the company realized $9,192,784.38 in cash from con-
ssAnnual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857.
^Railway Times, May 5, 1855 ( Satterthwaite's Report).
"Session Laws of Illinois, 1853-1854, February 27, 1854, sees. 2, 3.
^Railway Times, May 5, 1855.
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struction bonds from August 1st, 1853, to December 31st, 1857 .*
For the four and a half million sold in this period the company
received only $2,900,000, or $650 per bond.
By selling these four and a half million dollars of bonds at
65 instead of par, the company decreased its receipts by approxi-
mately sixteen hundred thousand dollars, while, from various
causes, cost of construction was increased by several millions.
To meet this deficit in receipts the management resorted to the
three hundred thousand acres of free land reserved by the
mortgage of 1851, and in 1855 an additional mortgage, covering
$3,000,000 seven per cent Free Land bonds of 1860, was placed on
the railroad and on the free lands.41 The change that had come
over the financial position of the Illinois Central is strikingly
illustrated by the results of this loan. Only $2,079,876.61, or
$694 per bond, were received. Including the discount, this was
equivalent to about fifteen per cent for the five years the bonds
ran, as against slightly under six per cent for the London loan
of 1852.42
Even the Free Land Loan of 1853 was not sufficient to meet
construction expenditures and finally, in 1856, the company re-
sorted to what was virtually a debenture note. In that year there
was issued $900,000 of eight per cent optional right bonds, pay-
able at any time after 1858.43 To make the notes more inviting to
investors, holders of these securities were given an option on stock
equal to the face value of the bonds.
44 This issue was disposed of
at a higher average price than the Free Land bonds, as it realized
$945 per bond, equivalent, including discount, to about eleven
per cent interest.
45 However, borrowing money on short time
notes at eleven per cent to finance a partially constructed railway
was a dangerous as well as expensive piece of financiering.
These loans did not provide the necessary capital, and to
tide the company over the period of construction floating obli-
gations in the form of bills and accounts payable were allowed
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, August I, 1853, 1855-1857.
"Ibid., 1855, 1856.
*-Ibid. The interest on the money actually received ($694 per bond
at 7%) was 10.1%. In addition, the company had to pay $1000 per bond
in 1860, although it received only $694. As the company had the use of
the money for between five and six years this was equivalent to about
five per cent more, making a total of fifteen per cent
"Ibid., 1856.
"Ibid.
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to accumulate a makeshift which eventually inflicted great mor-
tification as well as financial loss upon the company. Accord-
ingly, miscellaneous obligations were increased from $812,076.78,
on August 1st, 1853, to $3,700,551 on October 20th, 1857. Against
this liability the company carried in New York less than a hun-
dred thousand dollars in cash or cash assets.48
While pursuing these expensive, though perhaps necessary,
expedients of selling bonds and notes at a heavy discount, the
company continued its weak policy in regard to assessments on
the capital stock. Prior to 1854, calls for only a nominal amount
had been made upon the stockholders, and, on August 1, 1853,
only $746,465 had been paid, an average of $6.80 per share.41
In 1854 two assessments of $10 and $5 respectively were made48
and this was followed the next year by two small calls of $5 per
share on the entire capital.
49 $1,000,000 of new stock was also
sold at $25 per share. In the middle of 1857 another call of $10
was made, but only partial payments were made during the sum-
mer.50 By December 31, 1855, there had been received in cash
$2,571,050, or an average of $19.93 on the $12,925,600 outstand-
ing. The next year this was increased to $3,558,615," or $25.20
per share on $14,034,700.
Two additional sources were utilized during the period from
1853 to 1857, viz. net receipts from operation and sales of interest
and free lands. Early in 1853 short portions of the road were
put in operation, and the net receipts began to constitute an ap-
preciable amount. From 1853 to 1855, inclusive, $1,281,305.02
was received in this way.
52 In 1856 cash sales of free and interest
lands were important, the combined receipts to 1857 being as
follows :
Net receipts from Operation $2,134,403.78
Net receipts Free & Interest Lds 1,148,049.22
Total net receipts $3,282,453.00
Interest to Dec. 31, 1857 5,897,644.18
Net deficit $2,615,191.1853
"Statement of the treasurer, August i, 1853; Annual Report, Illi-
nois Central Railroad, 1857; Fisher Report, Railway Times, June 19, 1858.
"Ibid.
48Viz. $10 on 90,000 shares; $5 on 129,346 shares; making a total of
$20 per share.
*9Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855.
*Ibid., 1857.
"Ibid., 1855, 1856.
Ibid., 1855.
"Ibid., 1855, 1857.
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Thus the net receipts from operation and land sales failed to
meet the interest payments in this period by two million six hun-
dred thousand dollars and the deficit had to be made good by
assessments on the stock and by sale of bonds. In fact it was not
until the year 1861 that receipts from free lands and the oper-
ation of the railroad paid all interest charges.54
The various issues of short term notes and the accumulation
of unpaid bills meant that from 1853 to 1857 the directors were
forced into a hand-to-mouth financial policy, offset to only a par-
tial degree by subscriptions to stock or sale of long time bonds.
The result of this policy is shown by the condition of the treasury
in 1857. Over three million dollars of bills and accounts payable
were still outstanding, while the amount of cash actually on hand
in New York did not exceed a few thousand dollars. The com-
pany had a large amount of bills and accounts receivable, time
loans and other slow assets, and uncollected instalments on stock,
but these assets were not available in case of a sudden market
stringency.
55
Steps had been taken to remove these difficulties,
but before they could be carried out there occurred the panic of
1857. The directors of the Illinois Central were unprepared for
such a catastrophe ; Mr. Osborn was in Europe at the time. Notes
were presented for payment; the funds in the treasury at New
York were very low, and though the company had eleven hundred
thousand dollars to its credit in England and over a hundred
thousand more in Chicago, it was impossible to draw bills of
exchange at any reasonable discount. For the first and only
time in its history the company was forced to suspend payment ;
the creditors, under stress of general financial failure, became
urgent for their money ; and, in the absence of the President, the
Secretary made a temporary assignment of the property in order
to prevent seizure of valuable assets by creditors.56
On his return to this country, Mr. Osborn commenced ener-
getic measures to restore the property to the stockholders. Funds
were rushed from England ; arrangements were made with cred-
itors for extension of notes
;
and the directors used their personal
credit to put the company on its feet. Mr. Osborn, himself, en-
54Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1861.
^American Railway Journal, quoted in Railway Times, November 7,
1857; Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856; Fisher Report, Rail-
way Times, June 19, 1858.
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dorsed notes to the extent of several hundred thousand dollars.57
Unpaid assessments were immediately collected; a call, payable
September 25th, of $10 per share, was made ; and a further assess-
ment of $10 ordered early in 1858.58 In the emergency, the stock-
holders supported the company loyally, and made prompt pay-
ment of the additional calls, often at great personal inconvenience.
The crisis showed the danger of large balances of unpaid bills
and to eliminate this evil the directors issued sufficient short term
notes to pay off all such bills. Previously, they had found that
the optional right bonds had been very successful, and the $900,-
000 outstanding was now increased to $3,200,000. Optional rights
on 83,000 shares of stock were to expire between the first of June
and the first of July and this formed the basis of the loan. The
bonds were convertible into stock prior to February 20th, 1860,
on the basis of twenty five shares of stock with $40 paid in, for
each $1000 bond, and were to be redeemed on or before the 20th
of February, 1868.59 Although the interest rate was only seven
per cent, the convertible feature was so attractive that something
like $2,558,000 were subscribed by the 1st of May, 1858.
These energetic measures accomplished their object, and by
the close of the year 1858 the company was again on a sound
financial basis. All the floating debt was either paid or otherwise
provided for and the assignment was removed. During the fif-
teen months from October, 1857, to December 31st, 1858, between
seven and eight million dollars were paid into the treasury of the
company in cash or in various Illinois Central bonds in payment
of stock, allowing the directors to retire the entire floating debt,
with the exception of $396,167.53, and to pay all construction and
interest charges in full.
81
Thus, through the efforts of Mr. Os-
born and his associates, the company passed through the assign-
ment with an untarnished record, and, in 1858, its credit was
higher than it had been for six years. Though somewhat expen-
57A number of the English investors accused Mr. Osborn of taking
advantage of the company's condition to fill his own pockets, but this
resulted from the strong feeling over increased stock assessments, and
Mr. Osborn's long connection with the company, during which he was
ably supported by these very same men, amply refutes this assertion.
What compensation he received was by regular vote of the directors.
^Railway Times, June 19, 1858; November 7, 1857; August 7, 1858;
January I, 1858.
*9Ibid.t January i, 1858; August 7, 1858.M
Ibid., August 7, 1858.
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1858.
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sive, on account of the various financial expedients which had to
be adopted, the crisis of 1857 taught the company a valuable
lesson.
By 1859 all danger from the floating indebtedness had been
removed but there still remained the Optional Right bonds of
1868 and the Free Land bonds of 1860. Under the mortgages
these bonds could be retired in 1859 and 1860, and in those two
years all notes and floating liabilities in excess of those included
in strictly operating accounts, and the Free Land and Optional
Right bonds, were cancelled, leaving the construction bond mort-
gage of 1875 as the only lien upon the property. Thus, at a late
date, the company adopted a policy that should have been pur-
sued from the commencement of the undertaking.
During the years 1857 and 1858 the shareholders had paid
in an average of $35 per share on stock which they supposed
would cost them practically nothing, and judging from comments
in the English press British investors in the Illinois Central were
thoroughly indignant at the American directors. Meetings of
shareholders were held, two special committees were sent to the
United States, and the English stockholders and bondholders
formed a permanent organization to supervise the affairs of the
corporation.
62 The continued assessments, stimulated by a strong
bear movement on the exchange, forced down the price of both
stocks and bonds and for a time many of the small shareholders
were thoroughly frightened. The company was not yet in a
position to ignore the stock market and accordingly, as a peace
offering, the directors adopted two very important measures,
both of considerable financial benefit to the shareholders.
The first of these was the Cancelled Bond Scrip Dividend.
By 1856 the sales of land had been sufficient to cancel about $600,-
62Cf. Railway Times, November, 1857 to December, 1858.
The attitude of the more conservative investors is shown by the
following letter written by Richard Cobden : "I do not change in the
slightest degree my opinion in consequence of the fall in the Illinois.
That the stock will go up again to its former level I have no doubt.
It is not as a railroad investment that I regard so favorably this under-
taking, but its value in my eyes depends on the landed estate which is the
noblest domain ever transferred in one conveyance. Nothing but an
earthquake or some other convulsion of nature can impair the value of
2,600,000 acres of the richest soil in the world, situated in the midst of
the most industrious & intelligent population. The Wall Street 'bulls'
and 'bears' will make no durable impression on such a property." Mss.
letter to Sir Joshua Walmsley, Midhurst, September 18, 1857. Original
in office of President, Illinois Central Railroad.
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000 of the construction bonds and on July 12, 1858, as the result
of strong pressure from the English shareholders, the manage-
ment ordered that "whenever the amount of construction bonds
cancelled in a year should amount to five per cent on the share
capital of the company, certificates setting forth the amount so
cancelled should be distributed pro rata among the shareholders
and this scrip should be entitled to the same dividends as regular
stock."63 These dividends were continued until 1863, by which
time the amount so distributed was $1,772,270. After 1863 the
profits from the land sales were divided among the shareholders
in other ways.
6*
The second was dated from May 27th, 1859, and entitled any
stockholder who had paid up the full par value of his stock to
receive four per cent interest per annum on the same until a
regular cash dividend of at least four per cent had been declared.
There had been previous interest dividends paid in cash, but they
were sporadic, and this measure now offered an inducement to
the shareholders to pay up their stock in full.85
These measures had a very important influence on the stock
account and encouraged the shareholders to pay up all unpaid
calls and assessments. As a result the number of full paid shares
increased from none in 1858 to 97,821 in 1863, and the cash re-
ceived from all shares from $3,558,615 in the spring of 1857 to
$15,654,980 in 1860 and $17,543,700 in 1863.66
During the three years ending December 31, 1860, expen-
ditures for construction amounted to $1,080,237.86 and the deficit
in net earnings over interest charges to $2,095,408.08, thus leav-
ing $5,622,899.06 to cancel bonds and miscellaneous obligations.67
The Free Land bonds were paid off at maturity in 1860, and the
optional right bonds were either redeemed by cash payments or
converted into stock. This left the construction bonds of 1875 as
the only funded debt. Moreover, receipts from land sales had
reduced the amount outstanding in 1860 to approximately fifteen
millions, as against a share capital of $17,945,400, of which $15,-
654,980 had been paid in cash.68 This was a decided contrast to
"Resolution of the Board of Directors, July 12, 1858, quoted in
Railway Times, August 7, 1858.
**Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1863.
**Ibid., 1855-1865; Resolution of Board of Directors, quoted in Rail-
u'ay Times, June 18, 1858.
Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856-1864.
"Ibid., 1858-1860.
"Ibid., report of the Land Department, 1860.
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conditions in 1853 when less than eight hundred thousand dollars
had been paid by the shareholders.
The methods used to obtain money for construction purposes
having been reviewed it is important to see where these millions
of dollars went. To December 31st, 1857, when the railroad was
in full operation, the expenditures for equipment and construc-
tion amounted to a total of $23,436,668.32, or $33,198 per mile, to
which should be added interest during the period of construc-
tion. Including all proper construction charges, the total expen-
ditures for permanent improvements chargeable to capital were
as follows :
Construction charges to December 31st, 1857.. $23,436,668.32
Interest charges to Dec. 31, 1856......$4,874,279.59
Less net rcpts. from operation 1,742,930.30 3,131,349.29
TOTAL COST OP THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL $26,568,017.6169
While the aggregate cost is high there seems to be no reason
to question the correctness of the accounts. In 1857 the Illinois
Central Railroad was undoubtedly the best built road in the
West; ample terminal and yard facilities existed; right of way
and station grounds were more than sufficient forthe existing busi-
ness; bridges and culverts were usually of stone or iron and al-
ways substantial ; grades were light, curves were of large radius,
and tangents constituted about ninety per cent of the line ; the
equipment was up-to-date in every particular, ample in amount,
and well built; on the whole roadbed and equipment were suffi-
cient to provide for traffic several times that of 1857. There were
occasional misappropriations of funds, poor contract work, and
speculations, but there was not that organized corruption and
mismanagement characteristic of many of the land grant roads.
The company itself did most of the construction work and all
contracts were satisfied in cash or bonds at par. Moreover, the
officials of the company were able to secure supplies and labor
at low prices. The average wages of employees did not exceed
those paid in the eastern states; nearly all of the iron was pur-
69Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857.
The interest charge is based on the following assumptions: (i) the
road was not in completed condition until December 31, 1857; (2) inter-
est, less net receipts from operation, should be allowed from the time
individual sections were opened until the whole was in complete operation.
These assumptions are not absolutely correct, but the above plan seems
to be the best basis for determining interest during construction.
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chased in England at very low prices ; and the right of way, which
to-day is worth a fabulous amount, was secured at a nominal
cost. Three times the English shareholders sent a special com-
mittee to this country to audit the construction accounts of the
Illinois Central; they were given complete access to all vouchers
and original records; and in their published reports the three
committees state emphatically that, so far as they could discover,
the accounts were honestly kept, and no fraud or speculation of
any extent was found.
70
Moreover, from a comparison of detailed
expenditures of the Illinois Central with those of several other
roads71 it appears that, in the majority of cases, the Illinois cor-
poration paid lower unit prices for material than any of these
companies. The amount of interest seems somewhat excessive, but
this was made necessary by the size of the railroad, which pre-
vented efficient operation of the road until the whole was com-
pleted in 1856. Therefore, it is safe to say that the $26,568,017.61
given above is a reasonable and bona fide statement of the actual
expenditures and is a proper charge to capital.72
It is not possible to make so favorable a statement in regard
to the wisdom with which part of this money was spent.
Throughout the early history of the company the directors held
rather exaggerated views of the traffic possibilities of the road.
They also adhered to the English system of building a railroad
in a thoroughly substantial manner. It goes without question
that the heavy initial expenditures materially reduced operating
expenses, but it is also true that a much lighter construction
would have answered the needs of that period just as well, and
the company would have been saved interest charges on expendi-
tures, which were useless for many years. For instance wooden
trestles would have answered as well as stone culverts; frame
stations might have been used instead of brick ; ana similar inex-
pensive, but serviceable, equipment could have been used to ad-
vantage in many places.
TOAckerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad. Viz.
Railway Times, November 27, 1858; ibid., June 19, 1858; Report of the
Committee of Dutch and English Stockholders, 1876.
71Viz. New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern; Mississippi Central;
Mississippi & Tennessee ; Ohio & Mississippi ; Michigan Central.
"With different methods of accounting used in the fifties it is impos-
sible to obtain an absolutely accurate statement of expenditure at that
time. However, the figures may be regarded as absolutely correct for the
first two places. The smaller amounts are retained to conform to the
figures of the company.
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The period from 1850 to 1857 was a time of construction;
the years from 1857 to 1870 were years of enormous traffic devel-
opment which necessitated large additions to capital. Gross
earnings rose from $2,300,000 in 1857 to $8,700,000 in 1870, or
an increase of 266%, while the number of tons of freight moved
one mile increased from fifty million to two hundred and sixty
five million, or 430%.T3 At any period of railroad history, such
an enormous development would have demanded heavy capital
expenditures, but with the poor operating methods then in vogue
the amount of equipment had to increase in almost direct pro-
portion to the growth of tonnage. The greater number and
weight of trains also necessitated many improvements of the
property. In the thirteen years ending December 31st, 1870, the
charges to capital amounted to $7,084,421.10, bringing the total
cost in 1870 to $33,653,339.71, or $47,710 per mile. This amount
was distributed as follows :
Construction $4,317,169.05
Equipment 2,767,252.05
TOTAL ...... ............................................................................. $7,084,421.1074
In addition to the money expended on the Illinois Central proper,
a few thousand dollars were applied to capital account on the
Iowa leased lines, but this is not included in the total.75
''^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1870; the last three
years include earnings of 200 to 402 miles in Iowa, amounting to between
a million and a million and a half a year.
75Ibid. The expenditures for Permanent Improvements were distrib-
uted as follows :
Bridging .........._ ..............................................$ 496,016.59
Ballasting ........................................................ 401,865.55
Sidings ............................................................ 495,624.06
Lake shore Protection ............................ 292,416.23
Real estate ...................................................... 163,115.91
Rails ................................................................ 49,223.60
Ties ....................................................................................
Fencing ............................................................ 74,815.79
Telegraph ........................................................ 36,674. 16
Engineering .................................................... 40,953-92
Gen'l Expense .............................................. 420,360.65
Buildings ........................................................ 951,108.45
Masonry .......................................................... 1 19,172.83
Roadway ........................................................ 261 ,237.54
Miscellaneous .................................................................. $4,317,169.05
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Statements have been made that in the Civil War period
and the years immediately thereafter the permanent improvement
account of the Illinois Central was unduly increased at the ex-
pense of operating charges.
76 There is just enough truth in the
statement to make necessary a somewhat thorough explanation.
Prior to about 1872 or 1873 maintenance expenditures were very
high even when compared with present expenses on the system,77
and it is improbable that with such liberal appropriations the
property would run down. The company also had a very good
system of accounting and the accounts were as accurately dis-
tributed as on any railroad of the time. The following statement
of the Board of Directors approved by them on February 6th,
1874, shows the attitude of the company towards this matter:
"It should be noted that upon the plan of making up the con-
struction account followed by most railways, our charge to con-
struction expenditures would be considerably increased, owing
to the fact that, during the last ten years, extensive improve-
ments and additions have been made to your property, which
might have been charged to capital account, but have been in-
cluded in working expenses.
' ' 78
Moreover, with the exception of
the years 1865 and 1866, the net receipts from operation greatly
exceeded the fixed charges and dividends, and consequently, there
was no motive to increase the capital account at the expense of
operating charges. 79 Thus, it seems entirely reasonable to accept
Locomotives $1,071,944.08
Freight cars 1,389,385-64
Coal cars 10,985.22
Passenger cars 140,151.49
Shop machinery, etc 141,963.31 2,767,252.05
TOTAL $7,084421.10
76In the report of the English and Dutch Committee of 1876 it was
claimed that up to that time many items, properly chargeable to operation,
were included in capital accounts.
"For instance, in 1867, the year the Iowa lines were taken over, but
before the lease had affected conditions in Illinois, the expenditures for
maintenance were:
Bridges, $123; buildings, $135; labor, $1,672; total maintenance of way,
$2,080 per mile ; repairs, locomotives, $3,060 per locomotive ; repairs, pas-
senger cars, $1,378 per passenger car; repairs, freight cars, $87 per car;
total maintenance of equipment, $1,470 per mile. Annual Report, Illinois
Central Railroad, 1867.
"Quoted in Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1874.
78Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1870.
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the company's statement of permanent improvements for this
period. As the greater proportion of the permanent improve-
ments were paid for out of surplus receipts in other words, at
the expense of possible dividends it may be taken for granted
that reasonable economy was exercised. However, as explained
at greater length on page 18, the Illinois Central diverted a part
of the receipts of the Land Department from the purposes out-
lined in the mortgage of September 12th, 1851, and had this not
been done there would have been a deficit in some of the years.
In no year did the net earnings and
' '
proper
' '
receipts from the
Land Department equal the interest and dividend payments. As
a result the company virtually paid dividends out of capital.
While this policy disregarded the spirit of the mortgage of 1851
and was not as conservative as might have been desired, it is
unreasonable to accuse the company of a serious error in account-
ing.
In the period before 1857, practically all the expenditures
for permanent improvements or construction, came from the sale
of bonds
;
after 1857 net receipts from operation and sale of lands,
and assessments on stock, paid the major portion of such charges.
From 1861 to 1870, net receipts from sales of free and interest
land and from operation exceeded dividends and fixed charges
by $2,381,203, however, the fixed charges and interest dividends
from 1857 to 1860 exceeded the net earnings by $1,809,613.13,
leaving a net surplus for the thirteen years of only $285,794.95.80
The deficit of interest and dividend payments over net receipts
from operation alone amounted to several million dollars.81
In President Schuyler's financial plan of 1851, the funded
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1870.
81From 1857 to 1870 there were received in cash from the shareholders
$12,880,265, to which should be added the net surplus of $285,794.95, mak-
ing a total of $13,166,059.95. During this period various expenditures not
chargeable to operation were as follows :
Permanent Improvements $ 7,084,421.10
Redemption Free Land Bonds, Optional Right Scrip,
current liabilities, etc. (approximately) 6,500,000.00
TOTAL $i 3,584,421 .10
Received from stockholders and net surplus from
operation i3,i66,<>59-95
DIFFERENCE $ 418,361.15
This difference would be accounted for by the surplus in 1870, and miscel-
laneous investments during the period.
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debt, then represented by the $17,000,000 construction bonds of
1875, was a temporary expedient. Under the terms of the mort-
gage two million acres of land were set apart as security for the
loan, and the instrument was so worded that on the completion of
each sale, bonds, equal in value to the land disposed of, would be
cancelled. Thus, through the operations of the Land Department,
the entire loan was to be paid off not later than 1875. Various
difficulties delayed the sale of the construction lands. Except
in a few favored regions, transportation facilities were still poor
and several million acres of government land, selling as low as
$2.50 an acre, were also on the market. By the mortgage $8 was
the lowest price for any of these lands and the company found it
necessary to wait until most of the government domain had been
disposed of before placing its own land on the market. The con-
struction of the railroad in 1856 made settlement of the interior
counties of Illinois much easier and by that year practically all
of the government land had been sold. Tens of thousands of
settlers were seeking farms near the railroad, and the company
was thus in a position to demand reasonably high prices for its
land. However, through legal restraints and the good judgment
of the directors, the company pursued a very liberal policy. Cash
payments were not required, as was the case with the federal
land office. Instead, the settler could purchase his farm on credit
by giving a note for the amount, the principal to be paid in five
equal instalments, with interest at six per cent, the company, of
course, retaining title until all payments were completed.
82
In 1856 active efforts were made to sell the land and nearly
five hundred thousand acres were sold for upwards of four and a
half million dollars. The sales in 1857 were almost as large.83
Most of the sales were made to actual settlers in small holdings
of one hundred to a hundred and twenty five acres, although at
first a considerable quantity was disposed of to speculators. In
the panic of 1857 the company experienced much difficulty with
this class of purchasers, and from 1857 on it refused to sell except
to bona fide settlers.
Up to the summer of 1857, sales were all that the company
could have desired, and everything indicated a continuation of
* 2Land Office Pamphlets, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856-1870. The
interest per annum varied from two to six per cent, but most of the land
was sold on the basis of six per cent.
"Reports of the Land Office. Annual Report, Illinois Central Rail-
road, 1856, 1857.
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the purchases on the same extensive scale. But just at the height
of the sales, there occurred the panic of 1857 and the assignment,
which, of course, put a sudden stop to immigration into the state
and to further sales. Purchases dropped from $4,500,000 in 1856
to less than $500,000 in 1858 and to still smaller proportions in
1859.84 More important, still, many of the farmers along the
road had purchased land on credit and the panic left them unable
to market their corn, wheat, and pork, or else they had no crops
to market on account of repeated droughts. In many cases
settlers were unable to make any payment whatever. Over a mil-
lion dollars was due in both 1858 and 1859 and the purchasers had
no cash to meet the instalments. To foreclose the mortgages or
notes meant distress to tens of thousands of farmers and a serious
impairment of revenue, through reduced acreage, to say nothing
of universal ill-will. In this emergency the company followed a
wise and conciliatory policy. Farms purchased by speculators
or those too shiftless to succeed, were foreclosed. Where crop
failures and the panic prevented payment of the instalments by
bona fide settlers, payment in kind was allowed, generally corn.
Where even this could be done, notes were extended and in
other ways the farmers were encouraged to remain. Most of the
settlers along the railroad took advantage of this generosity, and
a large proportion of the payments due in 1858 and 1859 were
extended. Altogether, over two million bushels of corn were re-
ceived in payment of land notes and the officers of the company
found themselves engaged in the grain business on an extensive
scale. Miles of cribs were erected along the tracks and corn was
held there for several months. In the end the company lost quite
a large amount by handling this grain, though it was much more
than compensated by the increased good will of the people along
the line and by the prosperity of the farmers.85 Its liberal policy
secured it the support of the entire rural population of Illinois,
and for a decade the Illinois Central Railroad was the most pop-
ular corporation in the state. It must be admitted, however, that
the English shareholders viewed this generous policy with many
misgivings and severely criticised the management for its lib-
erality.
86
84Reports of the Land Department. Annual Report, Illinois Central
Railroad, 1858, 1859.
^Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders, 1877;
Fisher Report, Railway Times, November 27, 1858; Annual Report, Illinois
Central Railroad, 1856-1861. This loss was borne by the Land Department.
MIbid.
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Following the droughts, crop failures, and panics of 1857,
1858, and 1859, came the good times of 1860, and the sales of
land again reached the proportions of 1856. The respite was
only temporary, and in the spring of 1861 the great struggle be-
tween the North and South commenced. The Illinois farmer was
cut off from his southern market
;
thousands of men entered the
federal armies
;
and lack of a market and scarcity of labor made
the year 1861 notable for its severity upon the farmers.87 But
the war created a demand for vast quantities of corn, wheat,
oats and meat for the army ; the eastern and New England states
increased their manufacturing industries enormously, and the
West was called upon to supply a part of the raw materials for
these new industries and food for the men supported by them.88
Several hundred thousand settlers took up claims or purchased
farms in the western states and a considerable proportion of this
immigration remained in Illinois. The demand for railroad lands
grew with the immigration and in 1863 the sales of the Land De-
partment surpassed all previous records, and, that too, at in-
creased prices.
89 By 1864 the farmers were again in a position
to pay their notes, and in that year the cash receipts of the Land
Department reached the high water mark of $1,440,000.90
The remainder of the decade continued to be a period of
unabated prosperity in which the agricultural interests of Illinois
were especially favored, and the demand for farms remained
good. By 1870 practically all the land north of Vandalia, and
much south of that town, had been disposed of at good prices,
while instalments on previous purchases had been paid promptly
and in full.91 Thus, by December 31, 1870, $13,641,616.40 had
been received from construction land and $8,800,000 more from
free and interest lands, while upwards of four millions was still
due the company on notes, making a grand total of considerably
over $26,000,000 received from the land grant prior to 1870. 92
From 1870 to 1875 the sales of new land were very small.
Less than two hundred thousand acres of inferior land was sold,
87Bogart, Economic History of the United States, Chap. xx. Cf.
Chap, iv, where these points are taken up at much greater length.
88Bogart, Economic History of the United States, Chap. xxv. Cf-
Chap. iv.
^Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1860-1863.
Ibid., 1865.
91Ibid^ 1870.
92
Ibid., 1870, report of the Land Department.
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as compared with five times as much in the previous half decade.
However, it was a period in which practically all the outstanding
notes were paid off, with the result that cash receipts were large.
From 1871 to 1874 $2,304,649.87 was received in cash for sales
of new land and nearly all of the unpaid notes of 1870 were liqui-
dated.93 At the close of 1874 the mortgage of September 13, 1851,
was cancelled and the land grant was freed from all restrictions.
The following table shows the total receipts from the land office
from 1851 to 1874, inclusive:
Construction Bond Fund $15,946,272.27
Interest Fund 6,051,856.85
Free Land Fund 3,508,488.51 $25,506,627.63
Expenses Land Office to 1873 1,383,644.04
Paid Traffic Department..... 297,589.59
BiUs receivable, etc. (1874) 75,369.90 1,754,603.53
TOTAL _ $27,261,231.16
Net receipts Land Office, 1875 to 1907 2,219,061.66
GRAND TOTAL $29,480,292.8294
By 1874 approximately two million two hundred thousand acres
had been sold, which made an average receipt per acre of a little
over twelve dollars, including expenses, or eleven dollars net re-
93Report of the Land Department. Annual Report, Illinois Central
Railroad, 1874.
94
Ibid., 1855-1907; Fisher Report, Raiway Times, November 27, 1858;
Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders, 1877; cf.
special reports of the president, Illinois Central Railroad, 1890, 1897, 1906.
In 1851 President Schuyler predicted that the land grant would be suffi-
cient to pay the entire cost of the railroad and if the receipts of the Land
Department had been applied to the capital account that prophecy would
have been fulfilled.
Cost of Railroad to Dec. 3ist, 1857 $26,568,017.61
Receipts Land Department to 1874 net 25,506,627.63
DIFFERENCE $ 1,061,389.98
The value of unsold lands in 1874 was much larger than this difference.
If the spirit of the mortgage of 1851 had been rigidly followed and deficit
in earnings before 1863 had been made up out of surplus receipts from
1864 to 1870, the receipts of the Land Department would have sufficed to
have paid back the cost of construction to 1857. However, a large part
of the receipts from the land grant went directly into the treasury of the
company.
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ceiptg^. This grant of two and a half million acres of land has
oeena source of great profit to the company. At the same time
it has been managed well, and sold to the best advantage of the
community as a whole, as well as of the company.
Of the total receipts of the land office, $11,779,407.02 to
1907, or $9,560,355.36 to 1874, was used for the payment of inter-
est and dividends
;
the cancellation of floating indebtedness, free
land bonds and optional right notes; for permanent improve-
ments defrayed from income ; to purchase securities of other com-
panies, especially the lines south of Cairo ; in a word to the same
purposes as the ordinary receipts from operation.95 The remain-
der, amounting to $15,946,272.27, was applied towards cancelling,
in part, the construction bonds of 1875, in accordance with the
mortgage of 1851. It will be seen from the report of the land
department for 1872, the last full report, that $15,103,178.59, re-
ceived to that date, paid off construction bonds to the value of
$13,609,500, allowing a premium of eleven per cent, or $1,493,-
678.59. In 1873 and 1874 $657,856.47 was received, and the pro-
portion of premium to par value was presumably about the
Msame.
Since the mortgage covered $17,000,000 and only $14,200,000
was received from the sale of land there was a balance of approxi-
mately $2,900,000, which came from other sources, mainly the
Sterling and Currency Eedemption loans. These bonds had three
uses (1) to provide construction bonds for the Land Department;
(2) to pay for permanent improvement chargeable to capital;
(3) to substitute new bonds for the construction bonds, and to
allow the sales of construction land to be used for interest and
dividends.
By the terms of the construction bond mortgage, bonds had
to be cancelled on the completion of every sale of land. Prior to
1861 the cash receipts from construction land were less than two
and a half million dollars and sufficient bonds could be obtained
in the open market on reasonable terms. So long as this condition
continued the terms of the mortgage inflicted no hardship upon
purchasers of land. The prosperity resulting from the Civil War
allowed settlers along the railroad to pay for their farms, and, in
both 1862 and 1863, there were large demands for the bonds,
which naturally advanced the price of these securities. Many
9SAnnual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1906.
9
*Ibid., 1855-1875; Report of the Committee of English and Dutch
Stockholders, 1877.
425] FINANCES, 1851-1870 141
holders saw a chance to make a profit by retaining the bonds and
forcing the company to recall them at the twenty per cent advance
specified in the mortgage, which again tended to advance the
price. The bonds were gilt edge securities with interest payable
in gold and with the general advance in prices during the period
they increased in value from this cause also. To compel the set-
tlers or the Land Department to purchase the bonds at an ad-
vance of fifteen to twenty per cent was an injustice and to remove
the difficulty the directors, in 1863, isused $2,500,000 six per cent
1st lien currency redemption bonds of 1870, with the object of
purchasing construction bonds. These new bonds could be ex-
changed for the old on the basis of $100 currency bonds for an
equal amount of six per cent construction bonds, or $115 of the
new for $100 seven per cent construction bonds.97
This absorption of construction bonds in 1863 and 1864 tem-
porarily satisfied the needs of the Land Department, but, by 1867,
some $6,441,145.37 had been received from purchasers of land and
conditions were as bad as in 1863. The same remedy was applied.
In 1867, sterling six per cent redemption bonds of 1875 to the
amount of 500,000, or $2,500,000, were issued and exchanged for
construction bonds on about the same terms as the currency re-
demption bonds.98 Both issues were easily disposed of, and, by
1870, the entire loan of $5,000,000 had been sold for cash at par
or above, or exchanged for construction bonds on the terms speci-
fied above." Of the combined total approximately $4,000,000 was
used to purchase construction bonds, and, of this amount, per-
haps $750,000 was used in strict accordance with the terms of
the mortgage of 1851.
When the two loans were placed it was understood that a
part of the proceeds should be used to defray the cost of new
equipment and improvement of the property. No figures are
given by the company as to just how much was spent for this
purpose, but, as shown on page 186 the approximate amount ex-
pended in this way was a million and a half. Of this perhaps a
half was received from the sale of bonds for cash and the re-
mainder by exchanging redemption bonds for construction bonds
"Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1863. The six per cent
currency bonds were a first class security and the few bonds sold on the
open market brought $1000 per bond. However, nearly all of the issue
was exchanged for the construction bonds on the agreed terms.
8/&u/., 1867.
Ibid., 1863-1870.
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and transferring the proceeds from the Land Department to per-
manent improvements.
However, the greater portion of the receipts from these two
issues was used in a way entirely contrary to the spirit of the
construction bond mortgage. When that instrument was made
in 1851, it was understood that the two million acres set apart
would be sufficient to cancel the entire loan and that all the
proceeds from the land would be used to retire the construction
bonds. If the construction bonds were purchased through the issue
of other bonds it would not be necessary to apply the receipts
from the sales of land to that purpose and the money so received
could be turned into the general treasury to be used for interest
and dividend payments. About $3,500,000 of the redemption bonds
were used to purchase construction bonds and instead of an equal
amount of receipts from the land department being credited to
the Permanent Improvement account, as an offset to the new
bonds, the money was turned into the Free and Interest Land
account and made available for interest and dividend payments.
In this way the net earnings from operation were greatly in-
creased and the company was able to pay ten per cent dividends.
Had the $3,500,000 been applied in strict accordance with the
mortgage there would have been a deficit in net earnings for the
period from 1857 to 1870 of approximately $3,250,000, instead
of a surplus of $250,000. Under the changed conditions the com-
pany could not consistently have paid the dividends it did. In
other words, following a strict construction of the mortgage of
1851, the company from 1863 to 1870 was paying part of its divi-
dends out of capital. Except for a very few years the net earn-
ings from operation alone were never sufficient to provide for
both interest and dividends. Moreover, for the thirteen years,
the net earnings from operation and the receipts from the free
and interest lands as originally created, were less, by some two
and a quarter million dollars, than the disbursements for interest
and dividends, to say nothing of expenditures for permanent
improvements.100
However, the course pursued was not without justification.
"^Reports of Land Department, Annual Report, Illinois Central Rail-
road, 1872, 1873, 1874; Fisher Report, Railway Times, November 7, 1858;
Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders, 1877. Neither
the company itself nor the various investigating committees make any
definite statement as to where the receipts from the six per cent redemp-
tion bond issues went and for that reason the figures given above are
only approximate.
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Strict adherence to the mortgage would have necessitated a reduc-
tion of dividends by about two per cent a year. After the railroad
was built there were no legal restrictions upon the company 's use
of the land grant, except those provided in the mortgage of Sep-
tember 13th. The other restraints were those of the company's
own making and so long as the security of the bondholders was
not impaired it had a perfect right to abolish such self imposed
obligations. Moreover, under the circumstances, it would have
been foolish for the management to have pursued an ultra-con-
servative policy, detrimental to the immediate interests of the
shareholders, when a more liberal construction of the mortgage
and the president's plan of 1851 was very profitable to the owners
of the road, and did not impair the value of the property.
Aside from the objections noted above, the construction bond
account was well managed, and, on the whole, was of real benefit
to the railroad. At the same time, it was a rather expensive
loan. For the $17,000,000 of bonds issued there was received in
cash only $15,387,902.06 while $18,493,678.59 was spent to retire
them, allowing a difference of $3,105,776.53, or 20.2%.101 Prac-
tically all the loss fell upon the seven per cent issues, and by some
strange movement of chance the six per cents netted the company
nearly fifty per cent more per bond than the seven per cents,
although the latter were equally well secured and bore one per
cent additional interest. On the other hand, the construction
bond loan of the Illinois Central was far more profitable to the
company than were the results of similar loans for construction
purposes of such companies as the Ohio and Mississippi, St.
Louis. Alton and Terre Haute, and Great Western of Illinois.
Closely connected with the operations of the Land Depart-
ment and the issue of the two redemption loans was the action
of the company in regard to the stock account. Prior to the
assignment of 1857, as already stated, only nominal assessments
were made on the share capital, most of the funds for construc-
tion coming from the sale of bonds. Then from 1858 to 1863
this policy was reversed and heavy calls were made upon the
stockholders, with the result that from 1857 to 1870 $12,880,265
was received in cash from stock assessments. This, of course,
was a favorable showing. Beginning as early as 1860 the re-
ceipts from construction lands had decreased the funded debt
and during the same period payments on the capital stock
lAnnual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1875. Cf. Report of
the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders, 1877.
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allowed an increased investment in the property, without a
corresponding increase in liabilities. By 1865 these two parallel
movements brought the cost of the railroad to something like
three million dollars more than the sum of all liabilities
;
in other
words there was a surplus of that amount.102 This was a condi-
tion directly opposed to the original plan of the promoters, by
which the bonds were to pay for the road and the stock was to
be largely "water", and to conform to the plan of 1851 the
directors from 1858 to 1863 issued $1,772,270 of Cancelled Bond
Scrip Dividends, referred to above.103 Further reduction of the
funded debt continued to take place and in 1865 a stock dividend
of ten per cent, or $2,119,930, was declared, followed in 1868 by
another of eight per cent, or $1,881,100.104 According to the
common meaning of the term these stock distributions constituted
stock watering, because in no case did the shareholders contribute
a penny directly to the company in return. Nevertheless, this
action was justified from the standpoint of the shareholders and
the company.
The reasons advanced for these stock dividends were as fol-
lows: (1) This $5,764,600 was represented by an actual cash
investment in the property, though received through operations
of the Land Department. (2) From 1856 to 1867, the share-
holders had made up annual deficits in operation, not chargeable
to capital, to the extent of $1,506,285.55, and the stock was con-
sidered a repayment of these advances. (3) Some of the share-
holders for as long as twelve years and others for shorter periods,
had invested money in the stock of the company, for which they
had received practically no remuneration and naturally, they
desired some compensation for this lost interest.105 While the
last two items were important, they were more than compen-
sated for by later indirect rewards. In 1864 the stock was placed
on a ten per cent basis and dividends continued at that rate for
ten years. Furthermore, the stock dividends were enormously
valuable. In 1863, 1865, and 1868, the lowest prices reached in
August, the month in which the stock was received, were $100,
$123, and $143, respectively.106 For the shareholder of 1862, this
102Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1863.
103
Ibid., 1855-1863.
10
*/Wrf., 1865, 1868.
105/Wrf., 1855-1867; Fisher Report, Railway Times, November 7, 1858;
Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders, 1877.
10 Compare quotations on Illinois Central securities, 1860 ff.
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represented a bonus of 29.6% of stock, worth $36.30 per share
at current market quotations. For all the stockholders the value
of the stock,dividends amounted to $7,069,756^90, as against an
alleged loss of interest of $1,506,285.55. Further dividends and
stock rights on this additional stock may be ignored as they
would have accrued anyway, and the same dividend would have
been distributed over a smaller number of shares. There was
nothing wrong in the stock distributions, the amounts were com-
paratively small, and a cash equivalent had been received in
each case in an indirect way, but, nevertheless, these three divi-
dends must be regarded as contrary to the conservative policy
ordinarily pursued by the Illinois Central.
The paramount purpose of the undertaking, to which stock
dividends, price of stocks, or profits from the sale of the land
grant were incidental, was its efficient operation as a railroad.
Upon the basic fact of earnings rested the permanent financial
success of the company. For the purpose of this study, the
operating accounts of the railroad may be divided into seven
successive classes, viz. gross earnings from operation, expenses
of operation, taxes, fixed charges, net income applicable to divi-
dends (including miscellaneous income), dividends, and surplus.
Of these accounts that of gross earnings was determined mainly
by the general prosperity of Illinois, that of taxes by the provi-
sions of the charter, that of fixed charges by the original invest-
ment in the railroad, thus leaving the item of expense of
operation to indicate the efficiency of management, and the items
of dividends and surplus to indicate the financial wisdom of the
board of directors.107
The first of these accounts, i.e. gross earnings from opera-
tion, as the product of traffic carried and rates charged, was
determined by the traffic conditions outlined in Chapter V, most
of which were beyond the control of the management.108 More-
over, the period from 1855 to 1870 was quite abnormal on account
of the panic of 1857, the Civil War, the prostration of the South,
the feverish industrial activity of the East, and the fact that
the territory tributary to the road was just being settled.109 In
""Operating accounts for the period ending 1870 have been rearranged
somewhat so as to conform to recent practice. No attempt, however, has
been made to have them conform to the latest rulings of the I. C. C.
108Cf. particularly the concluding paragraphs.
109A very good present comparison is the traffic on the newly completed
Canadian Northern.
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the earlier part of the period, or from 1855 to about 1861, the
railroad was just being put in shape for operation, and the
earnings were much below normal.110
Commencing with the Civil War, gross earnings increased
at a phenomenal rate. Not until 1871 was the company
able to handle the enormous business forced upon it, and al-
though the larger traffic necessitated increased expenses, the
margin between the two grew larger insted of smaller from year
to year. From a million and a half in 1855 the gross earnings
from operations steadily advanced until the maximum of eight
million, six hundred thousand dollars was reached in 1870.
Part of this was due to increased mileage, but the receipts on
the charter lines alone were seven million two hundred thousand
in the final year.
111 In the first five years in which the road
was in operation, the total earnings increased by approximately
six hundred thousand dollars, about twenty-five per cent. This
slow growth was caused by the panic of 1857 and the crop fail-
ures in succeeding years. During this time passenger earnings
actually decreased.
112
Then, beginning with the second year of
the war, and continuing until the close of the decade, there took
place a remarkable traffic development, with a corresponding
growth of revenue.113 In the eight years from 1862 to 1869
freight earnings grew from one million, nine hundred thousand
dollars to five millions, six hundred thousand, or one hundred
and ninety per cent. On the other hand, the receipts of the
passenger department increased only sixty-one per cent.11 * As
a result, freight was responsible for two-thirds of the revenue
in 1870, as against less than half in 1855.115
110This condition is made clear by the fact that quite a large propor-
tion of the equipment purchased up to 1857 was not used until about 1862.
Cf. Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1862.
Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.
rf., 1855-1862.
U, 1862-1870.
irf., 1855-1870.
115The following table shows the proportion of freight, passenger, and
miscellaneous revenue in years indicated:
PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1855 1862 1870
Freight 40 54 65
Passenger 47 37 24
Miscellaneous 13 9 II
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As noted in Chapter V,116 average rates per ton- and pas-
senger-mile were actually higher in 1870 than in the period
immediately preceding the Civil War. Passenger rates were
the most peculiar in this respect and were practically twice as
great in the last year of the decade as in 1857.117 The average
freight charge on all goods was three mills per ton-mile higher
in the later year than in 1859. In general, through rates de-
clined during the period, and local rates increased, but there
were important fluctuations caused by special conditions.118
While rates were well maintained the total number of ton- and
passenger-miles more than doubled, permitting the rapid in-
crease in revenue noted above.119 However, the currency infla-
tion of the Civil War period brought about such a change in the
value of money that a comparison of the years from 1862 to
1867 is almost worthless.120 Moreover, the character of tonnage
and length of haul changed from year to year, and this cause
alone prevented a correct estimate of actual rate movement.
121
As a result of the heavy increase in traffic during the period
expenses of operation also increased, although at a somewhat
slower rate than gross earnings, or from $1,453,000 in 1856 to
$4,801,000 in 1870, ($2200 to $4300 per mile). However, the
operating ratio, i.e. the proportion of expenses of operation to
gross earnings, fluctuated greatly. Commencing at 58.9% in
1856, it rose, with the panic of the following year, to a maxi-
116Chap. v; see also Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-
1870.
Ibid.
id.; cf. Chap. v.
120Cf. Bogart, Economic History of the United States, Chap, xxiv,
especially pp. 339, 340, 341 ; Mitchell, History of the Greenbacks; Fite,
Agricultural Development of the West during the Civil War, Quar. Jour.
Econ., XX, 259-278; Chap. v.
121Statement of tonnage given in Annual Report, Illinois Central Rail-
road, 1855-1870. Only isolated tariffs and the average rate per ton or
passenger mile are available for comparison. The influence of the inflation
of the currency during the period from 1862 to 1870 is quite important.
An examination of the charts in this chapter and Chapter v shows a rapid
increase in all prices and charges given there, the rise being especially
marked in 1864 and 1865. However, it would be unfair to assume that
revenues and expenditures rose in direct proportion to the inflation of the
currency in these years. Many payments were made on long term agree-
ments, and others, such as wages, cost of fuel, etc., did not rise with the
general rise of gold.
148 HISTORY OP ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD [432
mum of 77.2%, from which point there was a gradual decline,
due to increased traffic, to a minimum of 46.8% in 1862. The
Civil War caused an increase to 62.9% in 1865, from which
level there was another decline to 54% in 1870. On the whole
the ratio of expense to earnings was less than is now considered
good practice, but operating conditions at that time were so
different that this low ratio was then consistent with good
management. The more prominent of these differences are:
(1) The volume of traffic, due largely to high rates, was only
a fraction of what is now carried. This resulted in less wear
and tear on equipment and roadway. (2) Wages, the most
important single item in operation, were considerably lower than
at present. (3) The freight and passenger service was much
poorer. (4) On account of the light volume of traffic and the
higher return on capital, fixed charges and dividends took a
much larger proportion of earnings.122
As might be expected from the light traffic of the period
maintenance of way expenditures represented a much larger
proportion of the total than in recent years. The total for this
account rose steadily, with the exception of the years 1861 and
1862, from $323,000 in 1856 to a maximum of $1,632,000 in 1869
($1,495,000 in 1870), or from $450 per mile in the earlier year
to $1500 per mile in 1870, with a maximum of over $2200 in
1865. This expenditure was for a railroad that was almost
entirely single track and was well built and maintained from
the first. The proportion of maintenance of way to expense of
operation gradually increased from 22.3% in 1856 to 36.5% in
1865, with an average of over 30%. The question of whether
these expenditures did keep the roadway in good shape is dis-
cussed in a later paragraph.128
Expenditures for maintenance of equipment, in marked
contrast to present practice, due in part to the heavy charges
for renewals and depreciation now insisted on by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, were much smaller than for mainte-
nance of way, increasing from $278,000 in 1856 to a maximum
of $1,211,000 in 1870, or from $442 per mile in 1857 to $1093
in 1870. The proportion of maintenance of equipment to ex-
122In reviewing expenses of operation prior to 1870 the fact must be
kept constantly in mind that it was not until a much later date that modern
methods of operation, with their tremendously efficient handling of traffic,
were introduced.
12SCf. n. 134.
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penses of operation varied from a minimum of 16.5% in 1859
to a maximum of 23.9% in 1868. As might be expected, the
maintenance per locomotive or car, particularly since most of
the equipment was still new and much of it purchased in 1855-
1857 was not used until after 1861, was much less than at pres-
ent. Locomotive repairs per locomotive increased from $800 in
1855 to $2800 in 1870, with maximum of $4000 in 1865 ; in the
same years passenger car repairs per car increased from $250 to
$900, with maximum of $1650, and repairs to freight cars per
car increased from $35 to $75, with maximum of $100.124
Expenditures for conducting transportation increased more
slowly than either gross earnings or maintenance expenditures,
and formed a considerably smaller proportion of expenses of
operation in 1870 than in 1856. The actual expenditures in-
creased from $768,000 in 1856 to a maximum of $2,038,000 in
1870, or from $1240 per mile in 1857 to $1840 in 1870. The
proportion of conducting transportation to expenses of opera-
tion, however, decreased from 53% to 41.9% during the same
years.
125 Of these totals slightly over half went for train opera-
tion, one fourth for station expenses, and the remaining fourth
was divided among the other charges, including part of the traffic
expense. These results, taken in connection with the large
increase in traffic mentioned in Chapter V, would seem to indi-
cate a considerable increase in operating efficiency. However,
an examination of the detailed statements given in the annual
reports, which lack of space prevents being printed here, shows
that this is not the case. 1^8 Three reasons may be given to
explain this apparent discrepancy: (1) Since the years from
1855 to 1862 were years of abnormally light traffic the cost of
handling it was heavy in proportion to the actual amount car-
ried. Consequently decreased costs later indicate merely a nor-
mal operating efficiency.1
'27 (2) Few important improvements
124It must be remembered that these expenditures were for the very
much smaller, lighter, and cheaper equipment then used.
123This ratio is generally regarded as representing the actual efficiency
of management, since maintenance expenditures are determined quite
largely by external conditions.
126According to the report of the company, although the figures for
the earlier years are probably less inclusive than for the later one, the
cost of train operation increased from 3.7 mills in 1859 to 9.9 mills in
1870 per passenger mile, and from 1.3 rcills to 2.6 mills per ton mile.
127As stated in Chap, iv, it was nef tssary to establish complete train
service during the years before 1861, ev< I though the traffic did not justify
so extensive schedules.
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in operating methods were introduced during the period, while
from 1863 to 1870 there was a congestion of traffic not favorable
to efficient operation. (3) Wages and the cost of materials
advanced considerably, especially during the closing years of
the Civil War. In summing up the efficiency of conducting
transportation during the period it may be said that, conducting
transportation took a smaller proportion of the gross earnings
than at present, due, largely, to a higher class of freight; the
cost of operations, per unit, i.e. train ton, or passenger mile, was
also very much higher than at present; improvements in oper-
ating methods were slight and insufficient to overcome increased
expenses.
1128
The last item in expense of operation, i.e. general expense,
varied quite decidedly from year to year, both in actual amount
and in proportion to the total cost of operation.129 The total
increased from $84,000 in 1856 to a maximum of $257,000 in
1870, with a proportion of 5.5% and 5.9%, respectively. How-
ever, in 1861 general expenses consumed eleven per cent of
operating expenses, while in 1867 it fell to only four per cent.
Since this account included many miscellaneous items this wide
variation is to be expected.
180
The question naturally arises, in an analysis of the various
items in expense of operation, whether the expenditures were
sufficient to properly maintain the railroad and to provide an
adequate service. To answer these questions completely would
require a presentation beyond the possibilities of this chapter,
but, in general, an affirmative answer may be given to both.
The matter of maintenance charges is discussed in the two fol-
lowing paragraphs and for the matter of service it may be said
that both an analysis of the reports of the company and an
examination of the publications of the time indicate that the
train service, both freight and passenger, considering the rail-
way development of the period, was reasonably adequate. From
a little before 1870 until several years later, there was much
128Cf. statements in regard to operating efficiency in the annual reports
of the president, Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.
129The main items in general expense were : salaries general officers,
salaries clerks, general office expense, insurance, legal expense, miscel-
laneous.
130In 1861 there is an item of $81,822 for miscellaneous, in 1868 insur-
ance was $48,513, and in 1869 general office expense and salaries totaled
$137,586.
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complaint about the service, but this belongs to another period.131
Up to 1862 both maintenance of equipment and road-
way charges were low, but this did not result in depreciation
of the property. This conclusion is borne out by the following
considerations: (1) Most of the equipment was from one to
five years old and heavy repairs were not as necessary as later.
(2) The roadway was also new and the small number of trains
passing over the tracks did not wear out the rails or affect the
condition of the superstructure. During these years rails, ties
or bridge materials did not need replacement and labor on track
was almost the only charge. Wages for efficient trackmen were
low, and moderate expenditures kept the permanent way in ex-
cellent condition. (3) The traffic was abnormally light and the
cars and locomotives were worked only a part of the time. In
fact, a considerable proportion of the equipment purchased in
1856 and 1857 was not used until 1862 and did not require exten-
sive repairs.
132
Thus, the locomotive and freight car repair
charges were distributed over a smaller number of units than the
reports would indicate, and repairs on locomotives in actual use,
considering the light service and their recent purchase, were
fully as heavy as after the Civil War.133
From 1863 to 1870, the road was taxed to its utmost capac-
ity and both roadbed and equipment depreciated rapidly. The
demands upon the rolling stock were so great that proper atten-
tion to repairs was impossible, and consequently, much larger
expenditures were necessary when shopped. This condition was
aggravated by high cost of labor and supplies. The hard service
had a similar effect on superstructure, rails and ties. More-
over, beginning with the Civil War, an increasing amount of tie
and rail replacement was necessary on account of a larger num-
ber of trains and natural deterioration. Despite this large in-
13lFrom about 1871 until after 1880 the railroad was forced to retrench
heavily and it is probable that conditions during that period are confused
with conditions before 18/0 when there was no financial necessity for cur-
tailment in service or insufficient maintenance charges.
132With the light traffic the average life of the ties, iron rails, and
bridge materials used on the Illinois Central was at least ten years. As
most of the track was not laid before 1854, no important replacements
were necessary until about 1864 or 1865. Moreover the quality of all
materials put in the road was first class and repairs were not as common
as on other roads which were built with cheaper materials. Cf. Acker-
man, Early Illinois Railroads, p. 42.
133Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870. The cost of
repairs to each locomotive is given in the annual reports.
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crease in the necessary maintenance charges the expenditures
were more than sufficient to keep the property in first-class con-
dition, and the railroad was in much better working condition
in 1870 than thirteen or fourteen years earlier. It is also rea-
sonably certain that a considerable amount of money was ex-
pended on maintenance which a more conservative system of
accounting would have charged to capital.134
Taxes, with the two minor exceptions mentioned below, were
confined to the payment of seven per cent of the gross earnings,
as provided for in the charter. By interpretations of the courts
and of the state auditor this amount was fixed as both maximum
and minimum after the full payment became due with the com-
pletion of the railroad. No other taxes of any kind were as-
sessed in Illinois. In addition, however, there was a slight
federal tax on earnings and dividends under the war legislation
of the government. In Iowa, the leased lines were subject to
the usual state taxes, which were quite light. Up to about 1863
the seven per cent tax was a heavy burden on the company, but
with increased revenues later it ceased to be burdensome.
Net earnings, over and above expenses of operation and
taxes, increased rapidly with the growth of earnings. From
$424,613 in 1858 (the net income previous to that year being
carried as a capital account in this monograph) the amount rose
to a maximum of $3,429,838 in 1870. To this strictly operating
income should be added miscellaneous receipts, mainly from the
sale of lands. This total of gross income increased from $581,-
134Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1862-1870.
This matter of maintenance of the property is one which is involved in
considerable dispute. In the report of the Delegates appointed by the
committee of English and Dutch stockholders, made in 1877, and in the
President's special report of 1897, it is asserted that the property was
allowed to deteriorate after the Civil War. The investigating committee
undoubtedly viewed the property from the English standpoint and natu-
rally expected to have the railroad kept in better condition than it was.
The report of 1897 made a contrast of conditions in the latter year with
earlier periods and there was an unintentional bias against reporting the
property in as good condition as it really was. Moreover, the standards
of maintenance have advanced very rapidly and the property has been
built up to a large extent out of maintenance expenses. Furthermore, as
stated in the text, the maintenance of way and equipment charges were
very heavy, considering the amount of traffic, and it is difficult to see how
the property could depreciate, provided reasonable care was exercised in
the disbursement of the money.
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732 in the earlier year to $4,043,705 in the later (a maximum
of $4,184,661 in 1869).
Against this gross income there was a charge for the fixed
items of expenditure, i.e. interest on funded and floating debt,
miscellaneous fixed charges on the bond account, and rental of
leased lines. With the reduction of the funded debt interest
charges steadily decreased from $1,340,997 in 1858 to only $622,-
053, in 1870, or only 18% of the gross income of the charter
lines. Including rentals, the item of fixed charges amounted to
$1,194,570 in 1870, or not quite 30% of the gross income. Since
nearly $500,000 of this amount, representing the lease of the
Iowa lines, was only incidental to the financial operations of the
Illinois Central proper, the company was in a very strong posi-
tion so far as income account was concerned. Moreover, since
the bonds were bearing only six and seven per cent, while divi-
dends were ten per cent, the fixed interest charge was in the
nature of an asset, rather than a drain upon net revenues
applicable to dividends.
1* 5
The amount available for dividends and surplus, after all
charges for operation, taxes, interest, and rentals had been pro-
vided for, varied from a deficit of $759,265 in 1858 to a surplus
of $2,849,135 in 1870 ($3,997,070 in 1869, the maximum). From
1861 on, the income was sufficient to provide for dividend pay-
ments, with a small surplus during most of the years. However,
if the dividends be set off against the net income from operation,
less fixed charges, i.e. omitting payments from the land account,
there would have been a heavy deficit in every year. In fact,
there was a deficit of $1,908,717 in dividend payments over
135The operation of the Iowa leased lines from 1867 to 1870 yielded
a slight profit to the Illinois Central and, therefore, the rentals paid were
not a liability upon the finances of the company. Aside from these rentals,
the fixed liabilities of the company towards the close of the period were,
as the text indicates, unimportant. They were amply covered by the
receipts from the Land Department and, therefore, left the railroad prac-
tically an unencumbered asset of the stockholders. With this high security
for any funded debt it became possible for the company to borrow at
interest rates lower than the dividends, and from this period dates the
policy of the Illinois Central of carrying a large funded debt bearing an
interest rate lower than the average returns on the investment, thus per-
mitting the payment of dividends higher than this average return. The
financial strength of the company rests on its wise application of this
policy.
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income applicable to dividends for the period, and, had the net
income from land sales not been included, as they should have
been according to a strict interpretation of the mortgage, there
would have been an additional deficit of over seven million
dollars.138
After 1861 there was a surplus of net earnings above fixed
charges and by 1863 the amount was large enough to justify the
directors in declaring a regular semi-annual, four per cent cash
dividend, instead of the four per cent interest on full paid stock
given before that date.137 In 1865 the annual dividend rate was
increased to ten per cent and was made payable on all stock
outstanding, including the scrip distributed prior to that time.138
This rate was continued until 1874 and was equivalent to 10.8%
in 1864 and 1865
;
to 12% from 1866 to 1868, and to 13% from
1869 to 1874, on the actual cash invested by the shareholders.13*
During the period, the Illinois Central stock was distinctly a
good investment, as evidenced by the stock quotations, which,
in July, 1868, reached a high mark of 159.140 Including cash
and stock dividends and rights, the shareholder received from
1863 to 1870, on an investment of $100, a return of $106.30,
equivalent to 15.18 per cent a year. Moreover, at the end of
this time his stock was worth forty dollars a share more than
in I860.141 This certainly was a handsome return on such a safe
investment.
Nor, as seen above, was there any question about the
justification of these dividends from the standpoint of net
136These statistics bring out forcefully the statement of Richard
Cobden that the strength of the railroad lay in the land grant. However,
the directors of the company must be criticised for their lavish use of
this reserve during the years from 1863 to 1870. In the language of Wall
street they were simply "cutting a melon" when a much more conservative
use of the reserve formed by the land grant would have saved the com-
pany much difficulty later on. In this connection it is interesting to com-
pare the policy of the Canadian Pacific Railroad in the use of funds
obtained from its land grants.
137Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1863.
188
/&jrf., 1865 ; i.e., eight per cent in 1864 and ten per cent in 1865.
1S9
Ibid., 1863-1870; i.e., if the stockholder of record of 1862 had kept
all stock distributions this would have been his return per $100 share.
**Ibid.; Commercial and Financial Chronicle, VIII, 9 (Jan. 2, 1869).
This includes "rights".
141Commercial and Financial Chronicle, X, 9 (January 7, 1871).
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earnings, other than distribution of land office receipts. In
only one year, viz. 1866, did the dividends exceed the reve-
nue applicable to dividends and then to only a slight ex-
tent.142 In the other years, there was no question about the
ability of the company to maintain the dividend. However, the
directors did not always pursue a conservative course and ex-
penditures from 1863 to 1870 were almost too near receipts for
perfect safety. In 1870, the year when net earnings were the
most satisfactory, the fund applicable to dividends amounted to
only 11.4% against requirements of 10.4% ,143 Omitting receipts
from the land department, necessarily only a temporary source
of income, the net earnings applicable to dividends ranged from
5.4% in 1866 to 8.6% in 1870.14* According to the company's
books, the high dividend rate was guaranteed by a large surplus,
but this was merely a bookkeeping account and was not repre-
lented by available assets.145 By paying, say nine per cent
instead of ten per cent, a large cash surplus could have been
accumulated which would have allowed a continuance of eight
or nine per cent dividends over a much longer period.146
Prior to 1870 the company pursued a conservative policy
in regard to extensions involving any financial risk. From the
completion of the road to the Civil War several traffic arrange-
ments with connecting or branch lines were made, but in no case
was the financial responsibility large. Bonds of the Ohio and
Mississippi and the Peoria and Oquaka, to the extent of approx-
imately $100,000 each, were purchased, but were not retained
for any length of time.147 No other important agreements were
made except with the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Com-
pany. As stated in Chapter IV, the Illinois Central, in 1867,
2Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1866.
143
/fctW., i.e., ten per cent cash dividend and about .4 per cent federal
war tax. In other years the dividend and war tax were barely earned.
14
*Ibid., i.e., excluding receipts from the land department and miscel-
laneous sources of income.
145The surplus was obtained by adding all interest payments to cost
>f construction and depreciation on construction and free land bonds and
deducting from it net receipts to 1863. This account was not only not
represented by cash assets, but was incorrect.
146From 1874 to 1905 the dividends were reduced to a four to six per
cent basis and the accumulation of a large surplus in 1870 might have
improved this condition.
147Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1862; Fisher Report,
Railway Times, June 19, 1858.
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leased the property of the Dubuque and Sioux City and its
subsidiary lines, the Iowa Falls and Sioux City and the Cedar
Falls and Minnesota, for a period of twenty years.
The calendar year 1870 was the most successful year for
the Illinois Central railroad to that time. Gross revenue was
large, and the net earnings were sufficient to pay all fixed
charges, a ten per cent dividend and provide a surplus of a
quarter of a million dollars. The financial policy pursued by
the company in the construction and operation of the railroad
had proved entirely satisfactory to the promoters and owners
of the stock. The construction work was carried on without
serious financial difficulty, and after the first few years of oper-
ation the net earnings were all that could have been reasonably
desired. The land grant was managed well and by 1870 had
paid off most of the indebtedness. While the sanguine prospects
of the promoters were not completely fulfilled, the investors in
the property were amply rewarded, as illustrated by the follow-
ing table :
Total cost of construction,
equipment, net cash assets
and supplies, Dec. 31, 1870 $36,242,203.82
$ 6,869,500.00
Cash paid on stock (net) 19,726,700.00 26,596,200.00
NET SURPLUS _: $ 9,646,003.82
At the same time the affairs of the company were handled in a
conservative manner, and only a part of this surplus, not quite
six million dollars, was distributed to the shareholders in stock
dividends. The remainder was invested in the railroad and
added to the real value of the property.
CHAPTER VII.
CONCLUSION.
The Illinois Central Railroad has always occupied a unique
position among the railroads of the country. From the inception
of the project it had been primarily a government enterprise.
It was the first important railway project in Illinois, and for
twenty years its construction was the ambition of the state and
its citizens. Moreover, it was also fostered by the federal gov-
ernment. The first land grant ever given by Congress to assist
in the construction of a railroad was given to the state of Illi-
nois to complete this undertaking. The legislature turned over
the grant to a private corporation and the Illinois Central Rail-
road became the first important land grant railroad. Finally,
fhe Illinois Central was the only company of any size in the
Northwest, or upper Mississippi valley that followed the lines
of longitude instead of latitude. The other great transportation
systems of the country, the New York Central, Baltimore and
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Erie, Northwestern, Burlington, and Rock
Island, extended west from the Atlantic seaboard or east from
the Mississippi River. The "Central", on the other hand, was
built to retain the commerce of the Mississippi valley along
north and south lines.
At the same time, though in this respect the railroad was
similar to most of the large roads of the "West, the Illinois Cen-
tral was built through territory very thinly settled and was
created with the definite object of developing the otherwise dor-
mant resources of such region. In 1850 the central counties of
Illinois were undeveloped, and the railroad was constructed
through that part of the state in order to provide cheap trans-
portation for their grain and live stock. The land grant and
special privileges given the company were merely the necessary
inducement to private capital to take up the undertaking.
From any view point, the construction of the Illinois Cen-
tral must be regarded as a success. After four successive fail-
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ures by the state itself and private individuals a group of Bos-
ton and New York capitalists built the road without receiving
one cent of help from the state, other than the land grant and
privileges granted in the charter, and without throwing any
financial liability upon the government. The financial problems
connected with construction were met, and the enterprise was
carried through in a more economical manner than was any
other similar undertaking of the period. At the same time the
promoters constructed the railroad according to the best stand-
ards of the period. When finished it was the best built road of
its size in the central West. Its operation, after the first four
years, was also successful and accomplished what the early advo-
cates of the scheme desired.
This success was accompanied by direct financial benefit to
the federal and state governments. By the terms of the land
grant act the alternate odd numbered sections not turned over
to the state were sold for not less than $2.50 an acre, double the
former price, and the government lost nothing by giving half
the land away. In fact, the construction of the railroad mate-
rially hastened the sale of all lands in central Illinois. Fur-
thermore, the Illinois Central was of almost incalculable value
to the country during the Civil War. The least important
service was the reduced rates for troops and army supplies. Of
far greater influence was the fact that such troops and supplies
could be transported at all. The railroad provided an easily
guarded connection between the federal armies in the West, and
the loyal states of the union. Hundreds of thousands of men
and tens of thousands of tons of supplies were carried over the
line and placed quickly and safely near the base of active mili-
tary operations. Had it not been for the Illinois Central the
vast resources of the central West could not have been placed
at the disposal of the government as easily as they were, the
operations of the army would have been hampered and re-
stricted, and the ultimate success of the national cause delayed
that much.
The direct influence of the railroad on the state of Illinois
was also of great importance. In the charter the state wisely
exacted from the company a consideration of seven per cent of
the gross earnings in return for the land grant. This is almost
the only instance where either the state or national governments
received any immediate compensation for lands surrendered to
a private corporation. The development of a system of internal
transportation was the primary cause of the state debt, and, by
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the foresight of the legislature, the land grant was made the
means of paying off the indebtedness, but without further risk
on the part of the state. It might almost be said the present Illi-
nois Central corporation was created for the purpose of increas-
ing state taxes.1 The results were all that the public could have
asked. Including the year 1870, the seven per cent tax on the
gross earnings of the company amounted to a total of four mil-
lion six hundred thousand dollars, or nearly a third of the
obligations of the state when the charter was granted. The
large annual receipts permitted the prompt payment of the
interest and the retirement of a portion of the principal of the
state debt without the imposition of heavy taxes upon the indus-
tries of the state. Moreover, the building of the road opened
up to settlement thousands of farms, and the increased taxes
\vere also an important consideration in placing the state on a
good financial standing. Through the cash payments into the
state treasury and the increased valuation given the property
of the citizens the Illinois Central placed the state of Illinois
upon a firm financial basis and made its credit as good as that
of any commonwealth.
The construction of the Central meant more to Illinois than
the payment of half a million dollars of taxes a year. When
Lieutenant Governor Jenkins and Sidney Breese first suggested
a central railway, the interior of the state from Chicago to
Du Quoin and from Danville to Springfield was an unoccupied
wilderness. When Colonel Mason and his engineers surveyed
the route of the railroad most of this territory was still unsettled
and its resources practically untouched. The important influ-
ence of the Illinois Central came in the development of this part
of the state.
Twenty years later there had taken place a transformation
in the interior counties of Illinois. One-fifth of the entire popu-
lation of the state was living in these counties, and their prod-
ucts formed one-fourth of all those raised by Illinois. Slightly
more than one-half the people of the state were within twenty
miles of the Illinois Central, and their wealth and prosperity
was equal to that of any portion of the commonwealth. Early
travellers declared the prairies could never be anything but a
desert, but in 1870 they were the granary of the north Atlantic
states. Nor was the development of the territory tributary to
1 Personal Statement of Mr. Head, clerk of the House during the
passage of the charter.
160 HISTORY OP ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD [444
the railroad confined to material things. Towns and cities were
numerous; churches, schools, and colleges were as common as in
other parts of the state; and the people were prosperous and
contented.2
This development of central Illinois was brought about,
almost entirely, through the efforts of the Illinois Central. There
were other roads through the region, but until after the close
of the war their influence was slight compared with that of the
"Central". Not another railroad crossed its line from Cairo to
Centralia, and there were only five from La Salle south.3 More-
over, during the first ten years of the company's history the
transverse lines were merely feeders for the north and south
road, so far as local territory was concerned. Thus, the full
credit for the development of the central counties of Illinois must
be given to the Illinois Central Railroad.
Furthermore, the construction of the Illinois Central had a
far-reaching influence on the growth of the country. In the sixth
and seventh decades of the nineteenth century there took place
an important expansion in the production of food stuffs due to
the increasing demands of Europe and the eastern states. Most
of this development, as shown in the preceding pages, occurred
in the central West, and the Illinois Central Railroad and the
country dependent upon it were the most prominent single fac-
tor in increasing the movement of western grain to the north
Atlantic seaboard. Next to the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
Railroad the Illinois Central handled more wheat and corn than
any other road in the West and, if the total tonnage of all grains
is considered, it surpassed even that road. In the four years of
the Civil War there was no other portion of the country which
increased its production of grain to as great an extent as did the
central counties of Illinois. By 1870 the agricultural territory
directly dependent on the "Central", including the Iowa leased
lines, supplied a larger share of the western grain forwarded
to the Atlantic coast than any other area of similar size in the
United States.
The Illinois Central was built with the definite object of
building up the interior of Illinois and the results amply justi-
fied all the efforts expended in securing the road. Instead of
being isolated from the leading markets and forced to be largely
2C. Chap. v.
8
Viz., Ohio and Mississippi, Terre Haute, Alton & St. Louis, Great
Western, St. Louis, Alton & Chicago and Peoria & Oquaka. Cf. Chap. iv.
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self sufficing, the people in that part of the state had become an
essential factor in the economic organization of the country.
They were no longer self sufficient, but produced commodities,
principally grain, needed by the eastern States and, in turn,
consumed the manufactured goods of that section. Instead of
being a drawback to the other portions of the state they occupied
a leading position in its economic, as well as political and social
advancement.
Thus, the construction of the Illinois Central may be re-
garded as the most important industrial undertaking ever com-
menced in the state of Illinois. The promoters of the enter-
prise, the investors in the securities of the company, and the men
who managed its financial, traffic, and operating affairs after
completion, deserve great credit for their efforts in making it
an actual reality, even though they did so with the purpose of
making handsome profits for themselves. At the same time, the
real success of the railroad was based on the federal land grant.
It was not the capital behind Robert Schuyler and the other pro-
moters that gave the company its standing, nor was it the busi-
ness ability of the directors that induced capitalists to purchase
the stock and bonds of the corporation. The enormous extent
of the land grant was the primary cause of the financial stabil-
ity of the company. Had it not been for the land, the promoters
could never have obtained the funds to build the road.
Moreover, after the enterprise was completed, it was the
receipts from the land grant which kept the corporation from
going into insolvency. From 1855 to 1861 there was not a year
in which the net earnings from the operation of the railroad paid
even the fixed interest charges. Without the receipts from the
land department the railroad would have been foreclosed before
it was finished. Even after 1862 the operation of the lines did
not give sufficient profit to pay a regular eight per cent dividend
on the actual cash invested in the stock. As a matter of fact, the
average dividend for this period would have amounted to six
per cent, instead of twelve, had it not been for the earnings of the
land department, and there would have been no stock distribu-
tions nor surplus at the end of the period. Investors in other
corporations which were managed as well as the Illinois Central
were making ten and twelve per cent or even more on their
actual investment, and the actual returns to the owners of the
Illinois Central, so far as the operating accounts were con-
cerned, were below a reasonable standard. In other words the
land grant subsidized the railroad. It was an arrangement which
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benefited both parties, and while the promoters of the Illinois
Central made handsome profits on the operation of the road, the
state of Illinois, its citizens, and the people of the country as a
whole received equal advantages through the development of
the territory near the railroad.
It is one of the ironies of the economic history of the United
States that the Illinois Central Railroad, which was constructed
to develop traffic along north and south lines, should be the
foremost influence in changing the commerce of Illinois into east
and west lines. The Civil "War and the changed economic con-
ditions following the struggle forced the company to send the
grain of central Illinois to Chicago, and prevented its develop-
ing a profitable market in the south, although the former policy
was clearly against its best permanent interests. As a result,
the people were accustomed to ship their grain, live stock and
raw materials east to the Atlantic seaboard and after the Civil
War the company was unable to bring about any change. So
long as the cost of carrying freight by railroad was high, and
there were no strong east and west lines entering the state below
Chicago, the Illinois Central did not lose much by this diversion
of traffic. It obtained almost as long a haul from the central
part of the state to Chicago as it would have to Cairo and the
return freight was greater. Up until 1870 the east and west
lines were not powerful enough to interfere with the business
of the north and south trunk line and the grain traffic of the
latter was reasonably profitable.
However, in the closing years of the seventh decade the
trunk lines, especially the Pennsylvania, New York Central,
Baltimore and Ohio, and Wabash, extended their tracks into
central Illinois, and one by one they gained complete possession
of the connecting and feeder lines which formerly had turned
their freight to the Illinois Central. The latter company, instead
of seeking to retain them even to the extent of purchase or lease,
pursued the ultra-conservative course of neglecting them entirely.
Thus, the company was practically isolated in 1870 and did not
have an important connecting or branch line directly under its
control.
As a result of the changed conditions in the movement of
grain and the expansion of the east and west railroads the Illinois
Central was gradually being forced into an awkward position.
Its natural business along north and south lines was hampered
and almost destroyed by the prostration of the South. The traffic
which it had built up from central Illinois to Chicago was being
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cut into by east and west railroads, which were each year becom-
ing better able to compete with their rivals. Finally, the branch
and connecting lines dependent upon it were now being pur-
chased or leased by strong companies whose interests were
diametrically opposed to those of the Illinois corporation. By
1870 these forces opposed to the Illinois Central had not made
themselves evident, but they were steadily gaining strength and
placing themselves in a better position for the conflict. On the
other hand, the Illinois Central neglected to better its position
and allowed important connections to slip from its control. When
the conflict did break out the latter company was unprepared and
suffered accordingly. Thus, the year 1870 represents the high
tide of prosperity for the Illinois Central Railroad, and not again
for some thirty-five years did it hold as strong a position from
the financial and traffic standpoint.

APPENDIX.
LAND GRANT ACT OF SEPTEMBER 20TH, 1850.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled:
That the right of way through the public lands be, and the
same is hereby, granted to the State of Illinois for the construc-
tion of a railroad from the southern terminus of the Illinois and
Michigan Canal to a point at or near the junction of the Ohio
and Mississippi rivers, with a branch of the same to Chicago, on
Lake Michigan, and another via the town of Galena, in said
State, to Dubuque, in the state of Iowa, with the right also to
take necessary materials of earth, stones, timber, etc., for the
construction thereof: Provided, that the right of way shall not
exceed 100 feet on each side of the length thereof, and a copy
of the survey of said road and branches made under the direction
of the Legislature, shall be forwarded to the proper local land
officers, respectively, and to the general land office at Washing-
ton city, within ninety days after the completion of the same.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That there be, and is
here granted to the State of Illinois, for the purpose of aiding in
making the railroad and branches aforesaid, every alternate sec-
tion of land designated by even numbers, for six sections in
width on each side of said road and branches ; but in case it shall
appear that the United States have, when the line or route of
said road and branches is definitely located by the authority
aforesaid, sold any part of any section hereby granted, or that
the right of preemption has attached to the same, then it shall
be lawful for any agent or agents to be appointed by the Gov-
ernor of said State, to select, subject to the approval aforesaid,
from the lands of the United States most contiguous to the tier
of sections above specified, so much land in alternate sections,
or parts of sections, as shall be equal to such lands as the United
States have sold, or to which the right of preemption has attached
as aforesaid, which lands being equal in quantity to one-half of
six sections in width on each side of said road and branches, the
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State of Illinois shall have and hold to and for the use and pur-
poses aforesaid : Provided, that the lands to be so located shall
in no case be further than fifteen miles from the line of the
road : And, further provided, the construction of said road shall
be commenced at its southern terminus, at or near the junction
of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and its northern terminus
upon the Illinois and Michigan Canal, simultaneously, and con-
tinued from each of said points until completed, when said
branch roads shall be constructed, according to the survey and
location thereof: Provided further, that the lands here granted
shall be applied to the construction of said road and branches,
respectively, in quantities corresponding with the grant for
each, and shall be disposed of only as the work progresses, and
shall be applied to no other purpose whatsoever : And provided,
further, that any and all lands reserved to the United States
by the Act entitled ''An Act to grant a quantity of land to the
State of Illinois, for the purpose of aiding in opening a canal
to connect the waters of the Illinois river with those of Lake
Michigan" approved March second, eighteen hundred and
twenty-seven, be, and the same are hereby reserved to the United
States from the operation of this Act.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the sections and
parts of sections of land which, by such grant, shall remain to
the United States within six miles on each side of said road and
branches, shall not be sold for less than double the minimum
price of the public lands when sold.
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That the said lands
hereby granted to the said State shall be subject to the disposal
of the Legislature thereof, for the purposes aforesaid and no
other; and the said railroad and branches shall be and remain
a public highway, for the use of the Government of the United
States, free from toll or other charge upon the transportation
of any property or troops of the United States.
Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That if the railroad
shall not be completed within ten years, the said State of Illinois
shall be bound to pay to the United States the amount which may
be received upon the sale of any part of said lands by said State,
the title to the residue of said lands shall reinvest in the United
States, to have and hold the same in the same manner as if this
Act had not been passed.
Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That the United States
mail shall at all times be transported on the said railroad under
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the direction of the Post Office Department, at such price as the
Congress may by law direct.
Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That in order to aid in
the continuation of said Central Railroad from the mouth of the
Ohio river to the city of Mobile, all the rights, privileges, and
liabilities hereinbefore conferred on the State of Illinois shall be
granted to the states of Alabama and Mississippi respectively,
for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad from
said city of Mobile to a point near the mouth of the Ohio River,
and that public lands of the United States, to the same extent,
in proportion to the length of the road, on the same terms,
limitations, and restrictions in every respect, shall be, and is
hereby, granted to said states of Alabama and Mississippi
respectively.
MEMORIAL OF DECEMBER 28TH, 1850.
To the honorable the Senators and Representatives of the
people of Illinois in General Assembly convened:
The memorial of Robert Schuyler, George Griswold, Gouver-
neur Morris, Jonathan Sturges, Thomas W. Ludlow, and John
F. A. Sandford of the City of New York; and David A. Neal,
Franklin Haven and Robert Rantoul, Jun., of the City of Boston
and vicinity, respectfully represents :
That having examined and considered an act of Congress of
the United States, whereby land is donated by the United States
for the purpose of insuring the construction of a railroad from
Cairo, at the mouth of the Ohio River, to Galena and the north-
western angle of the State of Illinois, with a branch extending
to Chicago on Lake Michigan, on certain conditions, therein ex-
pressed ; and having also examined the resources of the tract of
country through which it is proposed that the said railroad shall
pass, and the amount of cost, and the space of time necessary
for constructing the same, the subscribers propose to form a
company, with such others as they may associate with them,
including among their number persons of large experience in the
construction of several of the principal railroads of the United
States, and of means and credit sufficient to place beyond doubt
their ability to perform what they hereinafter propose, make the
following offer to the State of Illinois for their consideration :
The company so formed by the subscribers will, under the
authority and direction of the State of Illinois, fully and faith-
fully perform the several conditions, and execute the trusts, in
the said act of Congress contained. And will build a railroad
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with branches between the termini set forth in said act, with a
single track, and complete the same, ready for the transportation
of merchandise and passengers, on or before the fourth day of
July, which will be in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred
and fifty-four. And the said railroad shall be, in all respects, as
well and thoroughly built as the railroad running from Boston
to Albany, with such improvements thereon as experience has
shown to be desirable and expedient, and shall be equipped in a
manner suitable to the business to be accommodated thereby.
And the said company, from and after the completion of the said
road, will pay to the State of Illinois, annually - - per cent of
the gross earnings of the said railroad, without deduction or
charge for expenses, or for any other matter or cause ; provided,
that the State of Illinois will grant to the subscribers a charter
of incorporation, with terms mutually advantageous with powers
and limitations, as they, in their wisdom, may think fit, as shall
be accepted by said company, and as will sufficiently remunerate
the subscribers for their care, labor, and expenditure in that
behalf incurred, and will enable them to avail themselves of the
lands donated by the said act to raise the funds, or some portion
of the funds, necessary for the construction and equipment of
said railroad.
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Annual Report of the Directors to the stockholders for calendar and
fiscal years, 1871 to 1907, inclusive. Contain considerable detailed mate-
rial, but not as much as in the earlier reports. With a few exceptions
statements and statistics are perfectly correct and no attempt is made to
misrepresent affairs. [U.C., I.C.]
Special Reports of the President to the Directors and Stockholders,
1890, 1897, 1906, October 30, 1895, December 19, 1895, January n, 1896.
Contain considerable miscellaneous information. The report for 1897 is
especially valuable as it contains resumes of operating conditions, etc.,
before 1887. [Reports of 1897, U.C. ; Reports of 1895, 1896, W.H. ; all, I.C]
Land Pamphlets, 1855 to 1870 (two or three missing). These are
pamphlets issued by the Land Department soliciting immigration into the
state of Illinois. There is some important information, but most of the
statistics are worthless. [C.H.]
Report on the Mineral Resources of the Illinois Central Railroad.
J. W. Foster. An accurate report of mining conditions along the Illinois
Central in 1857. Gives statements concerning cost of mining, etc. Pub-
lished by the company, 1857. [C.H.]
Documents Relating to the Organization of the Illinois Central Rail-
road Company. Contains Act of Congress, charter and amendments to
1852, mortgage of 1851, letters of President Schuyler, Robert Rantoul, and
D. Neal, miscellaneous correspondence between the company and the Gov-
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ernor, etc., and a copy of a bond. 2nd Edition, 1852. Published by the
company. [C.P., U.I.]
Map of Railroads in Illinois in 1855. Accompanies annual report of
the Illinois Central Railroad, March, 1856. Shows lines built and under
construction at that date. [C.H.]
Laws and Documents of the Illinois Central Railroad. Contains text
of charters, mortgages, etc., etc. (Incomplete set in Howard Library,
New Orleans, La.)
Letter from Richard Cobden to Sir. Joshua Walmsley, September 18,
1858. Relates to land grant and price of Illinois Central securities.
(Original in office of the President of the Illinois Central Railroad; pho-
tographic copy in possession of Stuyvesant Fish, Esq., New York.)
Fiftieth Anniversary of the Chartering of the Illinois Central Rail-
road. Collection of speeches at banquet in celebration of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the Company. Published by the company, 1901. [U.I.]
Abraham Lincoln as Attorney for the Illinois Central Railroad Com-
pany. Contains original documents relating to the McLean County Suit.
Published by the Company, 1905. [U.I.]
Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders, etc.
This pamphlet contains the conclusions and recommendations of the inves-
tigating committee. Sir. Douglas Galton and Mr. H. de Marez Oyens
made a thorough investigation of the books, property, and general condi-
tion of the company in the winter of 1876-1877. The pamphlet contains a
resume of the cost of construction, general receipts, etc., prepared by the
delegates from the books of the company. (Cf. Fisher Report of 1858
Railway Times, November 7, 1858.) (Published by the company, 1877.)
[C.P.]
Documents relating to the Lake Front Cases. Collection of court
decisions, briefs, etc., relating to the suits brought by the City of Chicago
and the State of Illinois against the Illinois Central. [C.P.]
Miscellaneous official and semi-official statements and reports, including
reports of meetings of the Board of Directors, statements of the treasurer,
proceedings of English stockholders, etc., published in Railway Times
(London), American Railway Journal, and the Chicago Daily Democrat.
PUBLICATIONS OF MISCELLANEOUS RAILROAD COMPANIES.
Report of the Dubuque and Sioux City Railway Company, May 31,
1864. Gives statements as to cost of construction, capitalization, etc. of
the company. [W.H.]
Report of the St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute R. R. (Terre Haute
and Alton), 1854, 1855. [W.H.]
Report of the Dubuque and Sioux City R. R., December 31, 1887.
Contains references to organization of the Dubuque & Sioux City and
lease of the Iowa Falls & Sioux City. [I.C.]
PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
Journal of the Senate, 1843 to 1850 (28th to 3ist Congresses).
Journal of the House of Representatives, 1843 to 1850 (28th to 3ist
Congresses).
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Congressional Globe, 1843 to 1850 (28th to 3ist Congresses). Con-
tains speeches in Congress in regard to the various grants proposed for
the Illinois Central, votes on bills, etc.
Seventh, eighth, and ninth censuses, 1850, 1860, 1870; also loth cen-
sus, volume on Agriculture; ibid., volume on Transportation; nth census,
volume on Land Transportation. Contain detailed information in regard
to crop production, population, manufacturing, and social conditions in
various counties of Illinois ; also information in regard to agricultural
conditions in 1850 to 1870; also rates of transportation on products from
West to Atlantic coast.
Transportation Routes to the Seaboard. 1st sess. 43rd Cong. Senate
Reports, serial numbers 1588 and 1589. Report of Senate committee on
rates from the West to the seaboard
; also rates on grain from various
local points to distributing centers ; also movement of crops, prices, cost
of transportation, testimony of railroad men and grain merchants, etc.
It is almost invaluable in the treatment of the traffic of the Illinois
Central.
Report on Wholesale Wages, Prices, and Transportation. Report
by N. W. Aldrich from the Senate Committee on Finance, March 3, 1893
(Senate Report No. 1394, Finance Committee, 2 sess., 52 Cong.) 4 vols.
Washington, 1894. Used for prices on wheat, corn, oats, and meat at
Chicago and New York from 1840 to 1870 inclusive.
PUBLICATIONS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
Journal of the Senate, 1830 to 1851.
Journal of the House of Representatives, 1830 to 1852. (State
Printer, Springfield, 1830 to 1852.)
Session Laws of Illinois, 1837 to 1851 inclusive. (State Printer,
Springfield, 1837 to 1851 inclusive.)
The State of Illinois vs. The Illinois Central Railroad. W. H. Stead,
Attorney General, In the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, Feb-
ruary term, A. D. 1907. (State Printer, Springfield, 111., 1907.) Con-
tains charter of the Illinois Central Railroad, all amendments thereto,
and gross earnings of the charter lines from 1870 to 1906, with other
miscellaneous information in regard to suit for back taxes.)
Report of the Illinois Railway and Warehouse Commission, 1871, 1872,
1873. Statistics of the Illinois Central and remarks of the commissioners.
(State Printer, Springfield, 1871, 1872, 1873.)
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1869. Remarks of
members and action of the Convention in regard to the Illinois Central
and the railroads of the state. (State Printer, Springfield, 1870.)
NEWSPAPERS.
Chicago Daily Democrat, January 1st, 1849 to December 3ist, 1853.
Contains numerous articles in regard to the charter and construction of
the road. [C.H.]
Illinois State Journal, January ist, 1849 to December 3ist, 1851.
Contains a large number of letters, speeches, etc., in regard to the Hoi-
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brook companies, the passage of the charter, and the character of the in-
corporators. [I.H.]
Illinois Daily State Register, January ist, 1849 to December 3ist,
1851. Supplements the Illinois State Journal. [I.H.]
Egyptian Republican, July 30, 1859 to July 6, 1861. (Centralia Daily
Sentinel Office Centralia Daily Sentinel, Centralia, 111.)
Mound City Journal, 1859 to 1861 calendar years. (Cairo Arfgus
Office of the Cairo Argus, Cairo, 111.)
Cairo Delta, April 13, 1848 to September 20, 1849. (Office of the Cairo
Trust Company, Cairo, 111.)
Cairo Sun, April 10, 1851 to April 10, 1852. (Office of the Cairo Trust
Company, Cairo, 111.)
Cairo Times, May 3ist, 1854 to April, 1859. (Office of the Cairo Trust
Company, Cairo, 111.)
Urbana Union, September 2ist, 1853 to July, 1855. (Urbana. In
possession of Mr. J. O. Cunningham, Urbana, 111.)
Belleville Advocate, September, 1849 to September, 1869. (Belleville
Public Library, Belleville, 111.)
Cairo Mirror and City Directory, 1864, 1865. (Cairo Public Library,
Cairo, 111.)
The above newspapers contain information in regard to the construc-
tion and operation of the Illinois Central, 1851 to 1870. Most of the
material is fragmentary and is of little historical value.
RAILWAY AND FINANCIAL PERIODICALS.
Hunt's Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Review, New York,
1850 to 1870. Of comparatively little value, especially after 1855.
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, New York, 1865 to 1870. Con-
tains abstracts of annual reports, miscellaneous items, editorials, statistics
of stock and bond quotations', and resume of crop and financial conditions.
Railway Times, 1850 to 1870. (London, Eng.) Contains extracts
from proceedings of the Board of Directors, etc., of the English stock-
holders, etc. Practically all letters or statements published by the com-
pany from 1851 to 1870 are contained in this series. It is the most impor-
tant single reference used for the period from 1851 to 1858. Practically
all statements are official or semi-official. (John Crerar Library, Marshall
Field Building, Chicago, 111. The set is complete.)
Railway Journal, 1854. (Philadelphia, John Crerar Library, Marshall
Field Building, Chicago, 111.) Of very little importance.
American Railway Journal, 1850 to 1860. (New York, 1850 to i860.)
Contains a great many statements, notices, advertisements, reports, edito-
rials, etc. in regard to the Illinois Central. The references to the Dubuque
and Sioux City Railway are especially important. A large number of offi-
cial statements of this company are included. (James Hill Railway Col-
lection, University of Wisconsin Library, Madison, Wis.)
Railroad Record, 1849 to 1853. (Cincinnati, 1849 to 1853.) Duplicates
material in American Railway Journal and adds some additional informa-
tion of slight importance. (Mercantile Library, St. Louis, Mo.)
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MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS.*
Illinois Monthly Magazine, complete. (Vandalia, 111., 1830.) Contains
some interesting information in regard to early plans for building a rail-
road or canal through the state. [C.H.]
Fergus Historical Series, Nos. 17 and 24. (Publications of the Chi-
cago Historical Society.) Personal reminiscences, etc.
Regan, Wilds of America. [C.H.]
J. M. Peck, Gazeteer of Illinois, 1837. [C.H.]
H. S. Tanner, Views of the Valley of the Mississippi River. [C.H.]
Publications of the Cairo City and Property Company. [I.H.]
Anon., The Past, Present and Future of the City of Cairo. [I.H.]
Henry Long, Report on the Condition and Prospect of Cairo. [I.H.]
Annual Reports, Chicago Board of Trade, 1858 to 1870. (Chicago,
1858 to 1870.) Give statistics of the city of Chicago, including receipts
over various railroads, the canal, and the lake. Of special importance in
traffic chapter. [U.I.]
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.**
W. K. Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads. (Fergus Historical Series
No. 23, Fergus Printing Co., Chicago, 1884.) Contains some valuable in-
formation, but on the whole is of little historical importance.
Davidson and Stuve, A Complete History of Illinois from 1673 to
1884. (2nd Edition, Springfield, W. H. Rokker, 1884.) Treats the Illinois
Central from a biased point of view.
J. Moses, Illinois Historical and Statistical (Fergus Print, Chicago,
1889-1892.) Gives some interesting information, but not of great historical
value.
Hinsdale, The Old Northwest. (New York, 1888 T. MacCoun.)
A. T. Andreas, History of Chicago. (A. T. Andreas, Chicago, 1884-
1886 3 v.) Fairly accurate and contains some valuable information on
the relations of the city of Chicago and the Illinois Central.
Sidney Breese, The Early History of Illinois. (E. B. Myers & Co.,
Chicago, 1884.) The Appendix contains correspondence between Sidney
Breese and Senator Douglas in regard to their respective influence in secur-
ing the federal land grant act.
Helper, The Impending Crisis of the South. (A. B. Burdick, New
'The above miscellaneous pamphlets were used in chapters I and II. Specific
references are not given to any of them in the text, but the writer's views are based
very largely on material found in these publications. They are all rare books without
dates in many cases, but they can be obtained at the libraries referred to by use of
the author and title only.
"Aside from the books and articles by Fite, Sanborn, and Ackerman, the sec-
ondary material relating to the Illinois Central is practically worthless. With slight
exception all published material relating to the history of the company is based on
Mr. W. K. Ackerman's paper on Early Illinois Railroads, read before the Illinois
Historical Society. The paper is excellent so far as it treats of events coming under
Mr. Ackerman's personal observation, but the remainder is merely a collection of
interesting incidents. Very little secondary material is absolutely inaccurate, but at
the same time, an equally small portion is of real historical value.
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York, 1860.) Treats of conditions in the South at the commencement of
the Civil War and shows the relation between the West and South. (Cf.
Olmsted's various travels in the South.)
G. Gale, Upper Mississippi. Clark & Co., Chicago, 1867.) Refers to
early history of Galena, but is of little value.
J. B. Sanborn, Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways.
(University of Wisconsin Publications, Madison, 1899.) Chapter II gives
a summary of Congressional legislation respecting the Illinois Central.
An accurate treatment of the subject.
Newton, Railway Legislation in Illinois, 1828 to 1870. (Mss. thesis in
University of Illinois Library.) Gives a summary of legislation by Illinois
on railroads and canals from 1828 to 1870. Of fair historical value.
H. W. Quaintance, The Influence of Farm Machinery on Production
and Labor. (University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., 1904.)
Fite, The Agricultural Development of the West during the Civil War.
(Quarterly Journal of Economics, XX, 250-278.) Treats of prices of
western produce in relation to freight rates and the inflation of the
currency. (Cf. Mitchell, History of the Greenbacks.)
INDEX.
Adams Express Company, granted monopoly by Illinois Central Rail-
road, 65.
Agriculture, in Illinois, the leading industry in 1850, 12; retarded by lack
of good transportation, 13; in 18/0, 90; improvements in, 90; profits
from, 1861 to 1870, 90, 92; growth, 1850 to 1870, 92 f., 138, 159;
influence on growth of Illinois Central Railroad, 90-92, 95, 138, 160;
decline in Atlantic states, 76.
Arthur, Mr., general superintendent of Illinois Central Railroad, 64.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 83, 162.
Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad, see Ohio and Mississippi
Railroad.
Belleville, Southern Illinois and Du Quoin Railroad, traffic alliance with
Illinois Central Railroad, 69.
Benton Standard, defends Great Western Company, 36.
Bissell, Colonel, aids in preparing measure favoring eastern promoters,
38; solicitor of Illinois Central Company, 49; presents petition of
Illinois Central Company to Chicago council for terminal facilities,
49 f.
Bloomington, manufacturing center, 108.
Breese, Sydney, urges building of Illinois Central Railrooad, 17; urges
grant of pre-emption rights to a central Illinois railroad, 23, 24, 26;
ends term as senator, 28; defends Great Western Company, 36;
speaker of House, 37.
C. C. C. & St. Louis Railroad, see Terre Haute, Alton and St. Louis
Railroad.
Cairo, specified point on route of proposed railroad, 43, 75 and note;
receipts of grain at, 98-100 and notes, (tables).
Cairo City and Canal Company, 20, 26, 34; incorporated as Great Western
Company, 21 ; fights incorporation of rival company, 36 f .
Cairo Short Line, see Belleville, Southern Illinois and Du Quoin Railroad.
Cairo Times, defends Great Western Company, 36.
Champaign county, growth of agriculture from 1850 to 1870, 93.
Chicago,
specified point on route of proposed railroad, 43, 74; public opinion
divided on grant of lake front franchise, 51 ; importance of lake
front franchise grant, 54 f; trade connection with Iowa, 70; as
market, 81, 92; influence of Illinois Central Railroad on rise of,
95; receipts, grain, 96; live stock, 103; lumber, 105 f; packing
center, 102; as industrial city, 108; effect of extension of eastern
railroads on, 115.
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city council of, attitude towards Illinois Central Railroad, 50; dis-
putes over lake front right of way, 51 ; votes franchise to Illinois
Central Railroad, 51; votes franchise over mayor's veto, 52;
reconsiders and votes new franchise, 52; reenacts ordinance of
first franchise, 54; opposes legislative grant to railroads of sub-
merged land along lake front, 72.
Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, connection with Illinois Central
Railroad, 68, 113; shipment of grain on, 97; of live stock, 102.
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, granted right to submerged
land along lake front, 71 f. ; connection with Illinois Central Railroad,
95, 113; shipment of grain on, 97; of live stock, 102 f.
Chicago, Fulton and Iowa Railroad, see Chicago and Northwestern Rail-
road.
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad, see Mineral Point Railroad.
Civil War, effect on Illinois Central Railroad, 66 f., 92, 112 f., 138, 151;
effect on southern trade route, 75, 76 n., 77 f., 87 n.
Coal, mining of, 14, 106 f. ; shipment on Illinois Central Railroad, 106 f. ;
market, 107.
Cobden, Richard, his estimate of land grant, 117, 129 n.
Coles, Edward, governor, 17.
Corn, chief farm product of Illinois, 92; shipments on Illinois Central
and other railroads, compared, 95, 97 ; receipts at Chicago and Cairo,
compared, 99 f. and notes (tables) ; effect of price on live stock
industry, 101 ; payment on railroad land, 137.
Crimean War, effect on Illinois Central Railroad, 123.
Crops, condition in Illinois, 1856 to 1870, 96.
Decatur, manufacturing center, 108; junction of Wabash and Illinois Cen-
tral railroads, 113.
Denny, representative, introduces resolution concerning charter of Great
Western Railroad, 37 n.
Douglas, Stephen A., advocates government assistance for Illinois rail-
road by direct grant of land to the state, 24; introduces a bill for
this purpose, 25; resorts to log-rolling to secure adoption of. his land
grants, 29; urges acceptance of Great Western release, 37 n.
Dubuque, specified point on route of proposed railroad, 43, 74.
Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad, traffic alliance with Illinois Central
Railroad, 70; lease by Illinois Central Railroad, 70, 96; leases Iowa
Falls and Sioux City Railroad, 71.
Economic development, retarded by lack of means of internal transpor-
tation before 1850, n, 12.
England, in American grain trade, 77 and note; bonds of Illinois Central
sold in, 121 f . ; effect of Crimean War on money market in, 123 ; iron
for Illinois Central Railroad purchased in, 131.
Erie Canal, completed, 80; deepened, 82; freight rates on, 84.
Erie Railroad, 83.
Europe, in American grain trade, 77.
Freight traffic, competition between all-rail and water routes outside Illi-
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nois, 83-85; rates outside Illinois, 84-86; rates in Illinois, 87, 147;
earnings from, 146; light, 149.
French, Augustus C., governor, recommends acceptance of plan of east-
ern memorialists concerning railroad, 38; ex officio director of Illinois
Central Railroad, 42.
Fruit raising, in Illinois, 104.
Fuel, 107.
Galena, specified point on route of Illinois Central Railroad, 43; opposi-
tion to granting franchise to Illinois Central Railroad, 56, 57 n. ;
manufacturing center, 108.
Galena and Chicago Union Railroad, 10; traffic alliance with Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad, 68, 95 ; grain shipment on, 99 n.
Grain, production in United States, 1850 to 1870, 79 n. (table) ; increase
in production in Illinois, 92 ff. ; price of, 92 ; payment on land in, 137.
Granger movement, rise of, 112 n.
Great Lakes, as eastern trade route, 80, 81 ; improvement of harbors of,
83 ; freight rate on, 84.
Great Western Railroad (Wabash), assisted by Illinois Central Railroad,
68; traffic alliance with, 96; competition with, 162.
Great Western Railway Company, 19 f., 34; charter of, 20 f. ; purchases
internal improvement works of the state, 21 ; failure of, 22 ; charter
repealed, 22 ; reincorporated, 27 ; release accepted by House, refused
by Senate, 37.
Gridley, Ashael, introduces in senate bill to incorporate Illinois Central
Railroad, 38.
Gurnee, Walter, mayor, 51 ; vetoes lake front franchise of Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad, 52 f . ; signs second franchise, 53.
Holbrook, Darius B., incorporator of Central Railroad Company, 17; of
Cairo City and Canal Company, 20.
Illinois, economic development retarded by lack of good transportation
before 1850, II f., 79 f . ; conditions in 1850, 9 ff., 159; importance of
Illinois Central Railroad in development of, 56, 75, 79 f., 115, 159 f . ;
conditions from 1857 to 1859, 66, 137; early trade of, 74; grain pro-
duction in, 79 and note; as natural trade center, 80 and note; immi-
gration into, 1830 to 1850, 12; 1850 to 1870, 88 f. ; growth of agriculture,
1850 to 1870, 92-93 (table), 138, 160; conditions in 1870, 90, 115, 159;
live stock industry in, 100-102; fruit raising in, 104; lumber supply
in, 105, 107; coal mining in, 106 f . ; manufactures in, 108; price of
land in, 117; credit of, 159; taxes, 159.
Illinois Central Railroad, building by state urged in 1835, 17; incorpo-
rated, 1836, 17; first charter, 18; assistance to urged in Congress,
24-26; grant of public lands to, 31; various routes suggested, 35;
bill for incorporation passed, 38; terms of charter of, 39; difficulties
in construction of, 40, 46 f., 60; early financial support of, 40, 42;
formal organization of company, 42 f . ; stockholders, English and
Dutch, 42 n., 121 f., 129, 132, 159 n.; commencement of construction
work on, 43, 47 f. ; route of preliminary survey, 43; sectional rivalry
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over route, 43 f. ; conditions determining selection of route, 45 ; con-
tracts for construction of, 46 ff., 125; method of construction of,
47 n. ; controversy at Chicago over terminal facilities of, 48 ff. ; allied
with Michigan Central Railroad to secure entrance to Chicago, 49;
opposition in Chicago to, 50; proposed route of entrance to Chicago,
50 f . ; provisions of lake front right of way franchise, 51, 54; board
of directors refuses second lake front franchise, 52; construction on
Lake Calumet-Chicago division, 52 f . ; first completed section of, 53 ;
dispute with Southern Michigan Railroad over crossing, 53 and note ;
importance of lake front franchise to, 54; construction work on lake
front route, 55 f. ; St. Charles Air Line, branch, 56; difficulties in
fulfilling construction contracts, 58 f . ; Illinois Central Company en-
gages directly in construction work of, 59; engineering problems in
construction of, 60; table of dates of completion of construction work
by divisions, 61 n. ; formal opening of, 61 ; final completion of, 61 f.
character of construction wor kand equipment, 62 f., 131 f., 151 f.
problems in 1857, 64, 66, 131 f. ; organization of operating department
64; transfer of offices of officials from New York to Illinois, 64 f.
New York, official meeting place of board of directors, 42, 64 f.
service of, 65 ; relation to Post Office Department, 65 ; grants mo-
nopoly to Adams Express Company, 65; prosperity of, in 1861, 66;
effect of Civil War on, 66 f., 92, 113, 138, 151, 162; prosperity of,
1866 to 1870, 67, 146; extensions and traffic alliances, 67 ff., 95 f., 155;
lease of Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad, 70 f . ; granted right to
submerged land along lake front, 71 f. ; decision of courts on this
'
grant, adverse, 72; physical development of, 72 f., 133-135; obstacles
to development of, 73 ; part of large railroad project, 74 f . ; place in
Mississippi valley trade route, 75, 76 n., 91, 114, 162; character of
country traversed by, 79, 92; extent of system, 80 and note; relation
to economic development of Illinois, 56, 90-92, 95, 104 f., 115; influ-
ence on rise of Chicago, 95, 114; comparative value to northern and
southern Illinois, 95 ; value to government during the Civil War,
158; nature of traffic on, 90 f., 96 f., 100-109; effect of high price of
corn on, 102 f. ; shipment of grain on, 96 f., 106; of live stock, 100-
103; of garden and dairy products, 104; lumber, 105 f . ; of coal,
106 f.
;
of factory products, 108 f. ; increase in general traffic on,
1855 to 1870, 108-112 (table, no) ; ratio of local to through traffic on,
no; comparison of northbound and southbound traffic on, 105 f.,
in; immigrant use of, 112; passenger business, 112 f.; railroad con-
nections with east and west points, 113; rivals of, 114 f., 162; factors
in success of, 114; tariff arrangements of, 65 f., 87 f., 90; fiscal
policy proposed by Schuyler, 117 f . ; fiscal policy, as carried out, 57,
58 n., 64, 72, 119, 124-128, 130, 132, 140-144, 153 n., 155, 161 f. ; assets
of, 120-127, 135 and note, 153 n., 156, 161 f. ; as land owner, 9, 135-
140, 153 n. ; stocks of, 42, 57, 119 f., 122 f., 128 f., 135 n., 144 f.,
154. 156; bonds of, 59, 120-125; 128, 136, 140 f., 143; liabilities of,
120-127, 156; cost of, 46, 59, 62, 116, 118 f., 124 f., 131-133, 156;
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expenditures of, 122, 124, 130 f., 133 and note, 141, 147 ff., 156;
assessments, 120, 122, 126, 128 f ., 135, 143 f. ; earnings, 91 n., 103,
109, 126, 134 f., 142, 146 and note, 152 f., 155; dividends, 67, 129 f.,
135, 142, 144, 153 ff. ; financial condition, 1853 to 1857, 123-128, 131 f. ;
in 1858, 128 f. ; traffic development, 1857 to 1870, 133; situation in
1870, isolation, 162 f.
Illinois and Michigan Canal, 9; southern terminus specified point on
Illinois Central Railroad, 43; shipment of grain on, 97.
Immigration, into Illinois 1830 to 1850, 12; 1850 to 1870, 80 n., 88 f. ; effect
of increase in Atlantic states, 76; relation of Illinois Central Railroad
to, 112.
Industries, development in Atlantic states, 76; condition in Illinois, 108.
Internal improvements, 10; need of, n; Act of 1837, i&, n6; failure of,
19.
Iowa, railroad development in, 70; settlement of, 88; wheat production
in, 96; expenditures on railroads leased by Illinois Central Railroad
in, 134 n., 152 f.
Iowa Falls and Sioux City Railroad, construction of, 71.
Iroquois county, growth of agriculture, 1850 to 1870, 93.
Jenkins, A. M., proposes a survey for a central railroad, 17.
Labor, price of, farm, 59, 92; railroad, 60, 124, 131, 151.
Lake Front Case, 71 f.
Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad, conflict with Michigan
Central Railroad, 48 f. ; hostility to Illinois Central Railroad, 50;
completed, 83.
Land grant, urged for building a central Illinois railroad, 17 ff., 74;
urged by Breese, 22 f . ; by Senator Douglas, 24 ff. ; bill passed, 31,
74; importance to Illinois Central Railroad, 32, 117, 157, 160; differ-
ent plans for utilizing, 33 ff. ; sale of land from, 90, 135 ff., 139 and
note, 140; Cobden's estimate of, 117, 129 n. ; financial value of, 117,
136 ff. ; mortgage on, 125, 136; restraint on, 143; text of act, 165 ff.
Lead, mining in 1850, 14.
Legislature of Illinois, action in Lake Front Case, 71 f.
Live stock, character of industry in Illinois, 13, 101 ff. ; price of, 92;
shipment of, 91, 100 f.
Livingstone county, growth of agriculture from 1850 to 1870, 93.
Logansport, Peoria and Burlington Railroad, traffic alliance with Illinois
Central Railroad, 69; see Peoria and Oquaka Railroad.
Lumber, 105.
Mail, federal provision for transportation on Illinois Central Railroad, 65.
Manufactures, slight development before 1850, 14 f. ; 1860 to 1870, 108.
Markets, for early Illinois products, u, 15; southern, 74, 76 n., 77;
effect of Civil War on, 91, 160; eastern, 76, 79, 90, 160 f. ; European,
77 and note, 79, 160.
Mason, Roswell B., engineer in chief of construction work of Illinois
Central Railroad, 43; survey of route, 44; presents petition for en-
trance of railroad into Chicago, 50; general superintendent, 64;
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resignation, 64; estimate of cost of Illinois Central Railroad, 118 f.
McClellan, G. B., general superintendent of Illinois Central Railroad, 64.
Memorial, plan of, 37 ; favored by governor and legislature, 38 ; fiscal
basis of, 116; text of, 167 f.
Michigan Central Railroad, conflict with Lake Shore and Michigan South-
ern Railroad, 48 f . ; allied with Illinois Central to secure entrance to
Chicago, 49; uses Illinois Central track, 53; granted right to sub-
merged land along lake front, 71 f.
Milwaukee, trade connection with Iowa, 70.
Mineral Point Railroad, assisted by Illinois Central Railroad, 68.
Mining, handicapped by high cost, 14, 106.
Mississippi Central Railroad, part of Mississippi valley trade route, 75.
Mississippi River, part of Mississippi valley trade route, 75, 76 n. ; freight
rate on, 85 f.
Mississippi valley, development of trade route of, 75 ; effect of Civil War
on trade route, 67, 75 ff., 87 n., 98; relation to Illinois Central Rail-
road, 160, 162.
Mobile, specified point on Mississippi valley railroad, 74.
Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 29; land grant to, 75; part of Mississippi val-
ley trade route, 75 ; effect of Civil War on, 87.
Morrill act of 1861, effect on industries, 76.
Morris, Gouverneur, member of board of directors of Illinois Central
Railroad, 40; bankrupt, 123.
Morrison, J. L. D., introduces substitute bill to incorporate Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad, 38.
Neal, David A., vice president of Illinois Central Railroad, agent to place
loan in Europe, 120.
New Orleans, shipping port of Illinois products, 74; decline, 78; rivalry
with New York, 85 ff.
New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern Railroad, part of Mississippi
valley trade route. 75 ; effect of Civil War on, 87 n.
New York Central and Hudson River Railroad, competition with Penn-
sylvania Central Railroad, 83; freight rates on, 85; extension of, 162.
New York City, meeting place of charter company of Illinois Central
Railroad, 42; official meeting place of board of directors, 64 f. ; ship-
ping port, 78; rivalry with New Orleans, 85 ff.
Northern Cross Railroad, 23.
Oats, Illinois staple, 93 f. ; shipment, 97; receipts at Chicago and Cairo,
compared, 99 f. and notes (tables).
Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, relation to Illinois Central Railroad, 68,
96, 113, 155; completed, 1856, 83; sale of bonds, 123.
Osborn, William H., dominant figure in history of Illinois Central Rail-
road, 1853 to 1882, 41; control of financial affairs of, 124; financial
policy during panic of 1857, 127 f . ; English investors' criticism of,
128 n.
Packing industry, 1856 to 1870, 100.
465] INDEX 181
Palmer, John M., governor, vetoes bill granting to railroads right to
submerged land on lake front, 72.
Panic, of 1857, 66, 127, 136 f., 146; of Wall street in 1853, 123.
Pennsylvania Central Railroad, completion to Chicago, 83 ; effect of
extension on Illinois Central Railroad, 162; see Logansport, Peoria,
and Burlington Railroad.
Peoria and Oquaka Railroad, assisted by Illinois Central Railroad, 96,
155 ; see Logansport, Peoria, and Burlington Railroad.
Population, increase in East, 76 ; in Europe, 77 ; in upper Mississippi
valley, 78, 88; effect of increase on agriculture, 78 f . ; distribution in
the United States, 1850, 1870, 79 (table) ; in Illinois, 1870, 89 (table),
159.
Promoters, eastern, present memorial of proposed railroad, 37.
Railroad materials, purchase and transporttation of, 60; cost of, 151;
quality of, 151 n.
Railroads, early, 10; inadequate service before 1850, 10; need of, 9 ff. ;
failure of efforts to build in Illinois, 1837 to 1845, 22; eastern, 83,
114, 162 f. ; southern, 75, 87 n., 98; Illinois, 81 and note, 95 ff., 102,
in, 113; see individual railroads.
Rails, cost of, 59 n., 133 n. ; quality of, 62, 72, 151 n.
Rantoul, Robert, presents memorial concerning proposed railroad in Illi-
nois, 37; aids in preparing measure favoring eastern promoters, 38;
member of board of directors of Illinois Central Railroad, 40; sketch
of public life, 41 ; his estimate basis of fiscal program of memorial-
ists, 116, 118.
Roads, poor condition of, early, 10.
St. Louis, place in Illinois Central system, 80, 81, 85 f . ; as market, 80.
St. Louis, Alton and Chicago Railroad, rival of Illinois Central Rail-
road, 69.
Schuyler, Robert, member of board of directors of Illinois Central Rail-
road, 40; sketch of public life, 41; president of board of directors
of Illinois Central Railroad, 42; report to board of directors on
fiscal plan of Illinois Central Railroad, 117 f.
Sheep raising, influenced by price of cotton, 101.
South, the, relation of to Illinois Central Railroad, 67, 86, 91.
Southern Michigan Railroad, see Lake Shore and Michigan Central
Railroad.
Springfield and Meredosia Railroad, 10.
Tariff, early arrangement on Illinois Central Railroad, 65 f . ; effect of
Civil War on, 67, 112, 147; eastern freight, 83 ff . ; southern freight,
85 f. ; ocean freight, 86 (table) ; regularized on Illinois Central Rail-
road, 91; low, impracticable, 104; on lumber, 105; on coal, 106;
passenger, 113, 147.
Terre Haute, Alton and St. Louis Railroad, assisted by Illinois Central
Railroad, 68; traffic alliance with Illinois Central Railroad, 69, 96,
in; shipment of live stock on, 102.
Trade, internal before 1850, n, 13, 15; retarded by lack of transporta-
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tion, 15, 16, 74; effect of eastern industrial development on, 76;
increased European, 77.
Trade routes, effect of Civil War on, 67, 75 ff., 87 n., 98; effect of indus-
trial development on, 75 ; natural, of Illinois, 80 ; comparison of
advantages of rival, 85 f . ; part played by Illinois Central Railroad
in development of, 160, 162.
Transportation, water, improvements in, 82 f . ; factors in . cheapening
cost of, 82 f. ; rail, eastern development, 83 f., 114, 160, 162; com-
petition between all-rail and water for Illinois exports, 83 ff. ; ocean,
rates, 86 (table); local, rates, 87 f., 147; rail, southern develop-
ment, 98.
Wabash Railroad, see Great Western Railroad.
Walker, Robert J., agent to place loan for Illinois Central Railroad in
Europe, 121.
Waterways, importance to Illinois trade, 80; relation to Illinois Central
Railroad, 81 ; improvement of, 82.
West Indies, in American grain trade, 77 n.
Wheat, Illinois staple, 93 f . ; rise in price of, 92 ; shipment on railroads,
95 f . ; Iowa staple, 96 ; receipts at Cairo, 98 f .
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IX LAXGUAGE AXD
LITERATURE
The Studies in Language and Literature are designed to include
monographs in general linguistics and comparative literature ; the classical
languages and Sanskrit ; the Romance languages ; and English, the Scan-
dinavian, and other Germanic languages. The title of the series will be
so construed as to admit the publication of such researches in the history
of culture as may throw light upon the processes of language and the
interpretation of literature. It is a serial published quarterly, for which
the annual subscription price is three dollars.
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George T. Flora. $1.25.
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